
Glass 3 ^"" / 3 / 



Functional Psychology 



NATHAN A. HARVEY 

STATE NORMAL 'college 
yPSlLANTI, MICHIGAN 



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Copyright 1911 
NATHAN A. HARVEY 



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I take it for granted that a teacher of psychology 
wants to give his students more than a mere classifica- 
tion of mental states, and he wants to show how the 
laws of mental life can be understood as part of the na- 
tural laws governing a highly developed organic being. 
What does he answer to the student's question in what 
manner the nervous system is modified when instincts 
are modified into habit? Unless he can offer the student 
a picture, however hypothetical, of the laws of nervous 
activity, he is obliged to offer mythological entities mak- 
ing and breaking connections at will. * * * We can- 
not explain to the student how our actions are determ- 
ined by our mental life without a detailed picture of 
nervous activities. Since experimental physiology at 
present does not offer such a picture, at least not one 
that serves the purpose of the psychologist, we have to 
develop one ourselves. We cannot wait for physiological 
discoveries which may never be made. 

Max Meyer, The Nervous Correlate of Attention, Psychological 
Review, Vol. 15, 1908, p. 360. 



PREFACE 

The problem of elementary psychology lies not in the 
discovery of new facts, nor in the detailed description of 
mental processes ; but in the recognition of the mental 
processes that the student has been experiencing all his 
life, their orderly interpretation, and the perception of 
the relations that they hold to each other. Like the 
man who after years of study of literature was surprised 
to find that he had been talking prose all his life, so the 
student of psychology must awaken to the fact, even 
though it be with surprise, that he has been studying 
psychology, or gathering data for it, throughout all the 
years of his existence. Unless the student arrives at 
such a conclusion, the teaching cannot be commended. 

The problem of elementary psychology is to lead the 
student to a recognition of what his own mental experi- 
ences are, and to a knowledge of their relations to each 
other. Incidentally this involves the acquisition of a 
vocabulary of the subject and a phraseology adapted to 
express the relations. 

The difficulties of teaching elementary psychology 
are multiplied by the indefiniteness of the language em- 
ployed and the lack of uniformity in the conclusions 
reached by the masters of the subject. The facts are the 
same for all students, elementary or advanced; but not 
only have we such differences as are expressed by the 
dualist and the monist, but in almost every department 
of the subject are upheld with equal vigor such divergent 
propositions as that will and feelings are identical, will 
and action, will and attention, and that there is no such 
phenomenon as the will in the ordinary sense of the term. 

But every student's experience is appealing to him 
and demanding explanation. Some explanation of his 
own life must be made, either adequate or inadequate, 
true or false. 

The following pages contain a method which is an 
attempt to enable a student to understand and interpret 



his experience, and to recognize the relations of his 
mental processes to each other. Starting- with the doc- 
trine of parallelism, which will be tolerated at least by 
all psychologists, the figure of a nervous current, which 
is a familiar one in psychology, is employed to make 
clear psychological relations. 

The device of recognizing in the different elements of 
a current the homologues of the elements of a mental 
psychon, enables us to make a clear, definite and thor- 
oughly understandable interpretation of the relations of 
mental processes to each other. We may or may not be- 
lieve that the hypothesis which the conception of a 
psychon involves is true ; we may or may not believe that 
it is demonstrable; but no proposition involved in its 
elaboration can be more startlingly divergent from our 
common experience than are many propositions advanced 
by an equally large number of eminent psychologists. 

The device of the psychological concomitants of a 
nervous current corresponds closely to that of the physi- 
cist who represents forces by lines, or to that of the 
chemist who pictures the molecular constitution of sub- 
stances by diagrams. No one supposes that the line is a 
force, nor that the diagrammatic representation of a 
molecule indicates anything like the molecule itself. But 
physics and chemistry have been transformed by the use 
of these devices, and it would be impossible to teach or 
to understand physical and chemical processes without 
them. For identical reasons the device of a psychon is 
developed in this book, and it is believed that equally 
satisfactory results will follow. There is also the addi- 
tional advantage in the conception of the psychon, that 
the truth of the several propositions involved in it, if not 
demonstrable, is to say the least, within the bounds of 
possibility. 



CHAPTER I 

THE CHRONOSCOPE. 

We know that nervous substance resists the incoming of 
stimulation. The resistance that it offers can be overcome only by 
stimuli of a certain strength. — Titchener, Outlines of Psychology, 
p. 96. 

The nervous substance of the central organs offers a greater 
resistance to the progress of a nerve commotion than is offered by 
the nerves. — Ladd, Outlines of Physiological Psychology, p. 174. 

We have then in the results of this series of experiments a 
confirmation of the inference already suggested by the long dura- 
tion of reflex time ; that the central elements offer incomparably 
more resistance than the nerve fibers to the progress of an excita- 
tion. — Wundt, Physiological Psychology, p. 88. 

Reaction to light lasts about 80 sigma longer than the reaction 
to sound and pressure. Sensorial reaction lasts about one-tenth 
of a second longer than the muscular. — Kulpe, Psychology, p. 407. 

It is certain that cells are more inert than fibers, and that rapid 
vibrations in the latter can arouse only relatively simple states or 
processes in the former. — James, Psychology, Vol. I, p. 156. 

All consciousness seems to depend upon a certain slowness of 
the processes in the cortical cells. — James, Psychology, Vol. JI,p. 104. 

The more these functions (intelligence) assume a psychical 
aspect, so much the longer is the duration of the impulse in the 
nervous system. — Moral, Physiology of the Nervous System, p. 277. 

The intensity of consciousness as a neural function depends 
upon the intensity of the decomposition of the brain tissue. And 
it is inversely as the ease and rapidity with which the inner work 
of one nerve element is transmitted to another. — Ladd, Outlines of 
Physiological Psychology, p. 417. 

Reaction Time. — Reaction time is the interval that 
elapses between the perception of a signal and a muscular 
contraction in response. It is the interval required for an 
impulse to be transmitted from the organ in which it is 
established to the muscle whose contraction constitutes 
the response. It is quite impossible to understand some 
of the phenomena of mental life without a knowledge of 
the facts of reaction time. 

The Chronoscope. — Reaction time is measured by an 
instrument called a chronoscope. There are several 



The Chronoscope 9 

forms of this instrument, but the one described here is 
perhaps the most easily understood. It consists essen- 
tially of a pendulum that is long enough and properly 




Fig. 1 — Chronoscope. 

A, Pendulum; B, Pendulum release key; C, Indicator; D, Indicator control 
mechanism; E, Scale. 

weighted to swing from one end of its arc to the other in 
half a second. It is supported on steel bearings like knife 
edges such as are employed in making delicate chemical 
balances. 



The Pendulum. — When the pendulum is drawn to 
one end of its arc, a sharp edge at the bottom of the pen- 
dulum catches in one of a row of notches in the upper 
side of a ratchet. The ratchet is held in the proper posi- 
tion to receive the pendulum edge by a spring. When 
the ratchet is pushed or pulled down, it releases the pen- 
dulum and permits it to begin its swing. 



10 Functional Psychology 

The Pendulum Release. — The ratchet may be pulled 
down and the pendulum released in either one of two 
ways: — first, the distal end of the ratchet projects beyond 
the axis that supports it and terminates in a key which 
may be lifted up by the hand, thus depressing the end 
of the ratchet bar that holds the pendulum, and so re- 
leasing it. Second, it may be released by sending a cur- 
rent of electricity through two coils of wire, which with 
their soft iron cores constitute an electro-magnet, that 
attracts downward a piece of soft iron attached to the 
ratchet bar. When the electro-magnet is energized by 
sending a current of electricity through it, the pendulum 
is released. When the current is broken, the ratchet is 
thrown back into place by a spring on its under side. 
When the ratchet is thrown up into its original position, 
the swing of the pendulum back to the end of its arc 
from which it started carries the lower edge of the pen- 
dulum up into one of the notches of the ratchet and holds 
it there until again released. The releasing of the pen- 
dulum by closing a ke)?- which makes the circuit, sending 
thereby a current of electricity through the coils of wire 
is the most satisfactory method. 

The Indicator. — The pendulum is supported upon a 
pillar that rises from a heavy steel bed plate. The pen- 
dulum swings on an axis which carries on its front end a 
circular soft iron plate furnished with a slender indicator 
arm, nearly as long as the pendulum. The circular plate 
is not fastened rigidly to the axis, but may move upon it, 
and the indicator which it carries moves with the pendu- 
lum in its swing until it is stopped by the attraction of 
the circular plate to an electro-magnet in front of which 
it swings. The circular plate that carries the indicator 
moves in front of the two poles of an electro-magnet at- 
tached to the pillar which supports the pendulum. When 
the electro-magnet is energized by a current of electricity 
through its two coils, the magnet attracts the circular 



The Chronoscope 11 

plate to its poles and holds it fast, thus stoppin^g the indi- 
cator. When the current is broken, and the coils are de- 
magnetized, a spring pushes the circular plate away from 
the poles and allows the indicator to continue its swing 
with the pendulum. 

The Scale. — The indicator swings over an aluminum 
scale near the bed plate of the instrument, which is grad- 
uated into five hundred degrees. The pendulum swings 
from one side of the arc to the other in half a second, so 
that the indicator passes over the five hundred degrees 
of the scale in the same length of time, and consequently 
passes over one degree in one thousandth of a second. 

Variation in Degrees. — The pendulum starts from a 
state of rest and comes to rest again at the extremity of 
its swing. In its course it moves with a constantly ac- 
celerated motion through the first half of its arc, then 
with a constantly retarded motion through the second 
half. It is swinging slowest near the extremities of the 
arc, and moving most rapidly near the middle of its 
swing. It is evident then, that if each degree is to be 
passed over in the same length of time, those degrees 
near the middle of the arc must be longer than those 
near the extremities. In fact, on the scale, the actual 
gradations of the first and fifth parts are into five degree 
spaces instead of into single degrees. 

We have thus indicated the principal parts of the 
chronoscope, which are the pendulum, the method of 
pendulum release, the indicator, the indicator control 
mechanism, and the graduated scale. Other parts merely 
hold these essential mechanisms in proper position. 
Operation of the Chronoscope. — In order to operate the 
chronoscope, the person whose reaction time is to be 
measured, is seated at a table with one hand upon a key 
which when pressed will close a circuit through the 
electro-magnet that stops the indicator. A single cell of 
a good dry battery will furnish current enough for this 



12 Functional Psychology 

magnet. The signal is given in various ways depending 
upon the sense that is to be measured. 

Reaction to Sight.^ — If we are to measure the reaction 
to the sense of sight, the person to be measured is seated 
behind a screen in which is a hole about an inch in diam- 
eter, on a level with the eyes. A light wooden lever is 
attached to the release key of the chronoscope, and the 
distal end of the lever is inserted in a strip of cardboard 
in front of the screen. The strip of cardboard is of just 
such a length that the upper edge of it comes to the lower 
edge of the hole in the screen. When the distal end of 
the release key is lifted, either by energizing the electro- 
magnet, or by the finger of the operator, the same move- 
ment that releases the pendulum throws the strip of 
cardboard up in front of the hole. The person perceiv- 
ing this as a signal, presses the indicator key, thus stop- 
ping the indicator. The interval between the appearance 
of the signal and the motor response in pressing the key 
is then read off the indicator scale in thousandths of a 
second. 

Reaction to Hearing. — The signal for hearing is given 
by the click of a telegraph key which is produced by the 
same current that releases the pendulum. In order that 
the person may react to hearing and not to sight, a screen 
is interposed between the person who reacts and the 
chronoscope. 

Reaction to Touch. — The signal for touch is given by 
pressing one hand of the reactor with a key which closes 
the circuit, thus releasing the pendulum, while the person 
reacts with the other hand. The reaction time is the in- 
terval between the release of the pendulum coincident 
with the starting of the touch impulse in the skin of one 
hand, and the closing of the indicator key with the other. 

Reaction Time Without a Chronoscope. — The reac- 
tion to the sense of touch may be measured quite accur- 



The Chronoscope 13 

ately for the average of a large class without a chrono- 
scope. Let all the persons in a class stand in such a way 
that they may form a complete circuit by joining hands. 
The first person in the circuit lets fall a pendulum of 
such a length that it beats seconds while at the same time 
he presses the hand of the person next to him. That 
person, when he perceives the pressure, presses the hand 
of the person next to him, and the pressure is thus trans- 
mitted through all the persons in the circuit. The last 
person in the circuit, when he feels the pressure, stops 
the pendulum. The number of seconds, divided by the 
number of persons will indicate the average reaction time 
for the whole class. 

Favorable Conditions. — In order to make accurate 
measurements of reaction time, there should be as little 
distracting circumstances as possible. The presence of 
other persons in the room is very likely to modify the 
time measurement. Noises are nearly certain to influence 
the reaction. It is better to place the signal and the re- 
acting key in a room where there is no other person than 
the one reacting. 

Analysis of Reaction Time. — Reaction time is capable 
of being analyzed into several parts. The time required 
for the signal to establish a nervous impulse, the trans- 
mission along the afferent nerve, the time required for 
the impulse to traverse the sensory center, the transmis- 
sion from the sensory center to the motor center, the 
transmission through the motor center, the transmission 
along the efferent nerve, the time of muscular contrac- 
tion, and the time for the electric current to traverse the 
wire to the indicator. However, all these times are so 
short, except the transmission along the nerve and 
through the two brain centers that there is likely to be a 
greater error produced by trying to take them into ac- 
count than if they were neglected. In order to obviate 



14 Functional Psychology 

errors to as great an extent as possible, it is usual to 
make several measurements and take an average. 

The Fact of Reaction Time. — From measurements of 
reaction time, several important conclusions have been 
obtained. The first important fact is that there is a 
measurable reaction time. Scarcely more than sixty years 
ago, the great physiologist, Johannes Miiller, asserted 
that it w^ould be forever impossible to measure the time 
of the transmission of an impulse, and v^ithin five years 
afterward it was measured. 

Length of the Interval. — The reaction time varies 
around 200 sigma. A sigma, represented by the Greek 
letter of that name, is the unit for small intervals of 
time, and is the one thousandth of a second. 

Variation in Different Persons. — The reaction time 
varies for different persons in the same sense. With 
some persons the reaction time for the sense of sight 
may be as small as 150 sigma, while with others it may 
be as great as 250 sigma. 

Variation in the Same Person. — The reaction time 
varies for the same person in different senses. Some 
persons have a reaction time of 150 sigma for hearing or 
touch, while that for sight may be 200 sigma or more. 
In general, those persons who have a noticeably short 
time for sight and longer time for hearing are called eye 
minded individuals. They are likely to learn better 
through the eye, and to make accurate judgments of size 
and shape, and will be likely to have pronounced ability 
in drawing. Those in whom the reaction for hearing is 
decidedly the shorter, are likely to learn better by hear- 
ing, to be good oral readers, to have more or less ability 
in musical subjects. However, this difference in reaction 
time is not a positive indication of ability in any one of 
these artistic directions. 



The Chronoscope 15 

Effect of Practice. — Practice diminishes reaction time. 
This is a fundamental fact of psychology which it is nec- 
essary to recognize. We may not be able to understand 
the process by which the reaction time is decreased, but 
it is necessary for us to realize that the fact occurs. 
When a nervous impulse passes through a brain center, 
or nervous arc, for the first time, it encounters resistance. 
The second time it passes through, it encounters less 
resistance, apparently in consequence of some modifica- 
tion of the nerve cells of the arc itself. This shortening 
of reaction time is the fact which lies at the basis of the 
formation of habit. No amount of practice, however, can 
shorten reaction time below about one-tenth of a second. 

Effect of Attention. — Attention modifies reaction 
time. This is the source of the greatest variations that 
are encountered. Any circumstance that distracts atten- 
tion increases reaction time. The precautions that it is 
necessary to take in order to get a true test of reaction 
time are precautions against a distraction of attention. 
The variations that occur in successive reactions are sure 
to have their origin in the variations of attention, and 
this fact is one of the phenomena that must be considered 
in any theory of the nature of attention. 

Motor and Sensory Reaction. — Motor reaction is 
shorter than sensory. By motor reaction we mean that 
which follows when the attention is fixed upon the hand 
and muscle with which the movement is made. By 
sensory reaction v/e mean that which follows when the 
attention is fixed upon the signal, or stimulus. In every 
case it is found that the hand can move more quickly 
after the signal is given, if the idea of the movement, in- 
stead of the idea of the signal, is kept in mind. 

Reaction Time in Children. — The reaction time of 
children is longer than that of grown-up persons. This 
must be taken as a general fact. It is not true that the 



16 Functional Psychology 

reaction time of every g^rown-up person is shorter than 
that of every child, but that the average reaction time of 
a thousand grown-up persons will be shorter than that of 
a thousand children. Also, it means that if the reaction 
time of a child is measured, it will be longer than the 
reaction time of that same child after he has grown up. 

Reaction Time in Educated Persons. — The reaction 
time of educated persons is shorter than that of unedu- 
cated persons. In this case also it must be understood 
that there are many individual exceptions, and that it is 
only by taking the average of large numbers of educated 
and uneducated persons, as well as by considering what 
may properly be called education, that we can demon- 
strate that the proposition is true. However, there can 
be little question of the general truth of the proposition, 
and that one effect of education is to diminish reaction 
time. 

Effect of Fatigue. — Fatigue increases reaction time. 
This effect of fatigue is shown rather promptly and decid- 
edly. It may be employed as a fairly satisfactory method 
of studying the intensity of fatigue. 

Effect of Disease. — The state of health modifies reac- 
tion time. In general, sickness, or poor health, or pathol- 
ogical condition of the body increases reaction time. But 
there may be many kinds of disease, characterized by ex- 
treme nervousness, in which the pathological condition 
may act to decrease reaction time. If the reaction time 
should go decidedly below 100 sigma, we may suspect a 
nervous condition that borders on the pathological. 

Demonstration of Resistance in the Brain. — It re- 
quires from ten to twenty-five times as long for the nerv- 
ous impulse to traverse a given distance in the brain as it 
does to travel the same distance in a ner\^e. The demon- 
stration of this fact is comparatively easy. Let us take 



The Chronoscope 17 

an example in which the reaction time to the sense of 
touch is 187 sigma. 

Rate in a Nerve. — In this interval of time, the nerv- 
ous impulse started in the left hand has traversed about 
three feet of nerve in the left arm and about three feet in 
the right, before going to the muscles that move the fin- 
gers. The impulse has thus traversed about six feet of 
nerve. All measurements of the rate of speed in a nerve 
shov,' that it m.oves at a rate approximately constant and 
about 100 feet in a second. It has then required six-hun- 
dredths of a second to traverse the six feet of nerve. The 
difference between 187 sigma, the total reaction time, and 
60 sigma, the time the impulse employs in traveling six 
feet in the nerve, is 127 sigma, which is the time occupied 
in traversing the brain. The distance that the impulse 
travels in the brain cannot be greater than six inches, and 
may be much less. Besides, part of this distance is along 
an association fiber connecting the sense center with the 
motor center, and having the same transmission rate as 
a nerve. Six inches is the longest distance that we can 
suppose the impulse to travel in the brain, and anything 
less than that merely makes the demonstration so much 
the more emphatic. 

Rate in the Brain Center. — If it requires 127 sigma 
to traverse six inches in the brain, it would require twice 
that time, or 254 sigma, to go one foot in the brain, and 
25 and four-tenths seconds to traverse 100 feet, or more 
than 25 times as long as it requires to traverse the same 
distance in a nerve. 

Rate in the Brain Center Variable. — The rate of 
transmission in a nerve is constant, while in a brain cen- 
ter it is variable. All measurements of the rate of trans- 
mission in a nerve arrive at approximately the same re- 
sult, while there are scarcely two measurements of reac- 
tion time, even in successive trials with the same per- 



18 Functional Psychology 

son, that do not show more or less variation. We are 
compelled to suppose then, that the variation in reaction 
time is associated with the transmission through the 
brain center, not in the nerve. 



Rate in Cell Body and in the Nerve. — The nerve fiber 
is merely a prolongation of the neuron, and is part of a 
cell, containing the same essential constituents. There is 
no reason for supposing that the matter of the cell dif- 
fers in any degree in its conducting power in any part. A 
nervous impulse would travel as rapidly, and at exactly 
the same rate, in the cell body or the dendrite as it would 
in the axon of the nerve fiber. 



Delay at the Synapse. — We must suppose, then, that 
the hesitation, delay, slowing up of the nervous impulse 
in its passage through a brain center occurs, not in the 
cell, but at the synapse, where the impulse passes from 
one cell over to another. 

Delay a Condition of Every Mental Process. — But the 

most far-reaching generalization derived from our meas- 
urements with the chronoscope and the demonstration of 
reaction time is that if it were not for this hesitation, de- 
lay, resistance, slowing up of the nervous impulse in 
transmission through a brain center, there would be no 
mental process other than that kind which is manifested 
in a reflex act, such as is seen in the knee jerk when the 
patella is struck. It is believed that without this delay in 
transmission through a brain center, we should experi- 
ence no feeling, sensation, perception, memory, will, at- 
tention, nor any other process that we call mental. This 
is the meaning of the quotations from James, Morat and 
Ladd at the beginning of this chapter. It is a fact that 
constitutes the basis of all of our subsequent explanations 
of psychological phenomena. 



The Chronoscope 19 

DEFINITIONS. 

Chronoscope — An instrument for measuring short in- 
tervals of time. Uusually it measures to the thousandth 
part of a second. 

Sigma (Represented by the Greek letter). — The 
unit in michronometry. It is the thousandth part of a 
second. 

Simple Reaction Time — The time that elapses be- 
tween perceiving a signal and the motor response. The 
time required for an impulse to travel from the sense or- 
gan in which it is started through the brain center to the 
muscle that contracts in response. 



CHAPTER II 

FEELING. 

The sensation (feeling) of pain presupposes a reflex movement 
and an arrest of nervous conduction in the gray substance of the 
spinal marrow. It is this consciousness of inhibition in varying 
degrees that is felt by the consciousness as pain. — Ribot, Psychology 
of the Emotions, p. 84. 

It (pain) probably supposes the subduing of a great resistance 
in the central nerve organs. — Hoffding, Psychology, p. 223. 

Where action is perfectly automatic (without resistance) feeling 
does not exist. — Spencer, Psychology, Vol. I, p. 478. 

Drugs such as chloroform in all probability produce their effect 
by increasing the resistance of the synapses. — McDougall, Physi- 
ological Psychology, p. 47. 

Here we have the three familiar stages : the too easy, which 
does not excite any noticeable feeling; the moderately easy, which 
excites pleasure, and the too difficult, which excites unpleasantness. 
— Kulpe, Psychology, p. 255. 

Some part of the energy, then, of every stimulus is lost for 
sensation (feeling). — Titchener, Outlines, p. 97. 

It is highly probable that in the state of surprise we have 
imperfect knowledge because we have too much sensation (feeling). 
— Ribot, Psychology of Attention, p. 25. 

These several exposition, I think, make it clear that cognition 
and feeling, throughout all phases of their evolution, are at once 
antithetical and inseparable. — Spencer, Psychology, Vol. I, p. 478. 

Cognition and feeling must thus stand in inverse relation to 
each other. The more strongly one is manifested, the less strength 
at the command of the other. — Hoffding, Psychology, p. 98. 

Meaning of Feeling. — The word feeling is used with 
several meanings. We speak of feeling, sometimes, 
meaning the exercise of the sense of touch. We may 
speak of feeling the top of the table, or the smoothness of 
a piece of glass. We may mean by feeling the general 
state of our health, as when we say that we feel bad, or 
sick, or well. Sometimes a picture is described as mani- 
festing much feeling, meaning that it exhibits certain 
properties likely to arouse in the beholder considerable 



Feeling 21 

emotion. Feeling is also used to mean an affective pro- 
cess of a particular degree of complexity, corresponding 
to an idea. 

Meaning Employed Here. — None of these meanings 
constitute the content of the word as it is used in this 
chapter. By feeling we shall mean any kind of an af- 
fective process, simple or complex, vivid or faint, pleas- 
urable or painful. Feeling will be employed to designate 
any kind of affective state, whether such as accompanies 
a fit of anger, or the scratch of a pin. 

Affective State. — It will be necessary for us to under- 
stand what we mean by affective state, and to distinguish 
it clearly from an intellectual process. An intellectual 
process such as sensation, or perception, gives us knowl- 
edge, and makes us acquainted with the quality of an ob- 
ject, or with the object itself. An affective process does 
not make us know anything, but makes us experience 
pleasure or pain. If we were to say that an affective pro- 
cess is the pleasure or pain, we should make an incorrect 
statement, but it would assist us in arriving at a distinc- 
tion between an affective and an intellectual process. 
Pleasure and pain are not affective processes, but they 
are their most characteristic properties, and affective pro- 
cesses can most clearly be distinguished by them. 

Older Treatment of Feelings. — The treatment of the 
feelings is the most unsatisfactory department of psychol- 
ogy. The older psychologists divided the powers of the 
mind into three groups : the intellectual powers, or the 
group of powers by which we know; the sensibilities, or 
the group of powers by which we feel ; and the will. The 
usual plan was to treat fully the intellectual powers, then 
of the will. The relation betAveen the intellect and feel- 
ing was not always made clear. In fact, the intellectual 
powers and the sensibilities were treated as if they were 



22 Functional Psychology 

entirely distinct processes. While the admission was 
made that there was a relation existing between intellect 
and feeling, no one was able to suggest what the relation 
was, and no necessary connection was really recognized. 

Treatment By the New Psychology. — The treatment 
of the feelings by the New Psychology has been scarcely 
more satisfactory. The movement that may be desig- 
nated as the New Psychology may be said to have fairly 
begun with the work of Wundt, not far from 1870, and to 
have become established in the United States with the 
publication of James's Psychology in 1890. It is especial- 
ly characterized by the much greater emphasis placed 
upon the study of the nervous system and physiological 
processes in general. This has brought about a complete 
transformation of the subject, but the improvement has 
been almost wholly in the study of the intellectual pro- 
cesses, and but little improvement has been made in the 
treatment of the feelings. 

Difficulty of the Subject. — It seems as if the feelings 
have almost entirely escaped all attempts to associate 
them with physiological processes. If we except Mr. 
James's theory of emotion, which is almost certainly not 
true, we shall find no improvement in the New Psycholo- 
gy over the Old in the treatment of the feelings. Mr. 
Ladd, in his Outlines of Physiological Psychology, says 
that " Since the beginning of serious attempts to establish 
a scientific psychology, the consideration of the feelings 
and emotions has been unsatisfactory." 

Separation of Feeling and Intellect. — The tendency of 
proceed to the discussion of the sensibilities, and finally 
the present day psychologists has been to regard the feel- 
ings as quite as independent from intellectual processes 
as it was among the older psychologists. Most of the 
psychologists of the present day see no necessary con- 
nection between intellect and feeling, and are unable to 



Feeling 23 

discover any way to fit the feelings into the physiological 
plan. Sometimes it is assumed that there are separate 
brain centers for different feelings, as there are for the 
different intellectual processes. Some of our popular 
school text books on physiology indicate on the surface 
of the brain an area designated as the location of the feel- 
ings. Mr. Ladd in his Physiological Psychology is in- 
clined to assume that there are parallel systems of end 
organs, nerves and brain centers for feelings and for in- 
tellectual processes; that the nerves which transmit the 
feeling impulses are distinct from those that transmit the 
intellectual impulses. If there are separate nerves there 
must be separate brain centers. 

Feeling as Indefinite Intellect. — A different tendency 
is manifested in rather a strong disposition to regard feel- 
ing as a process not differing essentially from an intel- 
lectual process, except in its clearness and definiteness. A 
feeling process when it becomes definite is an intellectual 
process. It seems that it is in consequence of this ten- 
dency that there has arisen a theory that pain is an intel- 
lectual sensation, with its own end organs, pain nerves 
and brain centers. The theory is widely held, although 
no pain end organs nor pain nerves nor pain brain centers 
have ever been demonstrated, nor is there any special 
stimulus for pain as there is for every other sensation. 
But it appears that this is the first step toward a definite 
reduction of feeling to an intellectual process, and it has 
therefore received very general support from psycholo- 
gists. 

Necessity for a New Theory. — Perhaps the greatest 
need in psychology today is some consistent theory of 
feeling that shall express its relation to other mental 
processes, and be in harmony with the tendencies of pres- 
ent day psychology, as well as to correlate all the facts 
of feeling that we daily experience. What has been said 
in preceding paragraphs seems to justify the attempt to 



24 Functional Psychology 

present a theory that is somewhat diiferent from any the- 
ory at present advanced. This theory may be called the 
resistance theory, and is foreshadowed by the expressions 
quoted from Ribot, Hoftding, Spencer and McDougall at 
the beginning of this chapter. 

The Theory Stated. — Stated briefly, this theory is that 
feeling is the psychological concomitant of the resistance 
that a nervous impulse encounters in passing through a 
nervous arc. Measurements with the chronoscope show 
that there is a resistance through a brain center. We find 
that the rate of transmission is 10 to 25 times as rapid in 
the nerve as it is in the brain center, and that the rate in 
the brain center is variable. The fact of this resistance is 
undeniable, and is recognized by all psychologists. We 
know nothing of the nature of the resistance, and know 
only that it exists. 

Analogy of the Electric Circuit. — We shall be able to 
understand the character of the resistance by examining 
the analogy of the nervous arc. The current that is em- 
ployed in our projection lantern is a current of 110 volts, 
which is too much to work satisfactorily. Therefore we 
insert into the circuit a coil of iron wire whose only func- 
tion is to offer resistance, and to stop out some of the cur- 
rent. The current that goes through produces the light. 
We might connect it up with a motor and make it turn a 
fan or a mill or run a street car. That would be work 
done, and would correspond to the part of the nervous 
current that goes through the arc, and which is the con- 
comitant of the intellectual work that is accomplished. 

Analogous to Heat. — But that part of the electric cur- 
rent that is stopped out by the rheostat is used up in over- 
coming resistance, and is transformed into heat. This is 
the part of the electric current that is analogous to that 
portion of the nervous current which is used up in over- 
coming resistance, and which is the concomitant of feel- 



Feeling 25 

ing. Feeling then, strictly is analogous to the heat pro- 
duced in the electric circuit, and we may describe it by 
saying that it is the concomitant of the overcoming of the 
resistance, or more briefly that it is the concomitant of 
the resistance encountered in the transmission through 
the nervous arc. 



Cause of Resistance Unknown. — We must not carry 
the analogy too far. We speak of the resistance in the 
electric circuit and measure it in ohms. We know noth- 
ing whatever about the cause of the resistance in the elec- 
tric circuit, nor why an iron wire offers more resistance 
than does a copper wire of the same length and diameter. 
Nevertheless, we are able to measure it very accurately, 
and to construct machinery that involves the employ- 
ment and the accurate calculation of the resistance. In 
the same way, we know nothing about the cause of the 
resistance in the nervous arc, although we are able to 
approximate an explanation of it more nearly than we are 
of the resistance in the electric circuit. But we have not 
as yet established a unit for it, and we are unable to 
measure it. 

What Resistance Means. — It is necessary for us to 
have a clear understanding of what we shall mean by 
resistance, for by it we shall expect to explain and make 
clear many divergent, obscure and apparently contra- 
dictory phenomena. We are using the term resistance in 
a slightly modified sense from that in which it is em- 
ployed in describing the phenomena of an electric cur- 
rent. As the term is employed in electricity it means 
the property of a conductor and its magnitude is meas- 
ured in ohms. 

Amount of Current Destroyed. — When we use the 
term resistance in discussing the nervous current, we con- 
sider it not merely as a property of the conducting ner- 



26 Functional Psychology 

vous arc, but it will be measured by the amount of cur- 
rent destroyed. The amount of current destroyed will 
depend not merely upon the nature of the arc, but also 
upon the amount of energy that is transmitted along the 
arc, or enters the brain center. 

The Two Factors in Resistance. — It will be seen that 
this definition is intended to cover two elements; first, the 
nature of the nervous arc; second, the strength of the 
current. Resistance, then, in the sense in which we shall 
use the term, depends upon two factors, both variables, 
and varying independently of each other. 

First Law of Resistance. — We may state some of the 
laws of nervous resistance in the following manner : 
With a current of given strength, resistance will vary 
with the nervous arc through which it is transmitted. 
The resisting power of any nervous arc will be modified 
by various circumstances. In the first place, repeated 
transmission of an impulse through the arc will diminish 
its resisting power. This is sometimes called the law of 
neural habit, and is one of the best known laws of ner- 
vous action. Its explanation is to be sought for in the 
manner in which the molecular structure is restored after 
its equilibrium has been destroyed by the removal of 
atoms in the transmission of an impulse. 

Modification of the Arc. — But it is not merely the 
number of repetitions of an impulse through a nervous 
arc that decreases resistance. The resistance in the arc 
will be modified more rapidly by a strong impulse than 
it will by a weak one. A smaller number of repetitions 
of a strong nervous current will modify the resistance of 
the arc as much as a larger number of weak impulses. 

Modification by Other Conditions. — The resisting 
power of a nervous arc will be modified not only by prac- 
tice, or habit, but by the blood supply at any particular 
time and the general pathological conditions of the nerve 



. Feeling 27 

tissue. Inflammation of the nerve tissue, or the action of 
different kinds of drugs may modify the resisting power 
of any given nervous arc to a current of any particular 
strength. 

Modification by Attention. — A third method by which 
the resisting power of a nervous arc may be modified is 
through the process of attention, whose discussion must 
be reserved for a subsequent chapter. 

Second Law of Resistance. — A second law of resist- 
ance may be stated as follows : In a given nervous arc, 
the amount of resistance encountered will vary directly 
as the strength of the current. As a consequence of this 
second law, we understand that if a current is feeble and 
weak, little resistance will be encountered in passing 
through a nervous arc, and there will be but little modi- 
fication of the arc by it. If a current is strong, great 
resistance will be encountered, and much modification of 
the arc will result. 

Variation in Strength of Current. — There can be no 
question that nervous currents vary widely in strength. 
The strength of the current at any time is dependent in 
some degree at least upon the amount of tissue that is 
oxidized. Blood supply, plenty of food, pure air, suffi- 
cient exercise to quicken the heart beat and send blood 
rapidly to the brain are all conditions that tend to in- 
crease the amount of tissue oxidized, and the amount of 
energy liberated. Narcotic drugs tend to diminish the 
oxidation of tissue, to weaken the strength of the current, 
to diminish resistance, and to deaden the feeling. 

Peripherally and Centrally Initiated Impulses. — We 
can readily recognize the fact that a peripherally initiated 
impulse which starts in some sense organ is stronger than 
a centrally initiated one. The external forces that act 
upon sense organs are generally greater than the force 



28 Functional Psychology ^ 

which originates a centrally initiated impulse. It is even 
possible now to measure the pressure of light which was 
believed for so many years to be absolutely lacking, but 
it is scarcely possible to measure the force that can de- 
compose a molecule of protagon and deprive it of some 
of its atoms. It is very possible, too, that the end organs 

of sense are devices for multiplying the effects of the 
external force, which is not likely to be true of the cere- 
bral organs. 

Relation of Feeling to Intellect. — This hypothesis of 
the nature of feeling will help us to understand what is 
the real relation of feeling to the intellectual process 
which accompanies it. The two processes are described 
by Herbert Spencer as at once antithetical and insepar- 
able. No feeling is ever experienced alone, but it must 
always be accompanied by an intellectual process. This 
is a fact of profound significance, and no other hypothesis 
has been proposed that satisfactorily explains it. There 
can be no resistance unless a current is passing through 
a nervous arc, and the concomitant of the transmission 
is an intellectual process. 

First Law of Feeling. — We are now in a position to 
understand what Mr. Spencer means by saying that feel- 
ing and intellect are antithetical. The reciprocal relation 
between the two processes has frequently been noticed, 
and hundreds of illustrations of the fact have been ex- 
perienced by every one. We may state the first law of 
feeling as follows : With a given amount of nervous 
energy, the more feeling the less intellectual work can 
be done, and the less the feeling experienced the greater 
the amount of intellectual work. 

Illustrations of the Law. — If we are experiencing a 
toothache, or great fatigue, or hunger, or cold, or any 
other form of physical discomfort, we are unable to ac- 



Feeling 29 

complish the usual amount of intellectual work. Our 
ability to study is decreased, and our decision upon any 
matter cannot be relied upon to manifest its usual accur- 
acy. Even an amount of pleasurable excitement is 
unfavorable to our best work. Quite as disastrous to 
intellectual work is a mental, as distinguished from a 
physical, feeling. Anger destroys our ability to solve 
problems, learn lessons, or commit to memory. Fear is 
equally destructive, and in fact any unpleasant mental 
feeling has a disastrous eitect. Only less destructive is a 
highly pleasant feeling, such as is experienced in antici- 
pating a holiday, or some much desired event in the near 
future. 

Other Illustrations. — A person is a poor judge of the 
merits of his own case, because he is likely to be exper- 
iencing a good deal of feeling in connection with it, and 
his intellectual judgment is deficient in consequence. The 
person who wishes to meet the arguments of an adver- 
sary, whether mental or physical, must keep cool and 
experience as little feeling as possible, for only by so 
doing will he have sufficient amount of intellectual capa- 
city to meet them. If he dissipates his energy in feeling, 
he will not be able to cope with his adversary intellect- 
ually. 

Second Law of Feeling. — Such examples of the reci- 
procal relation between feeling and intellect are those in 
which the concomitant resistance is determined in the 
larger part by the nature of the nervous arc itself. But 
there are other phenomena of feeling in which our sec- 
ond law of resistance miost immediately applies. When- 
ever the resistance is determined principally by the 
strength of the nervous current, the relation between 
feeling and intellect is direct and not reciprocal. What 
could be more directly contradictory than the statement 
of Hofi'ding (Psychology, p. 98), that "Cognition and 
feeling must thus stand in an inverse relation to each 



30 Functional Psychology 

other. The more strongly one is manifested the less 
strength at the command of the other," and the statement 
made by an old time book on Mental Philosophy (Haven, 
p. 378), ''The range and power of the sensibilities, the 
mind's capacity for feeling, depends upon the range and 
vigor of the intellectual powers. Within certain limits, 
the one varies as the other. The man of strong and vig- 
orous mind is capable of stronger emotion than the man 
of dwarfed and puny intellect." 

Intellectual Men of Deep Feeling. — When we see the 
real relation between intellect and feeling, and under- 
stand the conditions upon which that relation rests, we 
see that both statements manifest a partial truth. Some 
men of deep feeling are men of great intellectual ability. 
Abraham Lincoln was a good example, and perhaps 
Colonel Parker was a better. In all cases of this kind, we 
shall find that such men are those who are capable of gen- 
erating nervous energy in an unusual amount, so that 
while a large part of it is used up in overcoming resist- 
ance, and its concomitant feeling is great, there is still an 
unusual amount to be transmitted through the nervous 
arc, and manifest its concomitant intellect. 

Interest in Our Work. — Here, too we shall recognize 
the explanation of the fact that is so generally insisted 
upon, that we learn our lessons better and do better intel- 
lectual work if wx are interested in the subject; that is, if 
we experience considerable feeling while engaged in 
study. Also that in order to remember anything success- 
fully we should learn it with feeling. Whatever truth 
there is in such statements, and they are generally be- 
lieved, arises from the fact that the feeling accompanying 
the study in which we are interested is the concomitant 
of resistance arising principally from the generation of 
energy in greater quantity. It is an application of our 
second law of feeling. When we are interested in study- 



Feeling 31 

ing our lesson, we straighten up, take deeper breaths, 
step a little more firmly, contract the muscles more 
strongly, and thereby induce a more rapid circulation of 
the blood, and oxidize more nervous tissue. Were the 
feeling to arise from an increase in the resisting power of 
the nervous arc without an increase in nervous energy, 
the intellectual work would not be better done. 

Children Creatures of Feeling. — Children are capable 
of but little intellectual work, although they manifest a 
great deal of feeling. A little child laughs or cries a large 
part of the time, and it seems about as easy for it to do 
one as the other. Both conditions of resistance are pro- 
nounced in the case of the little child, and both laws of 
feeling are cooperative. The little child generates a large 
amount of nervous energy, and at the same time its brain 
centers are poorly organized. Both conditions conspire 
to increase the amount of resistance, and its concomitant 
feeling is very great. 

Effect of Habit. — The effect of habit or practice is to 
decrease the resistance which a nervous impulse encoun- 
ters in passing through a nervous arc. We know as a 
matter of experience and observation that feeling tends 
to disappear from an habitual act. We may be set to 
doing something that at first appeals to us as very un- 
pleasant; but if we keep at it long enough, we not only 
become skillful in doing the work, but we cease to exper- 
ience the discomfort that we felt at first. The explanation 
is easy, if we recognize that feeling is the concomitant 
of the resistance that is overcome. Practice renders the 
resistance less, and the feeling decreases. 

Unpleasant Becomes Pleasant. — An unpleasant occu- 
pation is more likely to become pleasant than a pleasant 
occupation to become painful. We nearly always like to 
do any kind of work in which we have attained a high 
degree of skill, and we believe that the skill is the cause 



32 Functional Psychology 

of the pleasant feeling. Really, the pleasant feeling is not 
the cause of the skill, nor is the skill the cause of the 
pleasant feeling, but the skill and the pleasant feeling 
both arise out of the same condition, namely, the dimin- 
ished amount of resistance originating in habit. 

Pleasure Succeeds Pain. — An unpleasant feeling is the 
concomitant of a stronger degree of resistance than is a 
pleasant feeling. So as the resistance decreases, the 
pleasant feeling takes the place of the unpleasant one. 
There is a common saying, that "It will feel good when it 
quits hurting," and indeed there is much truth in the 
saying. There is usually a distinctively pleasurable feel- 
ing accompanying the cessation of pain. The excessive 
magnitude of the impulse which has occasioned the great 
resistance accompanying the painful feeling has so modi- 
fied the nervous arc that a smaller amount of current 
•meets with less resistance than the same amount would 
have encountered had the nervous arc previously been 
traversed by a current of only ordinary strength. 

Indifference. — In passing from a feeling of pleasure to 
one of pain, or from an unpleasant feeling to one of pleas- 
antness, the feeling passes through a point of indifference, 
at which it is impossible to decide whether it is pleasant 
or unpleasant. The pleasure is most intense just before 
the point of indifference is reached. The sweeter any- 
thing is the more pleasant it tastes until it becomes too 
sweet, and then it is described as sickening. A faint odor 
is likely to be pleasant, but there seems to be no odor 
that is not capable of becoming unpleasant if it is inten- 
sified to a proper degree. There is truth in the saying, 
"Too much of a good thing." 

Monotony. — An unpleasant feeling may diminish to 
the point of indifference, become pleasant, the pleasant- 
ness diminish until all feeling seems to evaporate, and 
the feeling may be described as monotony. Monotony is 



Feeling 33 

not pain nor unpleasantness ; it is rather a lack of pleas- 
ure. All acts tend to become monotonous as they become 
habitual, and take on the form of a reflex. By varying 
the action we throw new cells into the circuit, increase 
the resistance, and break up the monotony. 

Interest of Artistic Accomplishment. — There is appar- 
ently one exception to the general principle that an habit- 
ual action tends to become monotonous. That is the 
continuous pleasure that a workman who is an artist in 
his business derives from it. An artist in any business 
always experiences pleasure from the activities of that 
occupation. There is a certain limit of skill that may be 
attained, and when the limit is reached, no amount of 
practice can increase the ability to perform the act. For- 
getting goes on at an equal rate with learning. The last 
cells that are reached by the nervous impulse in the 
process of learning are affected only slightly, and never 
attain such a modification that they transmit an impulse 
without resistance. The forgetfulness, or restoration of 
the cells will always be sufficient to keep in the centers a 
sufficient amount of resistance to furnish a pleasurable 
feeling. The professional player, who is an artist, must 
practice his scales everyday. The professional singer 
must not let his voice get out of practice. Ever}^ artist 
must keep in training, or his brain centers will lose too 
much by forgetfulness, or disuse. 

DEFINITIONS 

Feeling — Any kind of affective process, simple or 
complex, faint or vivid, pleasurable or painful. 

Affective Process — Any kind of a mental process 
which does not give us knowledge, but whose most no- 
ticeable characteristic is pleasure or pain. 

Sensibilities — An old word used to mean the entire 
group of feelings. 



34 Functional Psychology 

Resistance — As here used it means the effect produced 
upon a nerve current by the arc through which it is trans- 
mitted. 

Concomitant — An invariable accompaniment. 

Reciprocal — A relation between two things which 
may be described by saying the more of the one the less 
of the other. 

Indifference — A high degree of feeling that marks the 
transition from painful to pleasurable, or from pleasur- 
able to painful. 

Monotony — An absence of pleasurable or painful tone 
in any feeling. It is a condition in which little or no feel- 
ing is manifested. 



CHAPTER III 

EXPRESSION OF FEELING. 

The impulse overflows the cortex and becomes partially involved 
in the motor paths, since the muscles themselves reveal a trace of it. 
— Morat, Physiology of the Nervous System, p. 518. 

* * * And on the principle of the radiation of nerve force, 
the glands would be stimulated. — Darwin, Expression of the Emo- 
tions, p. 178. 

In adult life, also, very intense stimulations cannot be held 
within their ordinary channels, but become diffused through many 
courses. Note the contortions of the man undergoing torture at 
the hands of the dentist. — Baldwin, Handbook, Feelings and the 
Will, p. 296. 

When an impression is accompanied by feeling, the aroused 
currents diffuse themselves freely over the brain, leading to a gen- 
eral agitation of the moving organs as well as affecting the viscera. 
— Bain, Mind and Body, p. 52. 

Feeling makes a greater demand upon the nerve centers than 
cognition, and the consequent tension finds vent by distributing 
itself over a larger or smaller number of the remaining parts of the 
organism. — Hoffding, Psychology, p. 269. 

The Principle of the Direct action of the Nervous System. 
It would be more correct to call this the overflowing excitation. 
This arises from the fact often observed in physiology that when 
a sensory excitation becomes too violent, it diffuses itself all over 
the nervous system, and also to all the centrifugal paths whether 
motor or inhibitory. — Morat, p. 405 (Derived from Darwin, Epres- 
sion of the Emotions). 

It is a sort of psychological law that the intensity of conscious- 
ness varies inversely as the intensity of the movements produced. — 
Ribot, Psychology of the Emotions, p. 224. 

The concealment of a feeling may cause it to penetrate deeper 
int the nature of the individual. — Hoffding, Psychology, p. 332. 

Expression of Feeling. — Whenever we experience any 
kind of feeling, there is some kind of muscular movement 
accompanying it which is called the expression. The 
muscles of the face are particularly expressive, and we 
can judge rather accurately by the expression of the face, 
what kind of feelings the person is experiencing. The 
facial expressions are produced by the contraction of the 



36 Functional Psychology 

facial muscles and while we may be unable to describe 
the muscular contractions that produce the expressions, 
we are not likely to be mistaken about the kinds of feel- 
ings which they express. 

Other Muscular Expressions. — Not only do the facial 
muscles express feeling, but other muscles of the body do 
the same. The heart may beat more rapidly when we 
experience one kind of feeling, and more slowly when we 
experience a different kind. The muscles that move the 
lungs fill them fuller and more frequently when we exper- 
ience one kind of feeling, and are less vigorous in their 
action when we experience another kind. We can judge 
something of the feeling a person is experiencing by the 
very attitude of the body. The drooping shoulders, 
dragging walk, bowed head, are all indicative of a 
feeling that we may describe as dejection. But the 
upright carriage, vigorous steps, erect head, indicate a 
different feeling. Sometimes we can discover that a man 
is angry by the mere appearance of his back. We say 
that he is mad clear through. 

Glandular Expressions. — Not only are muscles ex- 
pressive of feeling, but the glands as well. The weeping 
of children is a most common expression of grief. Under 
the influence of the feeling of grief, the lachrymal glands 
are stimulated to secrete tears so abundantly that the 
secretion cannot be carried off in the usual channel, and 
the tears overflow the eyes. So the contemplation of an 
article of food that is much desired is likely to stimulate 
the salivary glands to an unusual secretion, and we say 
that our mouth waters. Occasionally in cases of exces- 
sive fright a cold sweat breaks out. The usual stimulus 
for the activity of the sudoriparous glands is heat; but, 
in case of fright, it is a different stimulus, and we experi- 
ence the phenomenon of cold sweat. Occasionally, also, 
the inhibition of muscular or glandular activity is an 



Expression of Feeling 37 

expression of feeling. In some cases of fright, the heart 
seems almost to stop beating. When a speaker or singer 
becomes embarrrassed, he is likely to experience a sensa- 
tion of dryness in his mouth and throat, caused by the 
failure of the salivary or the mucous glands to secrete 
the usual amount. 

Identical Conditions of Glandular and Muscular Ex- 
pression.— Glands and muscles are both expressive of 
feeling. Under the proper conditions, and the influence 
of the proper feeling, every gland and every muscle in 
the body may be stimulated to activity and may express 
feeling. Glands and muscles are alike in the fact that 
they are stimulated to activity only by a nervous im- 
pulse that reaches them, without which they will not 
perform their proper function. 

Common Theory. — The common theory about the ex- 
presison of feeling is that we first experience the feeling 
and then express it. The feeling is experienced first and 
is the cause of the expression. No good reason can be 
assigned upon this theory for the expression, and there 
is no necessary connection between the expression and 
the feeling. It is quite commonly believed that certain 
muscles, particularly those of the face, are designed from 
the first for the purpose of expression, and have no other 
function. Our common ideas of expression, and the 
words we use to describe it, including the word expres- 
sion itself, are colored by this theory. 

James Theory. — Another theory of expression is of 
so much importance and has exercised so much influ- 
ence upon the study of pS3^chology that it is necessary 
for us to study it carefully. This is known as the Lange- 
James theory, or, in this country at least, as the James 
theory. This theory asserts that the expression comes 
first and causes the feeling. First we weep, and then 
we experience the feeling of grief. We laugh, and after 



38 Functional Psychology 

we laugh we are happy. In a dangerous situation, we 
first jump, or shriek, and only after the expression do 
we experience the feeling of fear. 

Expression a Reflex. — According to Mr. James' theory, 
the muscular movement that is called the expression is 
purely a reflex, and has no mental antecedent nor accom- 
paniment. An outside stimulus affects the organs con- 
nected with the muscles, and the muscles contract, thus 
producing the expression. It is the same kind of effect 
that is produced by striking the patella, causing the knee 
to jerk, or that is produced by the action of light upon 
the muscles of the iris, causing the pupil to contract or 
enlarge without any mental process, or the perception 
of the amount of light. 

Origin of the Feeling. — Let us illustrate the process 
involved in the origination of the feeling by supposing 
that we are traveling along a lonesome road, or are in 
a haunted house, and see a ghost. Our hair may stand 
on end. The muscle that tends to cause the hair to 
stand up perpendicularly to the skin is found at the root 
of every hair, but it is a vestigial muscle, and only under 
extraordinary circumstances is it made to contract. One 
of these extraordinary circumstances is the presence of 
extreme danger. The contraction is a reflex and entirely 
beyond the control of the will. When we experience 
the sensation of our hair rising, we then experience the 
feeling of fear. If we could interpret the order of occur- 
rences, it might be represented by something like the 
following: ''Hello. My hair is standing on end. There 
must be danger. I am scared." 

Peripheral and Central Theories. — Mr. James' theory 
is susceptible to two interpretations. One is that it is 
the contraction of the muscle itself which is the cause 
of the feeling and determines what feeling shall be ex- 



Expression of Feeling 39 

perienced. This interpretation of the theory makes of it 
a peripheral theory, or one in which the feeling is de- 
termined by the end organ of expression. The other 
interpretation assumes that the contraction of the ex- 
pressive muscle establishes an impulse in the muscle it- 
self which is transmitted to the brain, runs through some 
brain center, and that it is the transmission of this back- 
ward flowing impulse through the brain center that 
arouses the feeling and determines what it shall be. This 
interpretation makes of it a central theory, or one in 
which the existence of the feeling and the kind it shall 
be is determined by the brain center. Also, this inter- 
pretation would necessitate the existence of a brain cen- 
ter for feeling, in all probability different from the other 
centers that are traversed when an intellectual process 
is experienced. 

Differences. — The important differences between the 
James theory and the common theory lie in the fact that 
according to the James theory the expression comes first 
and causes the feeling. According to the common theory, 
the feeling comes first and causes the expression. 

How Resistance Explains Expression. — The resist- 
ance theory asserts that feeling is the concomitant of 
the resistance which the nervous impulse encounters in 
passing through a nervous arc. If there is no resistance 
there is no feeling. But when a nervous impulse encoun- 
ters resistance in a brain center it tends to spread out into 
the places and in the directions in which the least resist- 
ance is encountered. It is as if there were a pressure 
exerted upon the impulse in the brain center, or a ten- 
sion which forces it out along the path of least resistance. 
We may compare it to the water in a canvas bag, when 
there is pressure exerted upon it. The water will be 
forced out through all the openings in the bag, and if 
the pressure is great enough, it will pass through the 
meshes of the canvas itself. The greater quantity will 



40 Functional Psychology 

go through the larger openings, but some if it will go 
through every opening and through the interstices of 
the material of the bag. 

Escapes Into Motor Centers. — When a nervous im- 
pulse thus encounters resistance, it tends to spread out 
into brain centers that are most easy of access. Gen- 
erally, the motor centers w^ill be most easily reached, 
since they are among the first that v^^ere organized, have 
been traversed most frequently, and have become asso- 
ciated by impulses passing betv^een v^ith almost every 
other brain center in the cerebrum. Then, too, the motor 
area is almost in the middle of the brain, and association 
fibers run to every part of the cerebral cortex. Hence 
it is that the motor centers are those that are likely to 
be most easy of access from every part of the brain, and 
the impulse under pressure flow^s readily over into them. 

Relation of Feeling and Expression. — Nov^ v^e can 
understand the true relation betw^een feeling and its 
expression. The expression is not the cause of the feel- 
ing, nor is the feeling the cause of the expression, but 
both feeling and expression are similarly related to the 
same circumstance, that is, to the resistance v^hich is 
encountered in the brain center. Without resistance, 
there w^ould be neither feeling nor expression. 

Expression and Feeling Synchronous. — The feeling 
does not precede the expression, as the common theory 
assumes, nor does the expression precede the feeling, as 
is asserted by the James theory. But feeling and expres- 
sion occur at the same time, w^hich is determined by the 
time that the resistance is encountered. It w^ill be seen 
from this explanation that the resistance theory is a cen- 
tral theory, but does not necessitate the assumption of a 
separate series of feeling centers in the brain. Also it is 
clear that the relation betw^een feeling and its expression 
will be a direct relation, the more intense the feeling the 



Expression of Feeling 41 

stronger will be the expression ; and the weaker the feel- 
ing experienced, the less vigorous the expression will be. 
The concomitance in the variation, however, is not di- 
rectly with each other, but directly between resistance 
and both feeHng and expression; while it is only indi- 
rectly between feeling and expression, through the re- 
sistance. 

First Argument for James' Theory. — Mr. James 

argues the case for his theory very skillfully. His argu- 
ments may all be reduced to three series, and we shall 
need to know how to interpret the facts he adduces in 
its favor according to the resistance theory. The first 
line of evidence is that direct observation shows that 
the expression occurs first and the feeling appears later. 
Thus nearly every person has been in some kind of a 
dangerous situation and did not experience the feeling 
of fear until after the danger had been escaped. Then the 
feeling appeared in great intensity, and the expression 
took on an exaggerated form. 

Answer. — -The answer to this argument is a direct 
denial of its universality. As many examples can be 
adduced in which the feeling occurred before the dan- 
gerous situation' was encountered as can be shown in 
which the opposite relation prevailed. Many times per- 
sons have manifested great fear at the prospect of going 
into danger, when in the dangerous situation itself no 
fear was experienced. When two such series of contra- 
dictory experiences occur, it is evident that the theory 
that does not explain both cannot be true. 

Resistance Explains Examples. — Both may be ex- 
plained according to the resistance theory. In the cases 
in which no fear is experienced in the actual presence of 
danger, we may suppose that by the process of attention 
the impulse is directed through the brain center without 
resistance. When we study the phenomena of attention, 



42 Functional Psychology 

we shall find that this is one of the effects that attention 
produces. But when we contemplate the situation after- 
ward, or even before, we are not attending in such a way 
as to diminish the resistance, but rather we are increasing 
the resistance by our method of attention, and the feeling 
arises. We explain our lack of feeling by saying that 
we did not have time to be afraid, or we did not think 
about it. 

Second Argument. — The second line of argument that 
is adduced by Mr. James is that the inhibition of the ex- 
pression inhibits the feeling. If we repress the expres- 
sion of any feeling, the feeling fails to manifest itself. 
If we stop to count ten, we do not become angry. If we 
refuse to run, or shriek, we do not become afraid. So 
any feeling will fail to come into existence if we repress 
the expression. 

Answer. — The answer to this argument is a direct 
denial. All of us can in some degree, and some of us 
in a high degree, repress the expression of feeling with- 
out destroying or greatly minimizing the feeling itself. 
It sometimes seems as if repressing the expression in- 
tensifies the feeling. This fact is expressed in the quota- 
tion from Hoffding at the beginning of this chapter. 
Most women have experienced the relief of a "good cry" 
that diminishes, not increases, the feeling. 

How Inhibit Expression. — Nearly all the examples 
that are adduced as illustrations of this argument of Mr. 
James find their explanation in one of two principles : 
When we stop to count ten, or think about something- 
else, we are drawing away the nervous energy from the 
centers in which the resistance is accompanying the feel- 
ing, and are sending it through some other center, thus 
decreasing the resistance and inhibiting at once both 
the expression and the feeling. The other class of cases 
in which we repress the expression and at the same time 



Expression of Feeling 43 

the feeling, consists of those in which we direct the im- 
pulse through the brain center with little resistance by 
an act of attention. We may contemplate the circum- 
stance directly, but attend to it in such a way that we 
decrease the resistance to such an extent that little feeling 
is experienced and little expression appears. We then 
say that we have reasoned ourselves out of the feeling. 

No Decrease in Feeling. — But in cases in which the 
expression is inhibited while there is no decrease in feel- 
ing, the nervous impulse is prevented from entering the 
exprssion center by a process of attention. It may go 
into some other center or be completely repressed. 

Third Argument. — The third line of evidence asserts 
that giving expression to a feeling induces the feeling. 
Here again the answer is a direct denial. All of us can 
in some degree, and some of us in a high degree, express 
feelings that we do not experience, and the smoothness 
of polite society largely depends upon our doing so. Mr. 
James says that actors experience the feelings which they 
portray, which is true of only some actors and certain 
instances of feelings. Nevertheless, the best way to por- 
tray accurately the expression of any particular feeling 
is to experience the feeling. Many persons can by a 
proper process of attention image a scene so vividly that 
there will be sufficient resistance to accompany the feel- 
ing appropriate to such a situation. When the resistance 
is encountered in the appropriate centers, the nervous im- 
pulse will overflow into the proper expression centers. 
The important process in inducing the feeling is to in- 
crease the resistance by the proper kind of attention. The 
expression is rather the sign that the feeling is being ex- 
perienced, than a method by which the feeling is induced. 

Origin of Particular Expressions. — ^The particular ex- 
pression that belongs to any given feeling depends upon 



44 Functional Psychology 

the resistance that is encountered in passing out of the 
brain center in which the resistance which accompanies 
the feeling is experienced. The question which we need 
to answer is how the connection between the center in 
which the resistance that accompanies the feeling is en- 
countered and which for brevity we may call the feeling 
center, and the motor center, which similarly, with the 
serious risk of being misunderstood, we may call the 
expression center, has become such that a nervous im- 
pulse passes easily from one to the other. Ultimately it 
depends upon the structure of the brain and its nervous 
connections. In much the larger number of cases, the 
causes for the particular connections are so obscure that 
we are compelled to describe them as fortuitous. Per- 
haps, primarily, all were of this kind. Many expressions 
are learned by imitation, which places the fortuitous 
origin of the expressive forms farther back in racial his- 
tory. But no matter what the origin may have been, 
nearly all expressions become habitual, and become so 
thoroughly established and seem so ingrained and na- 
tural, that their fortuitous origin can scarcely be credited. 

Useful Expressions. — But in a comparatively small 
class of cases, the expression itself is an advantageous 
action ; and while its origin may have been fortuitous like 
any other variation, it has been preserved by the process 
of natural selection, and in all probability the nervous 
connection modified accordingly. 

Expressions of Fear. — The expression of the feeling of 
fear is a good illustration of this very interesting class of 
expressions. Running away, or escaping from the dan- 
gerous proximity is the natural expression of the feeling, 
and this action undoubtedly preserves the lives of many 
individuals, and so is distinctly advantageous to the race. 
The shriek of fear is the expression commonly employed 
by children, and to a considerable extent by women, who 



Expression of Feeling 45 

are more likely to depend upon the assistance of another 
than to rely upon their own efforts to escape the danger. 
Any one who has heard the shriek of a child in fear has 
no occasion to be reminded how effective it is in sum- 
moning assistance. This expression is as advantageous 
to a weak or dependent individual as are the escaping 
movements to one who is accustomed to rely upon his 
own efforts. 

Fear Paralysis. — But there is another expression of 
fear, also advantageous, which consists of a fear paralysis. 
This is most frequently seen in children, and in such 
cases it often preserves the life of the child who without 
it would run into greater danger. It is the same expres- 
sion, psychologically, as the feigning death in opossums 
and in many species of beetles and other insects. 

Expressive Inhibitions. — The fear paralysis is another 
illustration of that kind of expression which we have al- 
ready had occasion to notice in connection with the dry 
mouth as a sign of nervousness. Occasionally the inhibi- 
tion of the proper activity of the muscle or gland is an 
expression of feeling. Grief may become so great as to 
prevent the shedding of tears. Under strong emotion the 
heart may beat more slowly and even miss a beat or two. 
Strong feeling is likely to interfere with the digestive 
processes, and persons have been known to faint from 
excessive emotion, nearly always of an unpleasant char- 
acter. 

Paralysis from Excessive Resistance. — The paralysis 
seems to be induced by the excessive resistance which 
breaks the circuit, preventing the impulse from passing. 
In such cases, it is doubtful if the feeling is so intense 
after the paralysis, as it was before the paralysis occurred. 

Other Advantageous Expressions. — Darwin has point- 
ed out many examples of this kind of useful and advan- 
tageous expressions. The crying of a child from hunger 



46 Functional Psychology 

or pain, the shedding of tears, the contracting of the mus- 
cles around the eyelids in screaming, the lifting of the 
upper lip tending to expose the canine teeth in anger or 
disdain, with many more, are examples of expressions 
that come under this head. 

DEFINITIONS 

Expression of Feeling — Some muscular movement, or 
glandular activity that accompanies the feeling, and may 
be taken as evidence that a particular feeling is being ex- 
perienced. 

Vestigial Muscle — One that may sometime in the his- 
tory of the race have been functional, but by variation or 
disuse has ceased to function and persists merely by the 
processes of heredity. 

James's Theory — A theory of feeling, or of the ex- 
pression of feeling, which asserts that the expression 
appears before the feeling and causes it. 

Peripheral Theory of Feeling — Any kind of a theory 
which assumes that the activity of a peripheral sense 
organ or muscle determines that there shall be a feeling 

and what the feeling shall be. 

Central Theory of Feeling — Any theory of feeling 
which asserts that the brain center determines that there 
shall be a feeling and what the feeling shall be. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE PROPERTIES OF FEELING. 



The differences among feelings we must try to explain by the 
different cognitive elements that may be combined with them. — 
Hoffding, Psychology, p. 222. 

It is therefore an error, though common to most psychologists, 
to consider pleasure and pain as fundamental elements of the affec- 
tive consciousness. They are only marks. The foundation is else- 
where. What would be said of a doctor who confused the symp- 
toms of a disease with its essential nature? — Rihot, Psychology of 
the Emotions, p. 32. 

The sensation (feeling) of pain presupposes a reflex movement 
and an arrest of nervous conduction in the gray substance of the 
spinal marrow. — Rihot, Psychology of the Emotions, p. 84. 

By tone of sensation (feeling) is meant the feeling of pain or 
pleasure that accompanies it. — Baldwin, Handbook, Feelings and 
Will, p. 114. 

The agreeableness or disagreeableness of impressions, or states 
of consciousness — that emotional coloring or tone that makes them 
pleasant or distasteful — should be regarded rather as psychical 
qualities of sensation (feeling) than as separate and distinct ele- 
ments. — Lloyd Morgan, Comparative Psychology, p. 140. 

Pain is any sensation raised above a certain intensity. — Woods 
Hutchinson, Gospel According to Darwin, p. 213. 

But neither pain spots on the skin, nor a stimulus especially 
adapted in quality to cause sensations of pain have been shown 
to exist. — Ziehen, Physiological Psychology, p. 139. 

From this it follows that pain requires no special apparatus for 
its production. There is no organ of special pain sense, and there 
are no special conductors of pain. There is no system that properly 
belongs to it, no region in the cerebral cortex that is allotted to it. 
— Morat, Physiology of the Nervous System, p. 405. 

The presence of pain is distressing, its absence is fatal. — Woods 
Hutchinson, Gospel According to Darwin, p. 13. 

Properties of Feeling. — Feelings dififer from each 
other in several respects, and the means by which we 
distinguish them we may call their properties. We may 
discover three properties by means of which they are dis- 
criminated from each other. 

Specific Character. — Feelings differ from each other 
in their specific character; by which we mean that they 



48 Functional Psychology 

are of different kinds. We do not mistake a feeling of 
fear for a feeling of pity, and a feeling of anger is speci- 
fically different from a feeling of love. It is this specific 
difference that is indicated by the application of different 
names to the feelings. 

Associated with Intellectual Processes.— It is impos- 
sible for us to understand the difference between feelings, 
unless we recognize that no feeling is ever experienced 
except in conjunction with some intellectual process. 
That intellectual process is always a perception, either of 
some object or of a relation. 

Different Brain Centers Traversed. — No one will 
question the statement that whenever an intellectual pro- 
cess is experienced, a nervous impulse passes through 
some combination of cells in the brain. When an intel- 
lectual process of one kind is experienced, one combina- 
tion of cells is traversed, and when a different intellectual 
process is experienced, a nervous impulse passes through 
a different combination. We are not able to state the 
reason for the association of particular mental processes 
with particular combinations of cells, but the facts will 
be admitted by all psychologists. 

Varies with Things Perceived. — We have seen that 
under proper conditions, resistance is encountered in a 
brain center whenever a nervous impulse of sufficient 
strength is transmitted through it. Whenever an impulse 
passes through some combination of cells, and accom- 
panies the perception of a raging lion or an angry bull or 
some other dangerous animal, if the perception is clear, 
the nervous impulse strong, and the resistance great 
enough, we experience the feeling of fear. While if the 
impulse passes through some combination of cells accom- 
panying the perception of a starving mother with her 
family of little children, if the impulse is strong, the per- 



The Properties of Feeling ' 49 

ception clear, and the resistance great enough we exper- 
ience the feeling of pity. 

Depends Upon the Brain Center. — The difference in 
the thing^s that are seen accounts for the difference in the 
feelings that are experienced. Resistance encountered in 
one combination accompanies one feeling, while resist- 
ance encountered in another combination accompanies a 
different kind of feeling. Hence we may say that the 
specific difference in feelings depends upon the brain cen- 
ter in which the resistance is encountered. 

What Brain Center Means. — When we use the term 
brain center in this connection we must understand that 
we mean, not a definitely circumscribed location in the 
brain, but the entire combination of cells that is 
traversed by an impulse. Also it must be understood 
that the same cell or group of cells may enter into many 
different combinations, and at different times belong to 
many different brain centers. Hence we shall expect to 
find that m^any feelings bear various degrees of relation- 
ship, and whole series shade into each other. 

No Special Localization of Feelings. — With this un- 
derstanding we shall avoid the implication that there is 
one brain center, or cortical area, in which the feelings are 
located. There is not one center for fear and another for 
veneration, but there are as many centers in which resist- 
ance accompanies the feeling of fear as there are things 
that we can be afraid of. 

Number of Feelings. — As numerous as are the differ- 
ent kinds of feelings (Titchener suggests a list of more 
than a hundred), the number of intellectual processes 
must be indefinitely greater. This must be true, not only 
because of the fact that different intellectual processes 
are accompanied by the transmission of impulses through 
centers whose resistance accompanies the same kind of 



50 Functional Psychology 

feeling, but because unless the resistance reaches a cer- 
tain minimum which is difficult of determination, no feel- 
ing is experienced, while the concomitant intellectual pro- 
cesses may be very clear. Many intellectual processes are 
accompanied by no feeling. 

Not Sharply Discriminated. — It is difficult as well as 
unprofitable to try to make sharp discriminations between 
feelings. The feelings shade into one another, and one 
feeling will be specifically related to another in exactly 
the proportion that the number of cells in the combina- 
tion that offers resistance are identical with those in the 
combination whose resistance accompanies the second 
feeling. 

Transformation of Feelings. — A feeling of one kind 
may change to a feeling of another kind even when we 
contemplate the same object. This is not in consequence 
of the difference in "attitude," whatever that may mean, 
but because of the change in the cells through which the 
nervous impulse is passing. A person who has never 
heard of a rattlesnake, and sees one for the first time, 
is not in the least afraid of it. The cells through which 
the nervous impulse is passing are not those that have 
been associated with the feeling of fear. But a person 
who knows what a rattlesnake can do, when he sees a 
rattlesnake sees also his possible death; the suffering 
that may accompany the bite, the action of striking which 
the rattle precedes. All of these different combinations 
are traversed by the same impulse, and the resistance 
encountered in this entire combination accompanies a 
very different feeling from that which accompanies the 
resistance in the combination that gives merely a visual 
image of the snake. 

Different Feelings With Same Perception. — But if 

the person becomes very familiar with rattlesnakes, has 
killed many of them and escaped many more; if rattle- 



The Properties of Feeling 51 

snakes come to constitute an ever present element in 
the perceivable surroundings of the person, the feeling 
undergoes another change. Yet in all three cases, the 
supposition is that the same object is perceived, while 
really very different combinations of cells are traversed 
by the impulse. 

Intensity. — Feelings differ from each other in still 
another respect. Not only is there a specific difference, 
but there is a difference in intensity. There are weak 
feelings and strong feelings. We may experience a weak 
feeling of anger and a strong feeling of anger. We may 
pity a person much or little. But we may describe feel- 
ings as having different degrees of intensity even though 
they may differ in specific character. We may have a 
strong feeling of love and a weak feeling of contempt. 
Strong and weak are relative terms, and we may desig- 
nate by them indefinite degrees of intensity which every 
one will recognize as having been experienced. How 
shall we account for this difference in intensity? 

Depends Upon Amount of Resistance. — We have in 
the fact of resistance, an explanation of the various and 
varying intensity of feeling. The greater the resistance, 
the more intense will be the feeling, and the feeling will 
decrease as the resistance becomes less. We have in this 
fact an explanation of the decrease of feeling in habitual 
experience. No fact is better demonstrated in physiology 
than that habit tends to diminish resistance and the fact 
is generally recognized under the name of the law of 
neural habit. We have already seen that habit, or prac- 
tice, decreases reaction time, and that the limit toward 
which practice tends to diminish it, is that of a reflex act. 
But no feeling accompanies a reflex, so we can readily 
understand that habit, repetition, practice may so dimin- 
ish resistance that all feeling may disappear from it. 



52 Functional Psychology 

Intensity of Peripheral Experiences. — We have in 
this explanation of intensity an explanation also of the 
fact that an object, occurrence or an event that is ob- 
served directly is likely to be accompanied by a feeling 
of greater intensity than is one that is merely read about. 
If we should see a man run over by a street car and 
mangled out of all resemblance to humanity, the feeling 
accompanying such a perception would be so strong that 
we should characterize it only as a feeling of horror. 
But if we merely read about it in the morning papers, 
while we may be as certainly assured of the correctness 
of the account as if we had been present and witnessed 
it, the feeling that we should experience would be much 
less intense. 

Feebleness of Central Experiences. — A peripherally 
initiated impulse is always stronger than a centrally ini- 
tiated one. In case of our personal observation of the 
accident on the street car line, we have the whole situa- 
tion presented to us by means of peripherally initiated 
impulses, which are strong, and the percept is vivid, the 
accompanying impulses meeting with much resistance. 
But in the case of merely reading the account, the only 
peripherally initiated impulses are those that enable us 
to perceive the printed letters on the page, while the 
scene of the accident is pictured by means of centrally 
initiated impulses, which seldom approximate the inten- 
sity or encounter the same degree of resistance, as do 
the peripherally initiated. 

Weakness of Remembered Feelings. — A dish of ice 
cream that is eaten is much more satisfying than is one 
that is merely thought about, because of the difference 
in the resistance encountered by the accompanying peri- 
pherally and centrally initiated impulses. It is difficult, 
if not almost impossible to remember, or reinstate, a 
feeling. We can remember, or re-experience a feeling 



The Properties of Feeling 53 

only by reinstating the intellectual process that accom- 
panied it, and if this is accomplished by means of a cen- 
trally initiated impulse, it is not likely ever to approxi- 
mate the intensity and the resistance encountered by 
the previous peripherally initiated impulse. 

Decrease of Intensity From Habit. — But let us sup- 
pose we should see a man run over by the street car 
every day, or that almost every hour in the day some 
event of this kind should occur within our observation. 
It would not be long until we should look upon it as a 
matter of course, and rather express astonishment when 
some person less accustomed to such gruesome sights 
should reprove us for being callous and hard-hearted. 
The degree of resistance and the intensity of feeling ac- 
companying the first experience would become lessened 
by practice, custom, habit. Something of this kind must 
be considered to occur in case of soldiers who have par- 
ticipated in many battles. Physicians undergo the same 
kind of experience in their dealing with examples of 
suffering, and the same kind of change is observed in 
the case of persons whose duty it is to slaughter animals 
for market. 

Other Conditions of Decreased Intensity. — Since the 
amount of resistance is determined by the strength of 
the impulse as well as by the condition of the brain cen- 
ter, anything that modifies the amount of nervous energy 
will modify the resistance and the intensity of the con- 
comitant feeling. If the amount of nervous energy be 
decreased in any way, by narcotics, impure air, disease, 
starvation, or lack of blood supply, the resulting feeling 
will be decreased in the same proportion. This will en- 
able us to understand why in sleep, or as the result of a 
dose of morphine, the feeling is lessened. 

Intensity Modified by Attention. — Besides these fac- 
tors, the degrees of resistance and its congomitg^nt inten- 



54 Functional Psychology 

sity of feeling may be increased or decreased, although 
both the brain center and the amount of nervous energy 
remain the same, by a process of attention, whose 
mechanism we shall study in a subsequent chapter. 

Tone. — A third property of feeling is tone, by which 
we mean its pleasurable or painful character. This qual- 
ity is of so much importance in the life of the individual 
that many writers on psychology have regarded pleasure 
and pain as constituting the feeling itself. Some have 
regarded pain and pleasure as qualities of the intellectual 
sensation, rather than of the affective process feeling. 
However, we shall see that pain and pleasure are asso- 
ciated not with the amount of nervous energy that is 
transmitted through the brain center, but with the 
amount which is stopped out by resistance. 

Pain and Unpleasantness. — It is scarcely advisable 
to make the distinction between pain and unpleasantness 
as some psychologists do. Pain is regarded by them as 
a sensation originating in a sense organ, while unpleas- 
antness is the accompaniment of a mental process, or a 
feeling. Pain is, therefore, the accompaniment of a peri- 
pherally initiated impulse, while unpleasantness, or men- 
tal pain, is the concomitant of a centrally initiated im- 
pulse. The distinction is in vividness and is associated 
with the fact that the peripherally initiated impulse is 
always stronger than the centrally initiated. This is the 
only real distinction between them. 

Differ Quantitatively. — Pain and pleasure are not 
specifically different from each other, but differ quan- 
titatively rather than qualitatively. Pleasure may pass 
into pain, and pain into pleasure, without having the 
specific character of the feeling altered. Or, perhaps 
for the sake of accuracy, we ought to say that a feeling 
of a painful tone may pass into a feeling of the same 
specific character having a pleasurable tone. We experi- 



The Properties of Feeling 55 

ence a feeling of a painful tone when our hands are cold. 
When we come near a hot stove the feeling of warmth 
has a pleasurable tone ; but as the hands become warmer, 
the feeling may change to one of a painful tone. The 
odor of flowers is pleasant, but if the perfume is intensi- 
fied, the accompanying feeling will, with nearly every 
odor, become painful. 

Change of Tone. — Up to a certain point, the greater 
the intensity the more pleasant the tone; and beyond 
that point, an increase in intensity changes it to pain. 
We can understand that by varying the intensity we may 
cause a feeling having a pleasant tone to change to one 
having a painful tone, and conversely, we may cause a 
feeling having a painful tone to change to one having a 
pleasant tone. 

Change of Tone from Habit. — A feeling having a 
painful tone may change to one having a pleasant tone 
by varying the resistance, either through habit, atten- 
tion, or by diminishing the amount of nervous energy 
so as to produce less resistance and its concomitant feel- 
ing. Washing dishes is with many girls a disagreeable 
occupation, as is the weeding of the onion bed to the 
small boy. But by continued repetition, the feeling be- 
comes diminished in consequence of the diminished re- 
sistance incident to the habitual act, and the feeling be- 
comes less unpleasant, even if not positively pleasurable. 
It is not often that an occupation pleasant in the begin- 
ning remains continuously so. It becomes, not painful, 
perhaps, but rather monotonous, and ceases to furnish 
pleasure. 

Effect of Difference in Tone. — We may say in general 
that those actions which are accompanied by feelings 
having a painful tone are injurious, and those that are 
accompanied by feelings having a pleasurable tone are 
beneficial; or, painful feelings are injurious, and pleas- 



56 Functional Psychology 

urable feelings are beneficial; or, still more briefly and 
less accurately, that pain is injurious and pleasure is 
beneficial. 

Origin of Pain. — Any activity is accompanied by a 
feeling having a painful tone if the destruction of tissue 
in the active organ, nervous, muscular or glandular, goes 
on at a more rapid rate than it can be restored. When 
the destruction of tissue is not greater than can be re- 
stored as rapidly as it is used up, pain will not ensue. 
Whenever a nervous impulse encounters great resistance, 
we have a condition in which there is a rapid destruc- 
tion of tissue in nerve and brain. We cannot have great 
resistance without the liberation of much nervous energy, 
and this implies rapid oxidation of tissue. 

Excessive Intensity Painful. — It seems that pain arises 
whenever the activity of any organ is of such a nature 
that its continuation will prove injurious to the organ 
exercised. The feeling of fatigue is a painful feeling, 
and the actions that give rise to it are so excessive as to 
be injurious if persisted in. It is pleasant to see the sun- 
light, but to look directly at the sun engenders a feeling 
of such intensity as to be painful, and is injurious to the 
eyesight. 

Mental Pain Socially Injurious. — The illustrations 
that have been employed have all been of that kind which 
is called physical pain, but the same thing is true of other 
kinds of pain as well. When the action is of such a kind 
as to be injurious to the social organism, it is likely to 
be accompanied by a feeling having a painful tone, ex- 
amples of which may be found in the feelings that have 
been called conscience, shame, remorse. An action that 
is injurious to racial propagation is likely also to be ac- 
companied by mental feelings having a painful tone. So 
we may say that in general, any action that is injurious 



The Properties of Feeling 57 

to the physical structure or the social organism is likely 
to be accompanied by a feeling having a painful tone. 

Epicureanism. — The statement that pain is injurious 
is misleading if not properly understood. The correct 
form of statement is that those actions which are accom- 
panied by feelings having a painful tone are injurious, 
and those actions accompanied by feelings having a pleas- 
urable tone are beneficial. Now it seems as if we have a 
very satisfactory theory of life. In order to do the things 
that are beneficial, we need to do those things that are 
pleasant and avoid those that are unpleasant. We are 
thus landed into the philosophical system of the Epi- 
cureans. 

Apparent Exceptions. — But there are so many exam- 
ples of a contrary nature that we are inclined to question 
the philosophical soundness of the doctrine. If I should 
never do anything unpleasant, why am I advised to take 
quinine, or other equally distasteful medicine? Why am 
I told that the things I like to eat best are nearly always 
the things that are most likely to be injurious to my 
health? Why am I advised to get up early in the morn- 
ing, and to take exercise when I would so much rather 
not? Why am I advised to study in school the things 
that I like least, or why should I find it necessary to go 
to school at all, when I would so much rather play? 

How Explained. — The answer is easy. If we were 
perfectly adjusted to the environment in which we live, 
the rule would hold good in every instance. The things 
that are accompanied by pleasant feelings would always 
be beneficial, and those that are injurious would invaria- 
bly be accompanied by unpleasant feelings. But we are 
never perfectly adjusted to our environment, and never 
can be completely so. Our environment changes, chil- 
dren grow, improvements are made in methods of work, 
habits of living, and social ideals. Our ancestors lived in 



58 Functional Psychology 

a different climate and in different surroundings from 
what we do, and our whole hereditary fabric must be 
readjusted to the changed conditions. Our environment 
changes, and our perfect adjustment is destroyed. It is 
in the process of readjustment that the beneficial action 
is accompanied by an unpleasant feeling. Any process 
that is now unpleasant would ultimately become pleasant 
if only those who performed the unpleasant act survived 
and left descendants ; while those who were prevented 
from performing it by its unpleasantness died and left 
no descendants in consequence. 

Pain and Pleasure Both Beneficial. — Not only is pain 
in itself not injurious, but both pain and pleasure are 
alike beneficial. Pain is beneficial because in conse- 
quence of it we are induced to discontinue an injurious 
action. Pleasure is beneficial, because by it we are in- 
duced to perform the things that are advantageous to 
ourselves as individuals and to the community or the 
race. The painful feeling of hunger leads us to eat, and 
the pleasurable tone of the feeling accompanying the 
process of eating, contributes to the same result. Both 
pain of hunger and pleasure of eating conspire to induce 
us to eat, and when we realize that to eat is the first 
condition of living, we shall see that the process is not 
too well guarded by both pain and pleasure. In animals 
born like Mr. Hodge's puppies that refused to eat, having 
the fibres of the brain non-meduUated, no eating instinct 
being developed at birth, and no nervous organization 
that led to it, death was of course inevitable. They 
were described by Mr. Hodge as non-viable. 

Advantage of Pain. — Pain is a symptom of disease. 
It is a warning. As Dr. Woods Hutchinson calls it, it 
is the great danger signal of nature. The business of 
treatment is to cure the disease, not merely to mitigate 
the pain. If the pain is not relieved by the cure of the 



The Properties of Feeing 59 

disease, but is mitigated by the use of morphine or other 
narcotic drugs, or even by faith cure, or Christian 
Science, the relief of the pain is an evil rather than a 
good. 

Non-Painful Diseases Dangerous. — Some diseases, of 
which consumption may be taken as a type, are exceed- 
ingly dangerous, merely because in their early stages 
they are accompanied by no pain. More persons die of 
consumption every year in the United States than of any 
other disease, and yet in its earl}^ stages it is one of the 
most easily curable of diseases. If it were accompanied 
in its early stages by as much pain as a sore finger, no 
one w^ould in all probability die of consumption. 

Feelings of Constant Tone. — Pain and pleasure have 
been described as arising out of different degrees of in- 
tensity of the same feeling. Any feeling may have a 
painful tone or a pleasurable tone, depending upon the 
intensity of the feeling and its correlative resistance in 
the brain center. While in general this is true, it is 
possible that a modification of it is necessary in case of 
some of the most important activities. It is possible 
that some actions and some conditions are always pain- 
ful, no matter how little the intensity may be. It is 
doubtful if the feeling of hunger is ever pleasant, and 
possibly the feeling of fear may be the same. These 
feelings are of so much importance to the preservation 
of the individual that it would be unsafe to permit any 
degree of pleasure to exist in them. 

Constantly Pleasant. — Other feelings may be as con- 
sistently pleasant, as some of the race perpetuating feel- 
ings. It seems as if the activities of such tremendous 
importance cannot be trusted to the judgment of the 
individual; or rather, that those individuals and those 
races in whom certain important feelings always had 
these particular tones were the races and the individuals 



60 Functional Psychology 

best adapted to leave the largest number of descendants, 
and whose descendants had the best chance of surviving. 
Such examples, however, furnish no grounds for postu- 
lating a separate apparatus for pleasure and pain. They 
are brought directly under the laws of feeling, and ex- 
plained by the resistance that is encountered in the brain 
centers traversed by the appropriate impulses. 

Pain Not a Universal Device. — We are so much ac- 
customed to think of pleasure and pain as incentives to 
our actions that we can scarcely conceive that other 
creatures may not be actuated by the same devices. But 
to assume that pleasure and pain are universal in the 
animal kingdom, and still more in the plant world, would 
not be justified by anything that we know. We are 
inclined to attribute the squirming of an earthworm 
when it is cut in two to the fact that it feels pain, but 
there is really no more reason for considering the squirm- 
ing a manifestation of pain than of pleasure. A be- 
headed hen is moved to violent action, but we can 
scarcely see how a hen with her head cut off can experi- 
ence pain, or even pleasure. So the squirming of an 
earthworm may be an expression corresponding to our 
violent exertion of laughter, so far as we can discover. 
The action of a sensitive plant is not different from that 
of many animals whose actions we call expressions of 
pain, yet no one believes that the sensitive plant experi- 
ences pain. Although insects are highly organized 
creatures, it is doubtful if they are protected by the 
device of pain. At least, it is exceedingly difficult to 
prove that they are. 

DEFINITIONS 

Property of Feeling — A difference in feelings by 
means of which we distinguish one from another. 

Specific Character — That property of feeling which is 
expressed by giving feelings different names. 



The Properties of Feeling 61 

Intensity — That property of feeling which we describe 
by saying that the feeling is strong or weak. 

Tone — That property of feeling that is described as 
pleasure or pain. 

Unpleasantness — Mental pain, as distinguished from 
physical pain. 

Epicurean — One of the followers of the philosopher 
Epicurus who lived in Greece, about 320 B. C, and taught 
that the obtaining of pleasure constituted the highest 
good. 



CHAPTER V 

CLASSIFICATION OF FEELINGS. 

Nevertheless, the first foundation, or origin of the moral sense 
lies in the social instincts, including sympathy, and these instincts 
were primarily gained as in the case of the lower animals, through 
natural selection. — Darwin, Descent of Man, p. 700. 

It is certainly not true that there is in the mind of man any 
universal standard of beauty with respect to the human body. — 
Darwin, Descent of Man, p. 666. 

Purpose of Classification. — There can be only two 
purposes in the classification of a series of objects or 
processes, one is that of enabling us to remember the 
series more easily. When such is the purpose, the 
basis of classification is likely to be some purely acci- 
dental circumstance, and the resulting classification is 
not likely to possess a high order of merit. The second 
purpose is to show forth some relation that would not 
otherwise be discovered. Such a classification is likely 
to have for its basis some important character, and the 
classification will exhibit the natural relations between 
the objects classified, manifesting their nature more 
fully than would be possible without it. 

Natural Classification of Feelings. — As there is but 
one natural classification among animals and plants, 
which shows forth their relation by descent, so there is 
but one natural classification of the feelings, and that 
is one which manifests the relations among the feelings 
according to the functions that they perform in the life 
of the individual and the race, and the manner in which 
they have originated. 

A General Principle. — One general principle must be 
recognized in the study of the feelings, that is, that every 
feeling has now, or had in the comparatively recent past, 
some advantageous function to perform in the life of the 



Classification of Feelings 63 

race or the individual. If any feeling that is now experi- 
enced should prove to be injurious to the individual or 
to the race through the individual, that feeling would 
ultimately disappear, as a human characteristic in conse- 
quence of the elimination of the individuals in whom 
such feelings manifested themselves in an injurious man- 
ner. So a feeling that has proved itself advantageous to 
the individual, or to the race through the individual, has 
become fixed as a human characteristic by means of the 
advantage that the individuals who experienced the feel- 
ing had over the individuals who did not possess it. 

Natural Selection in Feelings. — This is the ordinary 

law of natural selection, and while its operation is diffi- 
cult to trace in mental processes, its efficiency has been 
manifested in so many directions that there is no hesita- 
tion in making this application of it to psychological pro- 
cesses, especially in the domain of the feelings. 

Two Primary Divisions. — In the development of 

every species of animals and plants, some means must 
be employed to secure the preservation of the individual 
and the propagation of the species. These are the two 
fundamental processes, and since in the human race the 
feelings largely determine the actions that secure these 
two results, it is possible to reduce all feelings to two 
great classes, one class being those feelings that accom- 
pany actions leading to the preservation of the individual, 
and the other the feelings that accompany actions lead- 
ing to the propagation of the species. 

The Two Divisions Fundamental. — These two groups 
of feelings are basic, and it is impossible to conceive how 
without them, the race could have survived, or have come 
to constitute a factor in the living world. No system of 
philosophy can ever hope to prove satisfactory as an 
explanation of human events that does not see all human 
actions springing out of these two great functions. 



64 Functional Psychology 

Hence we may expect the primary classification of feel- 
ings to be into two groups, the self preserving and the 
race perpetuating. 

A Third Principle. — But early in the history of the 
race, another principle came into operation. This is 
expressed in the gregarious principle by which human 
beings came to live in herds, or in society. The social 
organization has had such a tremendous influence in 
increasing the power of the individual, leading to the 
greater efficiency of the self preserving activities, and 
multiplying the number of individuals that constitute the 
species, that in periods of time comparatively recent, the 
function of social organization has become of almost 
equal importance with the self preserving function. 
Hence it is that while the feelings that lead to actions 
which maintain the social functions have been derived 
from the self preserving group, we must set them off by 
themselves as an independent group yet showing traces 
of their self preserving origin. 

The Three Groups of Feelings. — Since there are three 
important activities in the life of the race, we shall recog- 
nize that there are three great groups of feelings that 
correspond to these functions. The three groups are the 
self preserving feelings, which are called by Mr. Spencer, 
the egoistic ; the community preserving feelings, which 
correspond very nearly to Mr. Spencer's group of altru- 
istic ; and the race perpetuating, which include, without 
having the same limitations, Mr. Spencer's group of the 
ego-altruistic. 

Self Preserving Feelings. — The self preserving feel- 
ings, having once been named, need no definition nor 
description. Thy constitute a large group of feelings 
that accompany actions leading to the preservation of 
the individual. Nearly all the feelings that accompany 
the physical functions belong to this type. The feeling 



Classification of Feelings 65 

of hunger leads to the preservation of the individual by 
inducing actions that procure food. The pleasure derived 
from eating is of the same kind. Thirst, nausea, and 
fatigue belong to this group. The advantage of fatigue 
is very evident. Excessive activity of the muscle leads 
to destruction of tissue more rapidly than it can be re- 
placed, and danger of permanent injury arises. But the 
feeling of fatigue accompanying the increased resistance 
in the muscular center necessitates the cessation of ac- 
tivity. 

Self Preserving Fear. — Not all self preserving feelings 
are related to the physical functions. A good example 
is the feeling of fear. We have seen in a previous chap- 
ter that the various expressions of this feeling are actions, 
each of which in its appropriate situation tends to pre- 
serve the life of the individual. The shriek of the child, 
the flight of the man, the fear paralysis of the child or 
the man, each in its own situation may preserve him. 

Children's Feelings Self Preserving. — The self pre- 
serving feelings are especially dominant in the life of the 
little child. His only business is to live, and he makes 
everything else subservient to that purpose. There is no 
room in the constitution of the little child for feelings 
of self abnegation. He has no shame, modesty, rever- 
ence, gratitude, remorse, sympathy or pity. The doc- 
trine of total depravity is inevitable if we fail to tak€ into 
account the function of the feelings that a natural classi- 
fication discloses. 

Community Preserving Feelings. — The second great 
group of feelings are the community preserving, or al- 
truistic feelings. The name community preserving is 
much to be preferred, since it renders superfluous any 
explanation or definition of the group. While this group 
has been developed out of the self preserving feelings, 
it was split off from them very early in the history of 



66 Functional Psychology 

the race, when it adopted the gregarious habit of Hving. 
It is probable that the community preserving feelings 
exercised little influence upon the actions of men before 
the time that is known to anthropologists as the period 
of middle barbarism. We should not expect any great 
strength in the community preserving feelings until there 
was a community to preserve, and the community would 
in all probability develop coincidently with the growth of 
the appropriate feelings. 

Developed Out of Self Preserving. — It is possible to 
show that the community preserving feelings have been 
developed out of the self preserving, and that they are 
in their origin the same. Hence it is not at all a matter 
of surprise to us that so much ingenuity has been ex- 
pended in showing that altruism and egoism are at bot- 
tom one and the same thing. The person who preserves 
and benefits himself at the same time benefits the com- 
munity of which he forms a part by furnishing it with 
a more efficient member. So the person who does some- 
thing to benefit the community is at the same time bene- 
fiting himself, since he constitutes a part of the commu- 
nity to whom the benefit of his action accrues. 

Community Preserving Actions. — Any action that 
directly results in benefit to some one else is properly a 
community preserving act, and the feelings that are ap- 
propriate to it are community preserving feelings. We 
fail to recognize it as such in many cases, because by 
habit the feeling has largely disappeared from most of 
the community preserving actions that we do. The man 
who shovels coal into another man's cellar window is 
engaged in an altruistic act, and equally so is the man 
who puts up a sign in front of his store to let persons 
know where they can buy the kind of goods that they 
desire to purchase. 

Not Necessarily Sacrificial. — Such actions are not com- 



Classification of Feelings 67 

monly recognized as altruistic, because our content for 
the word is altogether too narrow and perverted. As 
habitually employed, it includes something of the idea 
of sacrifice and painful tone in the feeling that accom- 
panies the altruistic action. Such is not a proper mean- 
ing for the word, and the way in which such a perverted 
meaning came to be applied to it furnishes a most inter- 
esting chapter in the history of philosophical doctrine. 

Community Preserving Feelings Moral. — To this 
great group of community preserving feelings belong all 
the feelings that we call moral. Justice, truth, integrity 
are all of them necessary for the preservation of the 
communit}^, and the community is strong in exactly the 
proportion that these feelings dominate the actions of all 
its members. 

Courage. — But there are other feelings belonging to 
this group whose position is less readily seen. Courage 
is the great virtue, and in fact is the mother of all the 
others. Courage is a community preserving feeling, and 
finds its utility in the benefit it confers upon the commu- 
nity. Courage is the feeling that leads a man to go into 
the army and fight, even though he knows that he will 
be killed. In this way it comes directly into conflict with 
fear, which is a self preserving feeling. Courage, not 
hope, is the antithesis of fear. 

How Benefit the Community. — The individual who 
goes into battle and is killed, benefits the community, not 
directly by getting himself killed, although all of us have 
known men whom we have reason to believe could bene- 
fit the community more by getting themselves killed than 
they could in any other way. But the man who goes to 
war and fights the enemies of his community, even 
though he is killed himself, preserves the community for 
which he fights. 



68 Functional Psychology 

Not the Death of the Individual. — The death of the 
individual, especially one who has courage and the vir- 
tues that properly associate themselves with it, is directly 
an injury to the community. But in case that the exist- 
ence of the community is threatened, it is advantageous 
to set aside a portion of the community, even one-tenth 
of its members, to fight and be killed, if thereby the 
safety and continued existence of the community with 
the other nine-tenths of its members is assured. Hence 
it follows that courage is a community preserving, moral 
feeling. 

Malevolent Feelings. — Among the community pre- 
serving feelings we must class some that at first glance 
appear to be directly contradictory to the definition im- 
plied in the word community preserving. Here belong 
such feelings as anger, hate and revenge. These are 
the feelings that are sometimes called the malevolent 
group. It appears to be almost a paradox to class them 
with the community preserving, or altruistic group, be- 
cause to our common thought it appears that they are 
community destroying feelings. 

How Explained. — But we must look for a justification 
of our grouping to the function that they have had in 
racial history when they became established by the pro- 
cess of natural selection. In certain stages of society 
which we have called savage, it is universally regarded 
as a moral obligation to take revenge for the killing of 
a kinsman or fellow tribesman. The killer himself, or 
some member of the killer's family must be killed, and 
a relative of the murdered man who does not seek re- 
venge is considered immoral, and unworthy fellowship 
in his tribe. Even now in warfare it is considered neces- 
sary to stir up hatred and revenge toward the members 
of the nation with whom we are at war. It is necessary 
to "Fire the national heart." This induces enlistment 



Classification of Feelings 69 

in the army, prevents desertion, and makes better fight- 
ers. An army disintegrates if its soldiers become 
friendly with the soldiers of the enemy. 

When Moral. — It is perfectly allowable to hate an 
enemy in warfare, and to kill him if we can. A soldier 
must kill, take human life. That is what he is hired for, 
and the feelings appropriate to such actions, and which 
lead to killing, are moral, virtuous, and tend to preserve 
the community. 

When Immoral. — These feelings have their appro- 
priate function when they are directed toward the ene- 
mies of the community, and when so directed tend to 
preserve it. They receive their reprehensible character 
when instead of being directed toward the enemies of 
the community they are directed towards the members of 
the same community. Then they become immoral and 
detrimental to the community itself. Since warfare has 
ceased to be a universal and constant occupation, these 
feelings have largely lost their appropriate character and 
persist rather as vestigial feelings, than as feelings whose 
functions are still important. They have ceased to be 
regarded as moral, and have come to be considered im- 
moral, which fact in itself is an indication of their vesti- 
gial character. 

Among Whom Best Exemplified. — We find anger, 
hate and revenge best exemplified in those members of 
the community who are least developed ; among the un- 
educated and the lowest stratum of society; among the 
near-criminals. They are least exemplified among the bet- 
ter classes of persons in the community, and when they 
are manifested, they are never boasted about, but con- 
cealed with shame. So when we find anger and revenge 
exhibited by little children, we recognize these feelings as 
an indication of an undeveloped condition, and perhaps as 
the bringing forward of a tendency that is becoming 



70 Functional Psychology 

vestigial, and being dropped out of the life of the race 
as a characteristic of a human being. 

Sympathy, Pity, Charity. — We recognize pity, sym- 
pathy and charity as the best examples of community 
preserving feelings, and we can readily understand that 
they benefit the community by preserving many of its 
members who would otherwise be unable to preserve 
themselves. They are the best examples of the moral 
virtues, but it is perfectly possible that they might come 
to be considered immoral, and to occupy the same posi- 
tion in the estimation of the community generally that is 
now held by anger, hate and revenge. 

May Become Immoral. — We know that there are pau- 
pers, criminals and hopelessly insane persons in every 
community who must be supported and cared for by the 
work of other members. They constitute a weakness to 
the community, detracting from its strength and ability 
to accomplish what it otherwise would be able to do. 
We can see what the effect is if we should imagine the 
defective and dependent classes to become very much 
larger than they are at present and to continue to be 
supported by the community. The feelings of pity, 
sympathy and charity would then constitute a source of 
great weakness to the community, and tending to destroy 
it, would without any doubt come to be regarded as 
imm.oral. Even now we are taught that indiscriminate 
charity giving to beggars on the street is not a virtue, 
and should never be done. So it is not justice to allow 
defectives to marry and perpetuate their kind. 

Race Perpetuating Feelings. — The race perpetuating 
feelings constitute a third group. They are fundam.ental 
in the development of the race, and have the same basic 
position as do the self preserving feelings. They are 
even more fundamental than are the community pre- 



Classification of Feelings 71 

serving feelings, and even more powerful in leading to 
action, though their range is more circumscribed. 

Incident to Family Life. — The race perpetuating feel- 
ings are such as are incident to the rearing of children, 
and the propagation of the species. They are those that 
are especially incident to family life, such as the love of 
a man for his wife, or wife for her husband, present or 
prospective ; of parents for children, or a brother for a 
sister, or better, for somebody else's sister. 

Mother Love. — The best example of race perpetuat- 
ing feelings is perhaps that of mother love. This is a 
feeling of such intensity that it will overcome almost any 
other kind. A woman is likely to be influenced strongly 
by the feeling of fear, a self preserving feeling. But the 
influence of mother love will completely annihilate the 
self preserving feeling, and make of the mother an em- 
bodiment of courage. A parent can be injured in no 
other way so severely as through his child, and nearly 
any parent will, if necessary, preserve the life of the child 
at the sacrifice of his own. 

Late in Appearing. — The race perpetuating feelings 
are rather late in making their appearance, and scarcely 
manifest themselves in typical forms before the age of 
adolescence. Then they assume a dominant importance 
in the life of the individual. 

Religious Feelings Race Perpetuating. — The three 
groups of feelings that we have described are delimited 
from each other according to the functions that they have 
performed in the development of the race. The religious 
feelings constitute a group in a different system of classi- 
fication, and are separated from other groups of feelings 
by the object toward which they are directed. Much the 
larger number of religious feelings will find their place 
in the group of the race perpetuating feelings, and are 



72 Functional Psychology 

derived from them. This is shown by the fact that the 
important reHgious experiences occur nearly coincidently 
with the development of the race perpetuating feelings, 
and in connection with the oncoming of adolescence. 
The terms that are employed in religious life are those 
particularly appropriate to family matters. Father, son, 
bride of Christ, born again, brother, sister, are particu- 
larly noticeable. Similarly, the hope that religion holds 
out of a reunion of the family that has been separated 
by death is the most convincing appeal that can be made 
to believe in some of the most essential religious doc- 
trines, such as life after death and immortality. 

Religious Feelings of the Self Preserving Group. — 

But other religious feelings belong to the self preserving 
group. These are the sehfish feelings, and the belief in 
religion as a means of obtaining assistance in one's 
career, or in obtaining anything whatever that is ardently 
desired, as well as the hope of continuing existence and 
escaping future punishment. All feelings that relate to 
these activities and are classed as religious belong to 
the self preserving or selfish group. 

Religious Feelings of the Community Preserving 
Group. — But other feelings are designated as religious 
which are allied to the community preserving group. In 
so far as religion enters into the development of morality, 
the concomitant feelings belong to the community pre- 
serving group. It will be recognized that there is a wide 
diversity among different persons, religions and races 
concerning the feelings that may be called religious, but 
that there is no necessity for establishing a separate 
group of religious feelings, since all of them fall natur- 
ally into one or the other of the three groups already 
established. 

Esthetic Feelings. — It is quite common to describe 
a fourth group of feelings called the esthetic. Esthetic 



Classification of Feelings 73 

feelings are those which accompany the perception of the 
beautiful or the ugly. But when we undertake to decide 
what constitutes the beautiful or the ugly, we are com- 
pelled to rely upon the feelings that are awakened, or 
we must adopt a conventional standard. 

Pseudo-Esthetic. — Some things are judged to be 
beautiful wholly because a conventional standard has 
been established, and we have been taught to call them 
beautiful. The things adjudged beautiful are called so 
because they conform to this standard, not because we 
ourselves experience pleasure from their perception, in- 
dependently of the standard. Such feelings may be called 
pseudo-esthetic. We may experience much pleasure 
from owning and wearing a large diamond, but when 
we learn that instead of its being a diamond it is merely 
glass, our pleasure is very much diminished. We may 
be unable to discover the difference ourselves between 
the real diamond and the imitation, and our pleasure 
ought to be as great in the one case as in the other. But 
it is not, and consequently the feeling may be described 
as pseudo-esthetic. Our judgment of the beautiful in 
this case turns upon the opinion of other persons, and 
consequently we may group such pseudo-esthetic feel- 
ings among the community preserving. 

Esthetic Race Perpetuating Feelings. — But we judge 
other things to be beautiful that do not conform at all 
to the standard established by other persons. No one 
ever heard of a mother who was willing to accept the 
judgment of other persons in general upon the beauty 
of her children. Nor does a lover experience esthetic 
feelings in accordance with the judgment of the commu- 
nity concerning the beauty of his sweetheart. Such feel- 
ings are not pseudo-esthetic, nor do they belong to the 
community preserving group. They are excellent illus- 
trations of race perpetuating feelings. 



74 Functional Psychology 

Esthetic Self Preserving Feelings. — There are two 
kinds of esthetic feelings that belong to the self preserv- 
ing group. One is that kind of feeling that is manifested 
in perceiving such objects as the rainbow, or a magnifi- 
cent sunset, or any other experience that accompanies 
pleasure derived from a mere exercise of the senses. This 
is an example of the purest esthetic feeling and does not 
depend upon any conventional standard, nor the judg- 
ment of other persons. 

Esthetic Adaptations. — A second kind of esthetic feel- 
ings that belong to the self preserving group is that ac- 
companying the judgment of beauty in anything that 
performs its function admirably. The delicate mechan- 
ism of a watch, or other piece of machinery, the admir- 
able adaptations seen in a flower or the mechanism of an 
animial, the adjustment of the seasons and method of 
distributing the rainfall may all of them awaken esthetic 
feelings, and they are of such a nature that we may group 
them with the self preserving. Many persons refuse to 
call them esthetic, but personally it appears to the writer 
that they are excellent examples. 

DEFINITIONS 
Classincation — An arrangement of a number of ob- 
jects in series according to the presence or absence of 
certain characteristics in them. 

Natural Selection — A principle by which those ani- 
mals or plants which present some characteristic that 
adapts them to their situation are preserved (or selected) 
while those that do not possess the advantageous charac- 
ter die off and leave no descendants. Ultimately it hap- 
pens that all the animals or plants that survive possess 
the adapting character. 

Self Preserving Feelings — Those that accompany 



Classification of Feelings 75 

actions that tend to preserve the individual. Called also 
egoistic, or selfish feelings. 

Community Preserving Feelings — Those feelings that 
accompany actions that tend to benefit or preserve the 
community. Called also the altruistic, and moral feel- 
ings. 

Race Perpetuating Feelings — Those feelings that ac- 
company actions tending to propagate the species and 
perpetuate the race. 

Esthetic Feelings — Those feelings that accompany 
the perception of anything- that is adjudged to be beau- 
tiful or ugly. 



CHAPTER VI 

CONSCIOUSNESS. 

The term consciousness is equally ambiguous ; it may mean 
simply what is experienced; it may mean our knowledge of that 
experience; or it may mean a state to which our mental realities, 
otherwise unconscious, may somehow attain. — Kulpe, Psychol- 
ogy, p. 2. 

Many distinguished thinkers, especially on the physiological 
side (Wundt, Ziehen, etc.), take the ideas of consciousness and 
psychic function to be identical : "All psychic action is conscious" 
"The province of psychic life is coextensive with that of conscious- 
ness." In our opinion, such a definition gives undue extension to 
the meaning of consciousness, and occasions many errors and mis- 
understandings. We share rather the views of other philosophers 
(Romanes, Fritz Miiller, Schultze, and Paulsen) that our uncon- 
scious presentations, sensations, volitions, pertain to our psychic 
life. Indeed, the province of these unconscious psychic actions is 
far more extensive than that of consciousness. — Haeckel, Riddle of 
the Universe, p. 172. 

Let us repeat it, psychical and conscious are for us, at least at 
the beginning of our investigations, identical. — Ziehen, Physiological 
Psychology, p. 5. 

From the outstart, the conception unconscious psychical process 
is for us an empty conception. — Ziehen, Physiological Psychol- 
ogy, p. 5. 

The error has been in confounding two quite distinct things: 
having a sensation, and being conscious of having a sensation. — 
Spencer, Psychology, Vol II, p. 372. 

Consciousness accompanies the psychological processes of 
reasoning, sensation, recollection, etc. It does not constitute them. 
It is an epiphenomenon and nothing more. — Binet, Psychology of 
Reasoning, p. 91. 

Ultimate analysis of psychical processes shows that the uncon- 
scious is the theater of the most important mental phenomena. The 
conscious is always conditioned upon the unconscious. — Ribot, 
German Psychology, p. 191. 

I can receive a sense impression without recognizing it, for 
a sense impression does not involve consciousness. — Karl Pearson, 
Grammar of Science, p. 43. 

Consciousness may be compared to an internal light by means 
of which, and which alone,, what passes in my mind is rendered 
visible. — Hamilton, Metaphysics (Bowen), p. 120. 

Consciousness is the recognition by the thinking subject of his 
own acts and affections. — Hamilton, Metaphysics, p. 131. 



Consciousness 77 

We can be conscious only as we are conscious of something. — 
Hamilton, Metaphysics (Bowen), p. 132. 

Consciousness is the perception of what passes in one's own 
mind. — Locke, Human Understanding, Bk. H, Chap. 1, Sec. 19. 

The radiation of nerve force from strongly excited nerve cells 
to other connected nerve cells may help us to understand how 
reflex actions originated. — Darwin, Expression of the Emotions, 
p. 41. 

It is true and universal that consciousness tends to disappear 
from reactions as they are oftener repeated. — Baldwin, Methods 
and Processes, p. 168. 

Consciousness. — The entire matter of consciousness 
is in a more confused and disordered state than that of 
almost any other division of psychology. The confusion 
arises largely from the use of the word consciousness in 
two distinct senses, with a strong tendency to adopt the 
one that is least to be commended. The first use of the 
word means a knowledge of our own mental states and 
processes that are in progress at any particular time. 
This is sometimes described by employing the word 
awareness. In the terms of the old psychology, con- 
sciousness was defined as the power the mind has to 
know its own states and actions. It gave us knowledge 
of our own mental states and processes. 

Awareness. — We no longer describe mental processes 
as powers, and by consciousness we mean the knowledge 
of our mental processes ; or we may mean the process by 
which our own mental states become known; or, the 
property of a mental process by which it is known to us. 
Either of these descriptions is indicated by the word 
awareness to discriminate it from another use of the 
term. 

Unconsciousness Loss of Awareness. — This is the 
common meaning of the word. When we speak of los- 
ing consciousness, we mean that we cease to be aware of 
the mental processes that are going on. We are uncon- 
scious when we are asleep, and when we awaken we 
become conscious. Chloroform brings on a condition of 



78 Functional Psychology 

unconsciousness, and equally effective in producing the 
same result is a blow on the head. Unconsciousness may 
be produced in many ways, and the difference between 
consciousness and unconsciousness is always the same. 

Consciousness as a Synonym for Mind. — But another 
content of the word consciousness has come into very 
general use among psychologists, and by it is meant any 
mental process that can be experienced. It is used as a 
synonym for mind. Any mental process is a state of 
consciousness, and there can be no mental process that 
is not a conscious state. This is one form of the state- 
ment, and another form which is intended to mean the 
same thing is that there can be no mental process that 
is not attended with consciousness. In fact, the first 
statement that any mental process is a state of tonscious- 
ness grows out of the second that every mental process 
is attended by consciousness, or is a conscious state. It 
will be seen when we compare these two statements that 
there is involved in them a begging of the question, or 
an assumption of the thing that we undertake to prove. 

Not a Proper Use of the Word. — It would be equally 
possible to prove that every mental process is accom- 
panied by feeling, and therefore every mental process is 
a state of feeling; or, that every mental process is accom- 
panied by some muscular movement, and therefore every 
mental process is a state of muscular contraction; or, 
that every mental process is accompanied by a process 
of attention, and therefore every mental process is a state 
of attention ; or, that every mental process is conative 
condition, and therefore every mental process is a state 
of will. Any one of these statements has the same kind 
of justification that is shown by the definition that a 
mental process is a state of consciousness. 

Unconsciousness Not Mental. — The second meaning 
of the word grows out of the arbitrary doctrine that no 



Consciousness 79 

unconscious process can be mental, and that such un- 
conscious state does not constitute a proper subject for 
discussion in psychology. Those who employ the second 
meaning of the word assert that there is no difference 
betw^een a sensation and the consciousness of a sensa- 
tion, and that an unconscious mental process is a contra- 
diction in terms. 

How Originated. — It appears that the idea that men- 
tal action and consciousness are inseparable grew out of 
the desire of Descartes to prove that man constituted a 
different order of being from other animals. As that 
notion was consistent with the ultra religious spirit of 
the earlier psychologists, holding their peculiar views of 
the nature of mind, it was easy of acceptance by them. 
Recent physiological psychologists have accepted it 
without sufficient criticism, perhaps in consequence of 
the difficulty of framing any hypothesis of a physiologi- 
cal nature by which the phenomena of consciousness 
could be presented in understandable terms. 

Consciousness Not Necessary to a Mental Act. — It is 
difficult to propose such an hypothesis, that shall sum- 
mate all the effects of consciousness. Let us note in the 
first place that consciousness is not necessary to a mental 
act. Consciousness is most intense when the mental 
processes are most imperfect and hesitant. When we 
are learning to skate or play the piano, or to whet a 
razor, we are most intensely conscious of our actions. 
Even if our actions are not physical but mental, as in 
making a difficult calculation in arithmetic, we are in- 
tensely conscious of the steps that must be taken in 
learning it. But as we become familiar with the process, 
and acquire skill in doing it, the intensity of conscious- 
ness diminishes until when we have attained the highest 
degree of skill, it seems almost to have disappeared. This 
is one of the fundamental data that we shall have to con- 



80 Functional Psychology 

sider in expressing the relation of consciousness to other 
mental processes, and demonstrating a physiological 
hypothesis for it. 

Always Conscious of Something. — x\nother fact that 
must be considered is that we can never be merely con- 
scious, we must be conscious of something. Conscious- 
ness can never exist alone. Consciousness is the accom- 
paniment of an intellectual process, such as a perception, 
or the discovery of a relation or a feeling which it must 
accompany. The consciousness may be intense or feeble; 
it may vary in its intensity without any corresponding 
variation in the intensity of the process which it accom- 
panies. We shall expect then, to find the physiological 
concomitant of consciousness in some element of the 
nervous current, or of the transmission of a nervous im- 
pulse through a nervous arc whose concomitant is an 
intellectual act. 

Shadowy Background of Consciousness. — A third fact 
that must accord with any theory which we may present 
about consciousness is that in nearly every experience 
of which we are conscious, there is a shadowy back- 
ground of other facts, events and processes, less vivid 
than the one that we may consider in the focus as repre- 
senting the mental process for which consciousness is 
the accompaniment. This shadowy background is not 
necessarily present, and may be very much narrowed 
or altogether omitted ; but its frequent presence mate- 
rially assists us in suggesting a probable hypothesis for 
consciousness. These three facts will enable us to frame 
such an hypothesis when we consider them all together. 

Origin of Expression. — We have described feeling as 
the concomitant of the resistance encountered by a nerv- 
ous impulse in passing through a nervous arc. But we 
have recognized the fact that when a nervous impulse 
encounters resistance, it has a tendency to spread out 



Consciousness 81 

into the surrounding cells. We have seen that this 
spreading out into the surrounding cells of the motor 
region and the glandular centers is the nervous correlate 
of the expression of feeling. 

Radiation. — But not all of the impulse that radiates 
out of the brain center through which it is passing goes 
into the motor centers. Some of it passes into the fring- 
ing cells around the brain center and since these are not 
necessarily motor centers, no movement follows. If the 
radiating portion of the nervous impulse were to traverse 
these fringing cells as if they were other brain centers, 
each brain center so traversed by the radiating impulse 
would accompany an intellectual process, fainter than 
the original, as the radiating impulse is weaker than the 
main impulse. It is in such a supposition as this that we 
can picture the dim, faint fringe of perceptions and other 
mental processes that accompany the conscious act. This 
would be the physiological explanation of the things that 
are in the fringe of consciousness. 

The Fringing Cells. — But this background of faint 
perceptions and definite mental processes is not neces- 
sary to a conscious act. We may be conscious of the 
mental process in the focus without any of the fringing 
percepts. The nervous impulse may, and sometimes does 
radiate out of the fringing cells without passing through 
them as a brain center and completing their circuit. We 
may say that it radiates into the fringing cells without 
running through them. This will stand to us for the 
concomitant of consciousness. The radiation of the 
nervous impulse out of the brain center into the fringing 
cells we may consider as the concomitant of conscious- 
ness. This will give us an interpretation of the process, 
enabling us easily to understand and to express the rela- 
tion that it holds to other mental processes. 

Radiation Depends Upon Resistance. — It is evident 



82 Functional Psychology 

that the nervous impulse will not radiate out into the 
fringing cells unless some resistance is encountered in 
the brain center. The resistance itself is the concomitant 
of feeling, but the radiation Avhich follows upon the re- 
sistance is the concomitant of consciousness. 

Consciousness and Feeling. — It follows then, that if 
our interpretation of the physiological concomitant is 
correct, consciousness and feeling will vary together. 
Other things being the same, the greater the feeling the 
more intense will be the consciousness, and the less the 
feeling the less intensity of consciousness. This result 
arises, not in consequence of any causal connection with 
each other, but because the two, consciousness and feel- 
ing, are both similarly related to the same circumstance, 
the amount of resistance encountered. Whatever in- 
creases the resistance, will at the same time increase both 
feeling and the intensity of consciousness. Whatever de- 
creases the resistance will by that very fact decrease both 
feeling and the intensity of consciousness. Feeling is not 
the cause of the consciousness, nor is consciousness the 
cause of the feeling, but both of them are related in the 
same way to the antecedent condition, resistance. 

Feeling and Consciousness Discriminated. — The above 
explanation will enable us to see the relation between 
feeling and consciousness, and will help us to understand 
that whenever we are experiencing any feeling we are 
conscious, and conscious of that feeling. It will show 
us why consciousness and feeling are not likely to be 
experienced separately from each other, but it will show 
us also how inaccurate is the expression that feeling is a 
state of consciousness, or that feeling and consciousness 
are identical. 

Consciousness and Expression. — Similarly, our 
hypothesis v/ill enable us to understand the relation be- 
tween consciousness and expression. We might derive 



Consciousness 83 

this relation indirectly by saying that since feeling and 
consciousness are directly related to each other, the laws 
that express the relation between feeling and its expres- 
sion, would apply equally well to the relation between 
consciousness and expression. 

Consciousness Homologous to Expression. — We have 
explained the expression of feeling as the radiation of the 
nervous impulse out of the primary brain center into the 
motor and glandular centers as a consequence of the re- 
sistance encountered. In the radiation out into the fring- 
ing cells that are neither motor nor glandular centers we 
believe we have the concomitant of consciousness. It ap- 
pears then, that the expression of feeling and conscious- 
ness arise from the same circumstance and are conse- 
quences of the same condition. The difference between 
the two is merely the radiation of the nervous impulse 
into different kinds of cells and centers. 

"All Consciousness Motor." — Consciousness and the 
expression of feeling are, then, in a certain sense homol- 
ogous to each other, and both of them may vary with 
each other and with feeling. If we choose to stretch a 
point, we may assert that consciousness is as truly an 
expression of feeling as is muscular movement itself. 
This is one way in which, if we choose, we may read a 
meaning into the phrase, a favorite with some authors, 
that all consciousness is motor. 

Distribution of the Nervous Impulse. — We have now 
discovered that the nervous impulse that enters a brain 
center may be distributed into several portions, each the 
concomitant of a separate mental process. One portion 
passes through the brain center, and is the concomitant 
of the intellectual work done. Another portion is stopped 
out by the resistance it encounters, and is destroyed in 
overcoming it. This is the concomitant of feeling. 
Another portion escapes from the brain center, passes 



84 



Functional Psychology 



into the motor or glandular centers, and is the concomi- 
tant of expression. Still a fourth part escapes from the 
brain center, passes into the fringing cells that are a part 




Fig. 2 — A, the nervous impulse entering the brain center. B, the portion that runs 
through and is the concomitant of the intellectual process. C, the portion that- 
escapes into the motor and glandular centers and is the concomitant of expres- 
sion. D, the portion that is spent in overcoming resistance in the brain center and 
is the concomitant of feeling. E, the portion that radiates into the fringing cells 
that are neither motor nor glandular centers, and is the concomitant of con- 
sciousness. 

of neither the motor nor glandular centers, and consti- 
tutes the concomitant of consciousness. A clear picture 
of these several parts into which the entire impulse is 
split up will help very much in the understanding of the 
relations existing among the different mental processes. 

Consciousness and the Intellectual Process. — We 

have now discussed the relation between consciousness, 
feeling and expression. It remains to consider the rela- 
tion of consciousness to the intellectual process. Since 
we have seen that consciousness and feeling are directly 
related to each other, we may expect to find that the laws 
of feeling will apply equally well to consciousness. That 
is, with a given amount of nervous energy, there is a 
reciprocal relation between consciousness and intellect. 

Consciousness in Learning. — When we are learning to 
do a thing, we are intensely conscious of what we are 
doing. But as we become skillful in the act we can do 
it with less consciousness, and even perform it skillfully 



Consciousness 85 

without thinking about it, or without being conscious of 
what we are doing. Consciousness tends to evaporate 
from an habitual act as truly as does feeling. 

Consciousness and Skill Reciprocal. — Not only is con- 
sciousness not necessary to a psychic process, but it is 
really detrimental to the action. The highest degree of 
skill has not been attained when we have to think how 
the action shall be performed. We are not conscious of 
the muscular innervations and contractions that are in- 
volved in the process of talking, and are unconscious of 
the movements that are made. But when we attend in 
such a way as to try to discover what the movements 
are we speak very awkwardly, and our speech is not skill- 
fully accomplished. The same thing is true of all our 
daily actions, and adjustments, both mental and physical. 
We know how to spell separate and many other words, 
if we do not stop to think, but if we stop to think, that is 
to become conscious of our mental processes, we are 
as likely to spell the words wrong as right. 

Example of Stropping Razor. — The writer has often 
attempted to discover if he could become conscious of 
the pressure and the movement of the thumb that turns a 
razor over when it is stropped, but not a single indication 
of any feeling or consciousness of the movement of the 
muscle is observable. Practice every day for years in 
stropping a razor has resulted in the complete disappear- 
ance of consciousness from the muscular contraction in- 
volved in the process. Nevertheless, it is a truly volun- 
tary act, which as the result of habit has lost all resist- 
ance in the brain center, consciousness has dropped out 
and feeling has disappeared. It is an unconscious volun- 
tary act. At first, in the process of learning to strop a 
razor, the consciousness was intense, and the feeling pain- 
fully disagreeable. 

The Noise of a Wagon. — Consciousness bears about 



86 Functional Psychology 

the same relation to the other mental processes that the 
noise which a wagon makes bears to the effective move- 
ment of the wagon. The old conundrum "What is it that 
is no part of a wagon, but which the wagon cannot go 
without?" is directly illustrative of the point here. The 
wagon that makes the greatest noise is not the most ef- 
fective tool for the purpose for which a wagon is em- 
ployed, nor is it in the most satisfactory condition to use. 
The wagon that moves with the least noise, other things 
being the same, is in better condition for work. There 
is less energy lost in overcoming the friction. 

Consciousness and Feeling Both Reciprocal to Intel- 
lect. — Our actions, mental and muscular, accomplished 
without consciousness and without feeling, are better 
done and more accurately performed with the same 
amount of nervous energy than if feeling and conscious- 
ness accompanied them. Less resistance is to be over- 
come, and more energy is available for doing the work. 

Utility of Consciousness. — Consciousness implies hesi- 
tation and delay, and consequently, an opportunity to 
select and make choice between alternative possible 
actions. It is then a condition incident to deciding or 
choosing, or adjusting oneself to new and non-habitual 
situations. This seems to be its advantage in the devel- 
opment of the race. It is a condition that permits of 
deliberate adjustment, and assists in the learning of a 
new process. 

Variation in Consciousness. — Consciousness varies in 
intensity as truly as does feeling. Sometimes we are in- 
tensely conscious,and again we are relatively uncon- 
scious. Consciousness and unconsciousness are relative 
terms ; it is impossible to draw an exact line between 
them. Try to decide upon the instant at vv^hich you have 
ceased to be awake and have fallen asleep, and the diffi- 
culty of discriminating between absolute consciousness 



Consciousness 87 

and a state of absolute unconsciousness will be under- 
stood. 

Effect of Habit on Consciousness. — There are at least 
four ways in which the intensity of consciousness may be 
increased or decreased. First, the effect of habit is to 
decrease the intensity of consciousness, as has already 
been described. The only way to conceive of the effect 
of habit upon consciousness is by recognizing that the 
resistance in the brain center is decreased, and the rela- 
tion that resistance holds to consciousness. 

Effect of Attention. — Second, consciousness may be 
increased or decreased by a process of attention, whose 
mechanism we are not yet ready to discuss. We may 
study our lesson with such intensity of attention, or be so 
completely absorbed in some other object of contempla- 
tion that we are not aware of the passage of time, or 
events that occur in the room in which we are studying. 
This is the condition in which we may escape from a 
great danger, without being aware of how we escaped, 
or the dangers that we passed through. The unconscious- 
ness of the hypnotic state will serve as an example of this 
condition of unconsciousness. 

Effect of Decrease of Nervous Energy. — Third. Re- 
sistance may be diminished and consciousness conse- 
quently decreased by the decrease in the amount of ner- 
vous energy generated. This process is manifested as the 
primary condition of sleep, which constitutes the subject 
of the next chapter. 

Effect of Excessive Resistance : Chloroform. — Fourth, 
consciousness may be decreased, or completely obliter- 
ated by an increase in the amount of resistance to such an 
extent that the circuit is broken, and no nervous current 
flows through any brain center. This condition of uncon- 
sciousness is found in cases in which a person faints from 



88 Functional Psychology 

excess of emotion. It is also the condition resulting from 
the administration of chloroform, not from that of mor- 
phine. The probability is that chloroform causes a 
shrinking and retraction of the dendrites and so in- 
creases the resistance between the neurons in a brain cen- 
ter to such an extent that a nervous impulse will not pass, 
and unconsciousness ensues. 

DEFINITIONS 

Consciousness — The knowledge of our own mental 
states and processes; or, the process by which our own 
mental states and processes become known ; or, the prop- 
erty of a mental state or process by which we know it. 

Radiation — The running out of a nervous impulse into 
the fringing cells. 

Fringing Cells — Those brain cells which do not con- 
stitute a part of a brain center, but which are closely con- 
nected with it. 



CHAPTER VII 

SLEEP AND DREAMS. 

In sleep there is a diminution of arterial blood to the brain. — 
Bain, Mind and Body, p. 15. 

The condition of anaemia in connection with the withdrawal 
of external stimuli causes a depression of the psychical processes 
below the threshold of consciousness. — Manaceine, Sleep, p. 54. 

The psychical phenomena of dreams and the conscious life of 
waking hours are different, but they do not have a different psychi- 
cal value. — Ziehen, Physiological Psychology, />. 267. 

It is only in the most vivid dreams that either men or animals 
(especially hunting dogs) give a weak expression to the somnial 
ideas of motion by a few slight movements of the trunk and extremi- 
ties. In sleep, therefore, the initial element of the psychical process, 
the sensation, is produced by ideational stimulation, and the final 
element is almost omitted. — Ziehen, Physiological Psychology, p. 265. 

Sleep. — The phenomena of sleep are universal in the 
human race. It is a state of unconsciousness, and dreams 
are unconscious mental processes manifesting varying de- 
grees of intensity in their unconsciousness. Many psy- 
chologists place the phenomena of sleep and dreams in 
their chapter on Abnormal Psychology, but sleep and 
dreams are not abnormal, nor are they non-psychical. 
Those who define psychology as the science of Conscious- 
ness, and assume that no unconscious process can be men- 
tal, have no place for the discussion of sleep and dreams. 

Why Study. — It is quite necessary for us to study 
sleep and dreams. The universality of the phenomena, 
together with the amount of time that we spend in sleep, 
would seem to justify a great deal of attention to its 
accompanying mental states. One-third of our lives is 
spent in sleep. It is not unusual to find persons who have 
spent twenty years in bed, without being serious invalids. 
The twenty years are distributed over a lifetime of sixty. 

Influence of Dreams. — In the experience of dreams, 
we have a series of phenomena which have largely influ- 



90 Functional Psychology 

enced our philosophical and religious beliefs, and shaped 
our decisions upon many questions. Perhaps the dualis- 
tic philosophy finds its strongest support, and belief in 
it has become so general, in consequence of the experience 
that every one has had with dreams. The person who 
goes to sleep and in his dream finds himself in places far 
distant from that in which he went to sleep, and who 
talks with and sees other persons, some of whom he 
knows and some of whom are strangers ; some of whom 
are living in the same places in which he himself lives, 
and others that he knows to be living in distant lands; 
some of whom are living and some of whom are dead; 
when a person after having such experiences awakens 
and finds that his body is in the same place in which he 
went to sleep a few hours or minutes before, it is the 
apparent, easy and inevitable explanation that in some 
way he has been able to know the things of his dream as 
he would know them if he were freed from the limitations 
his body imposes. Hence it is inevitable that he should 
adopt the suggestion, even if he would never originate it 
himself, that his body is distinctly separate from an im- 
material thing known as his soul, spirit, or mind, which 
has traveled in the places of his dreams. 

Belief in Immortality. — Out of this easily grows the 
belief in immortality of the soul and freedom from the 
limitations imposed, not merely by space and time, but 
by disease and death. If it were not for the phenomena 
of dreams, belief in immortality would be far more diffi- 
cult to inculcate. 

Dream Books. — Dream books are printed and sold in 
large quantities. Many persons have a more or less pro- 
found faith in the prophetic character of some dreams. 
The phenomena of dreams, then, influence the lives and 
daily actions of many persons. On this account, no study 
of psychology can afford to overlook the phenomena. 



Consciousness 91 

Sleep Universal. — Sleep is universal in the human 
race, and is of so much importance that a person will die 
sooner from loss of sleep than he will from lack of food. 
We may readily conceive that this character of sleep has 
becom.e fixed in the human race by the processes of nat- 
ural selection. 

Established by Natural Selection. — Let us suppose 
that in the early stages of the human race, or of its pre- 
human ancestors, there existed a condition in which some 
did not sleep while others did. Our principal means of 
escaping from danger depends upon our being able to see. 
At night this means of escape is greatly lessened. Those 
who wandered widely at night would meet dangers from 
wild animals, dangerous rivers, swamps, from rock preci- 
pices and from many other things which those who did 
not wander at night would avoid. Those who possessed 
the habit of sleeping at night would avoid these dangers. 
Hence it would inevitably happen that those without the 
characteristic of sleeping at night would encounter more 
dangers, more of them would be killed, fewer descend- 
ants would be left, and a smaller number of them would 
survive, than of that group who in consequence of the 
characteristic of sleep remained at home at night, in their 
sheltered places. Ultimately, only those in whom the 
character of sleep manifested itself would survive and 
leave descendants. 

Nocturnal Sleep. — Our sleep is a nocturnal sleep, and 
recurs at intervals of twenty-four hours. It has its ad- 
vantage in the fact that the earth rotates on its axis in 
that length of time and produces the succession of day 
and night. Had the length of the day been different, it is 
probable that our interval for sleep would have been 
otherwise than it is now. 

Hibernation. — We shall be able to appreciate this only 
by comparing our nocturnal sleep with the winter sleep, 



92 Functional Psychology 

or hibernation, of other animals. The black bear once 
ranged over North America. It lives mainly on vegetable 
food. It can eat animal food, but is not v^ell adapted for 
catching prey. In v^inter, its principal source of food dis- 
appears, and it must accommodate itself to the changed 
condition. The same conditions prevail in the case of 
hedgehogs, bats and birds. They may overcome the diffi- 
culty in three or four v^ays. They may store up food for 
v^inter, as man does, and as some squirrels do. They 
might ship in food, as man does. They might migrate, 
and travel from the place w^here food is not to where it is, 
as birds do. But bears are not v^ell adapted for flying 
through the air, and they have adopted a fourth method. 
They go to sleep v^hen food becomes scarce and sleep all 
winter. Sleep is a condition in which little nervous en- 
ergy is generated, and there is very little oxidation of 
tissue; consequently little food is needed. A bear sleeps 
about three months, using up the food that has been 
stored in his body as fat. 

Estivation. — Estivation, or summer sleep, is a mani- 
festation of the same principle. In countries where the 
seasons are only two — wet and dry — animals and plants 
would perish in the dry season if they maintained their 
usual amount of activity. This condition is avoided by 
the animals burying themselves in the mud before the 
water entirely dries up, and there they remain in sleep 
until the rains come again. Nocturnal sleep, hibernation, 
estivation are manifestations of the same principle, differ- 
ing only in the conditions to which by their means the 
different animals are adjusted. From this also we might 
infer something of the nature of the climate in which the 
human race originated. It was evidently not one in which 
the wet and dry seasons prevailed, nor one in which the 
winters were long and severe. 

Sleep and the Nervous System. — Sleep is a character- 



Consciousness 93 

istic of mammals, birds, reptiles, batrachians and insects. 
When we arrive at a place in the animal scale in which 
the nervous system is less complicated than it is in 
insects, it is doubtful if the phenomena of sleep are mani- 
fested. We discover no indication of sleep in those ani- 
mals that have no nervous system, and even in the ani- 
mals that possess a nervous system we fail to discover 
that it is universal. It is doubtful if fishes ever sleep. It 
seems as if the animal must have a nervous system of a 
considerable degree of complexity before the phenomena 
of sleep manifest themselves. 

Sleep Correlative to Consciousness. — We have asso- 
ciated sleep with consciousness, and we might infer that 
where consciousness does not manifest itself, there is no 
occasion for the phenomena of sleep. Conversely, if we 
can discover an indication of sleep, we have a fairly satis- 
factory evidence of the existence of consciousness, and 
consequently by inference, of intelligence in a general 
sense of the term. 

Advantage of Sleep. — There is a distinct advantage in 
sleep other than escape from nocturnal dangers. The 
essential condition of sleep is lessened brain activity, less 
oxidation of tissue, and consequently a lessened amount 
of nervous energy generated. No matter what conditions 
bring this result about, sleep follows. When there is this 
lessened amount of oxidation of tissue, there is a better 
opportunity for the elimination of waste products that 
have accumulated in the system, and for the restora- 
tion of the tissues that the larger activity of the waking 
hours has depleted. 

How Sleep Restores Tissue. — If it were not for this 
diminished amount of oxidation of tissue and consequent 
decrease in nervous energy, there would be no advantage 
in sleep as a restorative. Sleep is not any mysterious 
process, imposed from the outside, nor is it in itself a 



94 Functional Psychology 

restorative at all. Its efficiency results from the fact that 
less nervous energy is liberated. 

Other Ideas About Sleep. — The above explanation of 
sleep is quite different from that which is given in many 
books. Madame de Manaceine asserts that sleep is the 
resting time of consciousness, whatever that may mean. 
Just what is meant by consciousness that needs a rest is 
difficult to determine. Hudson affirms that sleep is the 
time when the objective mind ceases to work the body, 
and lets it have a rest. Thompson, in his Brain and Per- 
sonality, asserts that in sleep the Mind ceases to work the 
brain, and the brain is then permitted to rest. The dualist 
can scarcely find any explanation for sleep, and so says 
little about it. Equally impotent are the explanations of 
sleep that are given by those who make of every mental 
process a state of consciousness. They class it along with 
insanity and abnormal psychology. 

The Primary Condition. — As we have already stated, 
the primary condition of sleep is a diminished amount of 
nervous energy. When a smaller amount of nervous en- 
ergy is passing through any brain center, there is less 
resistance, and less feeling, less radiation and less con- 
sciousness. The intensity of consciousness is so slight 
that we properly designate it as unconsciousness. 

How Established. — This primary condition may be 
brought about in several ways or there are many condi- 
tions that contribute to the reduction of the amount of 
nervous energy. In the first place, the brain is always, 
or nearly always, anaemic in sleep. That is, it is supplied 
with a smaller amount of blood than in the usual waking 
state. Any process that tends to diminish the supply of 
blood to the brain is favorable to sleep. Under the ordi- 
nary waking conditions, from one-twelfth to one-eighth 
of the blood that leaves the heart is sent to the brain. In 



Consciousness 95 

sleep, usually, perhaps not always, a much smaller pro- 
portion is carried there. , 

Blood Supply in Sleep. — To bring about this lessened 
blood supply to the brain, the heart beats slower, and a 
smaller quantity of blood is sent out from the heart at 
each pulsation. A larger proportion goes to the skin, 
and consequently in sleep the skin is warmer than in the 
corresponding waking condition, and there is a greater 
amount of secretion by the glands of the skin. 

Effect of Food. — Food taken into the stomach tends to 
induce sleep. The blood is determined to the stomach in 
digesting the food, and a smaller quantity goes to the 
brain. In the same way, hot baths induce sleep, deter- 
mining the blood to the skin, and thereby diminishing the 
quantity that goes to the brain. Exercise, in just suffi- 
cient amount to determine the blood to the muscles is 
also favorable to sleep, but the effect is counteracted in a 
large measure by the quickened circulation, and the 
greater amount of oxygen taken into the lungs. Loss of 
blood induces unconsciousness for the same reason, and 
pressure on the carotid arteries will bring on uncon- 
sciousness in thirty seconds. 

Effect of Diminished Oxygen. — So far, we have been 
considering only one factor, that of blood supply to the 
brain. But the diminished blood supply is favorable to 
sleep only because it results in a smaller supply of oxygen 
to the brain. If the supply of oxygen is diminished the 
same result follows as if the blood supply is diminished. 
Consequently we find in sleep that the rate of breathing- 
is slower, and that a smaller amount of air is taken into 
the lungs at one inspiration. If the air that we breathe 
is impure, and not v/ell supplied with oxygen, we become 
sleepy. Even if there is nothing deleterious in the air 
itself, but an unusually large proportion of an inert gas 
like nitrogen, sleep will follow. 



96 Functional Psychology 

Diminished Peripheral Impulses. — There is still an- 
other condition of sleep. When we wish to go to sleep, 
we close our eyes and shut out the light. We get away 
from noises ; we wish to be neither too hot nor too cold ; 
we desire a reasonably soft mattress, and we wish to 
avoid experiencing the sensation of hunger. In fact, so 
far as possible, we avoid all peripherally initiated im- 
pulses. These are always stronger than centrally init- 
iated, and therefore have a greater tendency to radiate 
and to accompany the phenomenon of consciousness, 
which is the contradictory condition of sleep. 

Effect of Starvation. — While hunger is not conducive 
to sleep, excessive hunger, designated as starvation, is. 
A person who is fasting for long periods finds that he 
sleeps a great deal of the time. In this condition, it is not 
lack of blood supply, nor of oxygen to the brain that pre- 
vents oxidation of tissue, but it is lack of tissue to be 
oxidized. The effect is the same, and our explanation of 
sleep seems to cover all possible conditions. 

Variation in Depth of Sleep. — Consciousness varies in 
intensity from the most complete consciousness to the 
lowest degree of unconsciousness. Consciousness and 
unconsciousness are relative terms. So sleep may be 
intense or feeble, deep or shallow. We may be half 
asleep or half awake, and the difference in the two condi- 
tions is not very great. Experiments have been made to 
measure the intensity, and in one of the most successful 
of such experiments, the sleeper was awakened by the 
noise produced by dropping a metal ball upon a brass 
plate outside of the room door. The height from which 
the ball must be dropped in order to awaken the sleeper 
was taken as the measure of the intensity of sleep. 

The Sleep Curve. — By this method it was found that 
in the ordinary night's sleep, the deepest intensity was 
reached about the beginning of the second hour. From 



Consciousness 



97 



this point it gradually decreased in depth until about the 
end of the fourth hour, when its intensity was not very 
great. There was a fairly uniform intensity not much 



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Fig. 3— Curve showing the depth of sleep at each hour in the night. The height is 
that from which a ball was dropped to awaken a sleeper. 

below the line of consciousness until the end of the eighth 
hour, or the time of natural awakening, with a tendency 
to a slight second maximum, or deepening of sleep in the 
last hour, just before awakening. 

Dreams. — In sleep there is mental action going on, 
which we call dreaming. The older psychologists could 
not account for this action of dreaming and refused to call 
it mental. They spoke of unconscious cerebration, or 
brain action, as distinguished from mental action. But 
we have reason to believe that much of our most import- 
ant mental action is unconscious, and we have no reason 
for refusing that designation to dreams. 

Continuity of Dreaming. — Nearly everybody dreams. 
The deeper the sleep the less mental action and the less 



98 Functional Psychology 

dreaming, while there may be occasions in which all men- 
tal action ceases. It is the usual thing, however, for 
mental action to continue throughout all the hours of 
sleep. We do not remember all the dreams we have, and 
those dreams that we experience just before waking up 
are the only ones that we are usually able to reproduce. 
Sometimes we are suddenly awakened just as we are 
going to sleep, and then we discover that we were dream- 
ing at that time. In this way we know that we dream as 
we go to sleep, and as we awake, and whenever we are 
awakened we find that we are dreaming, hence we are 
inclined to believe that we dream nearly all the time that 
we are asleep. 

Best Remembered Dreams. — AVe remember best only 
those dreams that we experience as we awake. There are 
two reasons for this : one is that these dreams have oc- 
curred most recently, and there is less chance to forget 
them. The second is that they occur just as the person 
is approaching the conscious state, and consequently the 
amxount of nervous energy is great enough to accompany 
an experience sufiBciently vivid to be remembered. 

Vividness of Dreams. — Sometimes we experience 
what we describe as a vivid dream. On examination we 
shall find that the vividness is mostly an illusion. Com- 
pared with other dreams it may be vivid, but compared 
with a waking experience it is never vivid. 

Less Vivid Than Waking Experience. — If a dream 
were as vivid as a waking experience, it would be as 
easily rem.embered. But if a dream is not reinstated, re- 
produced, recalled, talked about or thought of for six 
hours after waking up, it will be found impossible to 
reproduce it. Such a test applied to a waking experi- 
ence will show that it is different in this respect. An- 
other test is that of comparing the intensity of the ex- 
perience as soon as awakened, with corresponding ex- 



Consciousness 99 

periences when awake. For example, a sun illuminated 
snow covered landscape seen in a dream was judged 
to appear about as bright as the same landscape would 
have appeared if it had been illuminated by the full 
moon. The probability is that the vividness of the dream 
corresponded to the vividness of a waking experience 
of the same kind as full moonlight would compare with 
sunlight. 

Lack of Vividness Explained. — This demonstration of 
the small amount of vividness in dreams is explained by 
the fact that there is but little nervous energy generated 
in sleep, and only weak nervous impulses traverse the 
brain centers in dreaming. It is not only explained by 
that supposition, but it directly corroborates our inter- 
pretation of the nature of sleep. 

Elements of a Dream. — When we dream, a nervous 
impulse passes through some brain center. If it passes 
through some combination of cells in the occipital lobe, 
we experience a visual dream. If it passes through some 
combination of cells in the temporal lobe, we have an 
auditory dream. Most of our dreams are auditory or 
visual, and frequently both. If a person has become blind 
before the age of five years, his dreams are never visual, 
nor will they contain visual elements. Tactual elements 
may enter into a dream, and so may images of taste and 
smell, but these latter are rare. 

Peripheral Direction of Dreams. — All of our dreams 
are faint, accompanied by nervous impulses of little inten- 
sity, and nearly all of them are centrally initiated. Some- 
times, though not always, a peripherally initiated im- 
pulse, started in some sense organ, gives direction to a 
dream. Many persons have supposed that every dream 
was thus originated and directed, but such a supposition 
cannot be maintained without giving undue extension to 
the meaning attached to peripherally initiated impulses. 



100 Functional Psychology 

Fantastic Character. — One of the most characteristic 
features of dreams is their fantastic nature. Many times 
they appear to be wholly unreasonable, but their unreas- 
onableness does not appear to the dreamer. This may be 
accounted for by the fact that attention is completely 
inactive in sleep. The nervous impulse is not directed, 
but follows the path of least resistance at the moment. It 
encounters little resistance, engenders little feeling, and 
this in itself is a condition when any unreasonableness 
would not be recognized, since no feeling, even of sur- 
prise, is likely to be experienced. When the impulses be- 
come strong enough to engender feeling, we awaken. 

Not Prophetic. — Notwithstanding the very general 
belief to the contrary, dreams are not prophetic. It may 
be that in some cases, an event that has constituted the 
subject matter of a dream, has afterward occurred, but 
many more events dreamed about have not occurred. In 
the millions of dreams every night, and the millions of 
events every day, it would be very strange if there should 
not be some coincidences ; but for most of the coinci- 
dences very good reasons can be alleged. If an event is 
expected to happen, or not to happen, it must do one or 
the other ; and a person who dreams of the event has one 
chance in two of his dream being fulfilled. In a few 
cases, the oncoming of disease has been recognized in 
sleep, but this may be accounted for by the fact that in 
sleep the impulse is not directed by the attention, but fol- 
lows the path indicated by the actual condition of the 
brain. In this way it may give an indication of a diseased 
condition that has not been previously observed. This 
is the only kind of prophetic dream that has ever been 
supported by satisfactory evidence. 

Not of Daily Work. — Contrary to the general opinion, 
our dreams are not usually related to our daily work. It 
seems as if the brain centers that are involved in our 



Consciousness 101 

daily work become fatigued and offer resistanec to the 
passage of a nervous impulse, so that when it is not 
directed by attention, it seeks an easier path than that in 
which the fatigue occurred. After an occupation has 
ceased to be habitual, it may become the subject of 
dreams. It is in the fact that our daily occupations are 
seldom the subject of our dreams that we may have an 
explanation of the aphorism that dreams go by contraries. 

Mental Work in Sleep. — There are many instances of 
mental v/ork of value having been done in dreams. In 
fact, any person who has a difficult lesson to learn, may 
practically learn it in sleep if he reads it over carefully 
just before going to sleep and thinks of it until sleep 
ensues. It seems that the mental activity in sleep has 
avoided the difficulties imposed by the processes wrongly 
directed by attention. A smaller amount of nervous 
energy relieved from the usual amount of resistance, 
accomplishes much work. 

Kubla Khan. — Coleridge is said to have dreamed the 
whole poem of Kubla Khan, and upon awaking wrote it 
out just as he dreamed it. He said that there were twenty 
or thirty lines more of the poem that he could not remem- 
ber, and was ever afterward unable to reproduce. Also 
the story is an old one of one of the great mathematicians 
who upon going to bed, after having tried vainly to solve 
a problem, was astonished in the morning to find the 
solution carefully written out on his table, in his own 
handwriting. 

Awake at a Previously Determined Time. — One other 
phenomenon of sleep deserves notice. Many persons are 
able to awaken at any time that they have previously de- 
cided to wake up. The experience is the same thing as 
the ability to think of anything that we have decided in 
our waking hours to do at any particular time. When 
that time comes we think of the thing we have decided, to 



102 Functional Psychology 

do, or we are very much disposed to censure ourselves for 
failing to think of it. We do not know the mechanism 
of the process by which the result is brought about. But 
the occurrence of the same phenomenon in sleep is merely 
another evidence that the sleeping state differs only in 
one essential respect from the waking state, and that we 
have called the diminished amount of nervous energy 
manifested. 

Somnambulism. — Sleep walking and sleep talking are 
motor phenomena, and are explained by the fact that the 
nervous impulse is strong enough and encounters resist- 
ance enough to flow out into the motor, or expression, 
centers. Both of them are likely to be associated with 
more or less abnormal conditions, giving rise to peripher- 
ally initiated impulses, such as accompany the distressed 
feeling from an overloaded stomach, or a condition of 
brain tissue that more or less closely approximates in- 
flammation. Nervous impulses of an unusual degree of 
intensity for sleep readily explain the existence of the 
phenomena, although if the impulses become strong 
enough, the person awakes, the impulse radiates out into 
the fringing cells, and consciousness follows. 

DEFINITIONS 

Sleep — A condition of unconsciousness arising from 
a diminished amount of nervous energy liberated. 

Dream — Any kind of mental action in sleep. 

Hibernation — The winter sleep of such animals as 

bears and hedgehogs. 

Estivation — The summer sleep of animals in coun- 
tries that have the wet and dry seasons. 

Anaemia — A condition of diminished blood supply. 

Somnambulism — Sleep walking, or motor phenomena 
in sleep. 



CHAPTER VIII 

MEMORY. 

Memory is, as everybody says, on the bodily side, the rein- 
statement in the nervous centers of the processes in the original 
sensation, perception, etc. — Baldwin, Methods and Processes, p. 280. 

The treatment of the centrally aroused ideas is rendered easier 
by the present-day assumption that memory images and the origi- 
nally aroused sensations are of precisely the same character. — 
Pillsbury, Attention, p. 95. 

The comparative feebleness of the remembered states or ideas 
is, we presume, the exact counterpart of the diminished force of 
the revived currents in the brain. It is seldom that the reinduced 
currents are equal in energy to those of direct stimulation at first 
hand. — Bain, Mind and Body, p. 91. 

I think it can be shown that what the metaphysician calls con- 
sciousness (mind), are phenomena determined by the mechanism 
of associative mem.ory. — Loeh, Physiology of the Brain, p. 214. 

Mach has pointed out that the consciousness of the self or the 
ego is simply a phrase for the fact that certain constituents are 
constantly, or more frequently produced than others. — Loeh, Physiol- 
ogy of the Brain, p. 214. 

Forgetfulness is one of the conditions of our mental life, and 
a sine qua non of its development. — Lloyd Morgan, Comparative 
Psychology, p. 73. 

The faculty of forgetting details it is that makes retrospection 
possible. — Lloyd Morgan, Comparative Psychology, p. 112. 

Memory Defined. — Memory is the reinstatement of a 
previous mental experience with the same conscious ele- 
ments. It is the concomitant of the transmission of a 
nervous impulse through the same cells and centers that 
it passed through before, and the radiating out into the 
same fringing cells. The mental experience is reinstated 
and recognized. In this, as in all other definitions of 
memory, two different elements are introduced. One is 
the element of mental reproduction, and the other is the 
element of mental recognition. Neither, without the 
other, can be called memory. 

Mental Reproduction. — Mental reproduction is the 

concomitant of the transmission of the nervous impulse 



1 04 Functional Psychology 

through the same cells and centers that it passed through 
before. Some psychologists appear to believe that in 
mental reproduction the nervous impulse traverses a dif- 
ferent combination of cells from those that were trav- 
ersed in the original experience. That is, in an original 
experience, such as perceiving a landscape, the nervous 
impulse traverses combinations of cells in the sight cen- 
ter in the occipital lobe, while in remembering the land- 
scape, the impulse traverses only combinations of cells in 
the association centers, and passes through none of the 
cells in the sight centers. 

An Idea. — However, this interpretation has very little 
to commend it, and may safely be rejected. The remem- 
bered process is very properly designated as an idea, and 
differs from the original experience principally in vivid- 
ness, although as a consequence of the difference in 
vividness, it is not so accurate as the original and is ac- 
companied by less feeling. As a corollary of this inter- 
pretation of memory, it will be seen that -there can be no 
memory center in the brain. 

Retention. — Some psychologists also speak of reten- 
tion as an element in memory and we have some common 
expressions that involve the same idea. Thus we hear of 
a retentive memory ; that the mind retains an impression ; 
that ideas are stored up in the cells of the brain ; or stored 
up in memory, or stored up in the mind. All of these 
imply a wholly wrong conception of the nature of mem- 
ory. Ideas cannot be stored up, nor does the mind or the 
brain retain any idea. A candle does not retain the light 
when it is put out, nor does the road retain any part of 
the wagon that travels over it. It is true that the wagon 
may modify the surface of the road so that its next pas- 
sage may be attended with less jolting and noise, and may 
be accomplished with the expenditure of less force. So 
an idea may be reinstated the second time with less effort 



Memory 105 

than it was the first, but that is quite different from the 
storing up of an idea in the cells of the brain. 

Mental Recognition. — But mental reproduction is not 
memory. If the idea is reproduced without being recog- 
nized as having been experienced before, it is not mem- 
ory. When the original experience occurred, we were 
conscious of it, or it would not have been remembered. 
That is, the nervous impulse which accompanied it, en- 
countered resistance and radiated out into the fringing 
cells. When the impulse is reinstated, it must radiate 
out into the same fringing cells, thus accompanying the 
element of consciousness, and since the fringing cells are 
the same as in the original experience, we recognize the 
idea as one that has been experienced before. The radia- 
tion out into the same fringing cells is the concomitant 
of the element of mental recognition. 

Reproduction Without Recognition. — This hypothesis 
of memory seems to satisfy every condition and will 
assist us very much in understanding our experiences 
with it. If our interpretation is correct, we shall see that 
it is possible to experience the element of mental repro- 
duction without the element of mental recognition. The 
writer one time deliberately coined a word, to express an 
idea he wished to use in a paper, and then within a month 
read that same word in a book in his library. When coin- 
ing the word, he was unconscious of ever having seen it 
before. But after having read it many times in books 
published before the word was used in his paper, he 
became convinced that he had read the word many times, 
and when it appeared as the expression for the idea, it 
was reproduced without being recognized. 

Preacher's Defense of Plagiarism. — A preacher upon 
one occasion, preached as part of his sermon the graduat- 
ing oration of a young man, which was to be delivered 
on Commencement day, the following Wednesday, and 



106 Functional Psychology 

which the young man had shown to the preacher. The 
preacher asserted that he was unaware of having used 
the oration, but said that he had a tremendous memory 
for words and might have used it unconsciously, without 
knowing that it was an oration submitted to him, or that 
he had ever read it. Psychologically, the defense is pos- 
sible, but a very large number of young men in a similar 
situation would have explained it more promptly by as- 
serting that the preacher lied. 

A Common Occurrence. — Probably nearly all of our 
brilliant ideas are unrecognized reproductions. We fail 
to recognize them when they appear, and we believe that 
we have originated them. Seldom is it possible to detect 
ourselves in reproducing an idea without recognizing it, 
but the difficulty lies in the failure to detect it, not in the 
fact itself. 

A Necessary Condition. — More than this. It seems 
to be necessary that the element of mental recognition 
shall disappear from the reproduced experience before it 
can be thoroughly organized into our system of knowl- 
edge and be completely known by us. It has not become 
a usable piece of our mental furnishings until such or- 
ganization has taken place. It is generally better for us 
to study one lesson from several books than it is to study 
the same lesson several times from the same book. The 
essential elements of the lesson are likely to be found in 
each of the several books and be reproduced, but the non- 
essential elements will not appear in all the books, and 
will therefore not obscure the more important. 

Recognition Without Reproduction. — But can the ele- 
ment of mental recognition exist without the element of 
mental reproduction? How do we know that we are 
trying to remember anything unless we know what it is 
that we are trying to remember? The question seems 
absurd on the face of it, but it may not be so absurd as it 



Memory 107 

looks. We have seen that the element of mental recog- 
nition has for its concomitant the radiation of the impulse 
into the fringing cells, or neighboring brain centers. Sup- 
pose that the nervous impulse gets into the fringing cells 
without having reached them from che original center. 
Then we may experience the element of mental recogni- 
tion, or have the feeling of familiarity without the mental 
reproduction. 

Process of Remembering a Name. — Let us suppose 
that we are trying to remember a man's name. I know 
that there is a man and that he has a name. He is a 
school teacher, and principal of a school at Rosedale. 
The nervous impulse is traversing the combinations of 
cells that correspond to the ideas Principal, and Rosedale. 
I am trying to direct it from that center over into the 
name center. It will not go. I think of another circum- 
stance. He is a man of about forty years of age, wears 
sandy whiskers. The nervous impulse is now passing 
through a brain center corresponding to that idea. I try 
to make it go into the name center and it will not go. 
Then I think of another circumstance. He has a wife 
and two children. I saw them on the street car last Sun- 
day. Now the nervous impulse is passing through a com- 
bination of cells that corresponds to this experience, and 
I try to make it pass from this combination into the name 
center and it will not go. Then I think of another cir- 
cumstance. He wished me to write him a letter of recom- 
mendation to the Board at Springfield. His name is Hol- 
lister. 

The nervous impulse has, after repeated trials, found a 
center from which the resistance into the name center is 
smaller and finally passes into it. While it is traversing 
the centers corresponding to the related circumstances, 
we may say that we are experiencing with greater or less 
degrees of adequacy, the element of mental recognition, 
and we should immediately recognize the name as being 



108 _^ Functional Psychology 

the one that we are trying to remember if we should hear 
it. Something like this will enable us to understand the 
feeling that we experience in the very common situations 
when we are trying to reproduce an experience and fail 
to do so. 

Advantage of Many Related Circumstances. — The 

illustration above will also enable us to see the advantage 
in having many related circumstances if we wish to re- 
member anything. If the nervous impulse can make a 
choice of a route from any one of four combinations of 
cells into the primary center, it is more likely to pass into 
that center than if it is limited to one. The chances are 
about four to one that it will find a passable route into the 
primary center if there are four alternatives instead of 
only one. 

Attention Detrimental. — The illustration will also fur- 
nish us another corollary which will explain experiences 
that have occurred to every person. We have often tried 
to recall some circumstance when we needed to use it, 
and we have been distressed at our inability to do so. 
We have been compelled to lower our estimate of our- 
selves by our failure to recall it, and when we have given 
up in despair, and all opportunity to use the circumstance 
advantageously has passed by, and we have ceased to 
think of it, the circumstance placidly appears, and inno- 
cently inquires if we called it. We are unable to give it 
the proper reception, but if it were a person we should 
know exactly what to do and how to express our opinion 
of it. 

Remember Best Without Attention. — When we are 
trying to recall the circumstance, we are trying to direct 
the impulse into the primary center by a process of atten- 
tion. We are in effect forcing the impulse over a path of 
ci:r own choosing, and in all probabilit}^ we have not 
selected the path most easy of access, and so the impulse 



Memory 109 

fails to reach the appropriate center. When we cease 
thinking about it, and trying to direct it by atten- 
tion, the impulse seems to wander freely and finds the 
easy road into the primary center. This figure will help 
us much in understanding the process that we have all 
experienced. 

Memory Essential to Mental Life. — It is not too much 
to say that without this ability to reproduce a past exper- 
ience there would be no mental life. Our mental life is 
absolutely dependent upon the memory. If it were not 
for memory, our conscious life would be limited to the 
specious present which is the interval of one pulsation of 
consciousness, or the time required for an impulse to pass 
into, through and out of a brain center. In the larger 
number of cases, this interval is about three-fifths of a 
second. If we should learn to take a step, and could not 
then remember in the next three-fifths of a second what 
we had learned, we should be under the necessity of 
learning anew how to take the second step. All mental 
life would be impossible, and everything would have to 
be learned anew on every occasion. 

Basis of Education. — So important is memory that it 
has been assumed to be the chief educative process, and 
teachers have acted upon that assumption. Training the 
memory has in times past been regarded as the principal 
function of the school. Generally, the people regard the 
one who knows the most and has remembered the great- 
est number of facts as the most learned and the best edu- 
cated man. It can easily be shown that this involves a 
fallacious assumption. In fact, memory is sometimes a 
positive detriment to education. Suppose that every one 
in the class could remember without effort every word in 
this chapter, and when called upon to recite would state 
the words of the book. Neither the learning nor the reci- 
tation would be an educative process, and a phonograph 



110 Functional Psychology 

would do as well. In reciting, the teacher would be 
unable to judge of the amount of thought that the words 
really expressed, what ideas had been obtained from 
the words, and whether or not the words really rep- 
resented to the individual any ideas at all. In order to be 
educated, we must think, perceive relations, organize the 
subject in our own mind. Memory does not do that, but 
only furnishes us the material for thought which we are 
to organize, and among which we are to perceive the 
relations. 

Importance of Forgetting. — It is just as necessary 
that we shall forget as it is that we shall remember. The 
little boy who defined memory as the thing we forget 
with, was not very far wrong. If we could not forget, it 
would take us as long to reproduce an event that occurred 
in the past as it did to experience it in the first place, and 
the result would be as disastrous as if we could not re- 
member anything. In the process of thinking, it is neces- 
sary that we should hold up in mind two ideas at the 
same time, and bring them into juxtaposition. If the two 
ideas or events were originally separated by an interval 
of time, such as that one occurred yesterday and another 
today, without the ability to forget, we should be unable 
to bring the two ideas together, and thinking would 
be impossible. 

Examples of Remarkable Memories. — A few men of 
note have been remarkable examples of memories that 
seemed universal. Lord Macaulay was said to remember 
everything that he ever heard or read or saw. Julius 
Caesar, Cyrus the Great, Pascal, Euler, Maglibecchi, are 
all of them said to have had remarkable memories. But 
most persons of prodigious memories have been men of 
mediocre ability, or below the average. The pilot in 
Mark Twain's "Life on the Mississippi," is not even the 
worst example. Up here in Michigan is a man of prodi- 



Memory 111 

gious memory, a mathematical prodigy, perhaps the 
greatest that ever lived; and it is necessary for him to 
have a guardian appointed by the courts. This is rather 
the type of the man w^ith a tremendous memory, and 
Lord Macaulay and the others are exceptions. 

First Rule of Remembering. — Most of us are suffi- 
ciently skillful in forgetting, and we feel that it would be 
much better for us if we could remember more readily. 
There are three rules for remembering that contain 
everything that is of value in any system of memory 
instruction. One of these is that we must give the 
greatest possible attention to anything when we are 
learning it. This means that we must drive the great- 
est possible amount of nervous energy through the 
new combination of cells the first time. The greater 
the amount of nervous energy driven through the ner- 
vous arc, the more the arc will be modified and the 
easier it will be for the next impulse to pass through. 
Also, this will nearly inevitably be accompanied by 
considerable feeling, for the large amount of nervous 
energy will necessarily encounter considerable resist- 
ance in passing through the brain center that has not 
been traversed before. 

Memory and Feeling. — This fact will afford an expla- 
nation of the belief that we remember only what we 
learn with feeling. It shows us the relation between 
feeling and memory. If the feeling arises as the result 
of the resistance accompanying the transmission of a 
greater amount of nervous energy, the more feeling, the 
better we shall remember. But if the feeling occurs as 
the concomitant of the resistance arising from the poor 
quality of the nervous arc, then we shall not remember 
in consequence of the feeling. Most of the persons with 
prodigious memories do not experience much feeling in 
the process of learning. Those with ordinary memories 



112 Functional Psychology 

who experience feeling in learning do not remember so 
well as do those of extraordinary memory who learn 
without feeling. It is not the feeling, but the condition 
that accompanies the feeling, that is the occasion for 
remembering well. 

Difficult to Apply. — The large amount of nervous 
energy driven through the brain center is the concomitant 
of a good deal of intellectual work. We may express it 
by saying that we should see a thing that we are trying 
to learn very clearly, we should get just the thing before 
the mind, not merely something like it. This is the 
necessary result of a large amount of nervous energy 
and careful attention. But attention is a difhcult pro- 
cess, it is hard work, and most of us are lazy, and will 
not likely employ this process of remembering. 

Second Rule. — A second rule for remembering is to 
associate the thing we are learning with as many related 
circumstances as possible. The explanation of this rule 
has been already discussed in the example of the process 
of remembering a name. The nervous impulse is more 
likely to find some pathway of easy access into a particu- 
lar brain center if it has many avenues of approach than 
if it is limited to a single avenue. It is true that the one 
avenue may be just the one that would be most easy of 
access, even if there were a dozen others, but the possi- 
bility is strong that some one will be more open than a 
particular one. This rule is little recognized and little 
heeded when we wish to remember. 

Third Rule. — The third rule is repetition, and is the 
one that we all know and the only one that we consis- 
tently employ. The more frequently a nervous impulse 
traverses a brain center, the more it modifies the arc and 
the less resistance is encountered. It is another illus- 
tration of the law of neural habit. But repitition with- 
out attention has little value, while repetition with atten- 



Memory 113 

tion has much. Repitition will have value in remem- 
bering in just about the proportion that it is accom- 
panied by attention. 

Memory in Plants. — These several rules for remem- 
bering depend upon the assumption that the experience 
in learning has modified the structure of the nervous 
arc. There can be little doubt of the truth of this as- 
sumption. But the experience of plants modify their 
structure in such a way that their growth is different 
after the experience from what it would have been if the 
experience had not been encountered. Consequently 
some persons speak of memory in plants, and explain ac- 
climatization and other changed conditions of plants by 
asserting that the plant remembers. Francis Darwin in 
a widely known address speaks of the mnemic func- 
tion in plants. This is an unfortunate expression, iot 
memory is a psychological process, not a physiological, 
and the application of the word to plants seems to imply 
that plants possess psychic functions. 

Experimental Investigations. — Some very important 
investigations in remembering have been carried out ex- 
perimentally within a few years. The method of making 
these experiments is to construct a large number of non- 
sense syllables by inserting a vowel between two conso- 
nants. Then by trial discover how many of these non- 
sense syllables can be learned by one reading, or how 
many repetitions are necessary to learn a given number 
of syllables. Instead of nonsense syllables, series of fig- 
ures have been employed, or stanzas of poetry. From 
such investigations, valuable conclusions have been 
reached. 

Rate of Forgetting. — By methods of this nature we 
know how rapidly we forget. The rate of forgetting is 
determined by discovering how many repetitions of a 
series of syllables are necessary to relearn it after a cer- 



114 Functional Psychology 

tain time has elapsed. If it required 24 repetitions to 
learn a series originally, and after a number of hours, the 
series must be repeated 12 times before it can be repro- 
duced, it is assumed that one-half has been forgotten in 
the interval. In this way it is known that we forget 
about half of what we have learned in the first six hours 
after learning it. In 24 hours we forget about two-thirds, 
and in six days about three-fourths, while in one month 
we forget four-fifths. The precise amounts make little 
difiference, but the general law is unquestionable that 
forgetting is most rapid in the first periods after the 
learning has occurred. 

Retroactive Inhibition. — Especially is this true if after 
having learned anything we turn immediately to learn- 
ing something else, or to engage in some other activity. 
If after having learned a series of syllables we turn im- 
mediately to the study of another lesson, or engage in 
some other activity, we forget fully one-half of what we 
have learned in the first five minutes. The practical ap- 
plication of this is that if we wish to remember what we 
have learned, we shall refrain from doing any kind of 
work, and shall let our mind be as nearly blank as possi- 
ble for five minutes after the learning has been com- 
pleted. This fact is called the law of Retroactive Inhi- 
bition. 

Divided Repetition. — Another fact, or law of remem- 
bering that has been discovered by experiment is called 
the law of Divided Repetition. This means that if we 
wish to learn the largest possible amount in a given time, 
we shall not employ the entire time at once, but will 
divide it up into about four intervals. That is, if we wish 
to learn the greatest amount possible in two hours, we 
shall divide the study into four periods of half an hour 
each, separated by an interval of an hour or more. The 
advantage seems to arise from what has been called the 



Memory 115 

perseverance tendency. This is the same tendency that 
we have described in our lesson on sleep and dreams in 
which the learning seems to go on in sleep while we are 
unconscious. 

Third Law. — A third law of learning is that it is eco- 
nomical of effort to learn anything as a whole instead 
of learning part of it thoroughly before beginning to 
learn the next part. If we wish to commit to memory 
a poem of ten stanzas, it is unwise to memorize the first 
one before beginning to memorize the second. We should 
learn the whole ten together instead of each one singly. 
This law applies to tasks up to the length of those that 
require forty-five minutes to learn them, at least. 

Number of Repetitions. — The number of repetitions 
required to learn a series of syllables rapidly increases 
with the number of syllables. In an experiment of Eb- 
binghaus, it required only one repetition to learn seven 
syllables, while to learn 12 required 17, and to learn 16 
required 30. 

Memory and Consciousness. — We have already de- 
scribed the relation between feeling and memory, and 
have seen the explanation of the fact that the things we 
learn with feeling are best remembered. In the same 
way, we remember best the things that we learn when 
we are the most intensely conscious of the process, but 
the thing has not been thoroughly learned until we are 
able to remember it v/ith little or no consciousness. 
When the nervous impulse passes readily through the 
nervous arc, with little resistance, we remember it most 
easily, but there is little radiation and little consciousness. 
In the same way, the thing that we learn with expression, 
such as speaking, writing, drawing, etc., is likely to be 
best remembered, but it has not been thoroughly learned 
until it is possible to remember it without expression. 
Feeling consciousness and expression are all similarly 



116 Functional Psychology 

related to the fact of resistance, and memory holds the 
same relation to all. 

DEFINITIONS 

Memory — The reinstatement of a previous mental 
experience with the same conscious elements. The con- 
comitant of the transmission of a nervous impulse 
through the same brain center that it passed through 
before, and the radiation out into the same fringing cells. 

Mental Reproduction — The reinstatement of a pre- 
vious mental experience. The concomitant of the trans- 
mission of a nervous impulse through the same brain 
center that it passed through before. 

Mental Recognition — The reinstatement of the same 
conscious elements. The concomitant of the radiation 
out into the same fringing cells. 

Law of Retroactive Inhibition — A statement of the 
fact that if we turn immediately after having learned a 
thing to the study of something else we forget a large 
part of what we have learned in a few minutes after hav- 
ing learned it. 

Law of Divided Repetition — A statement of the fact 
that we can learn more in the same length of time if we 
divide the time that we spend into several periods sepa- 
rated by intervals. 



CHAPTER IX 



ATTENTION. 

The most important thing for us is to see that attention is noth- 
ing more than the interaction of different nerve cells and experiences 
in the control of other nerve cells and experiences. — Pillsbury, 
Attention, p. 306. 

If the neurons are fixed, they are necessarily immobile. If they 
are free from attachment, they are capable of receding and approach- 
ing each other under conditions that are not yet ascertained. — Morat, 
Physiology of the Nervous System, p. 23. 

The suggestion has been made that in some cases the space 
between two neurons may be varied by amoeboid movements of 
the dendrites and terminals of the elements concerned. Although 
much may be said in favor of this hypothesis, good histological 
evidence is yet wanting. — American Text Book, Vol. II, p. 207. 

Amoeboid movements of the dendrites were first described by 
Rabl-Ruckard. — Wundt, Physiological Psychology, p. 54. 

In the first place, the acts of attending, negating, assenting, 
making an effort, are felt as movements of something in the head. 
— James, Psychology, Vol. I, p. 300. 

Duval asks if we must not admit that the cerebral neuron and 
its ramifications are not always comparable to an amoeba with its 
pseudopodia, these ramifications retracting under various influences 
and so producing more or less intimate contiguity of the cerebral 
neurons. — Manaceine, Sleep, p. 52. 

Nevertheless, as mechanical phenomena, properly so called, are 
those which are most easily comprehended, as they are those which 
in the study of any function have always contributed to furnish 
the first intelligible ideas, the doctrine of amoebism (dendritic 
movement) by clearly defining the connection between nerve ele- 
ments indicates progress in the study of nerve physiology. — 
Morat, p. 26. 

Cajal regards the neuroglia as possessed of amoeboid characters, 
by virtue of which it is enabled to act as an isolator of nervous 
currents. — Manaceine, p. 53. 

Growth of mind and brain power shows itself most clearly 
in increased power of attention. — Hoffding, Psychology, p. 160. 

Again we see that pathological facts compel us to assign atten- 
tion to the frontal lobes. — Pillsbury, Attention, p. 254. 

A Double Process. — Attention was defined by the 
older psychologists as the power the mind has to turn 
all of its energy in one direction. We no longer speak 
of the power of the mind, and such a definition is un- 



118 Functional Psychology 

satisfactory. Attention is a mental process, but we can 
best understand it by means of its physiological con- 
comitant, if we can determine what that concomitant is. 
We may be quite safe in asserting that attention is the 
concomitant of the process by which a nervous impulse 
is directed into and through a brain center. But this is 
a double process, both phases of which are manifested 
in every act of attention. If we direct a nervous impulse 
into and through one brain center, we direct it away 
from and keep it from passing through another at the 
same time. 

Positive and Negative. — Stating it in a psychological 
way, we may say that we attend to a thing and attend 
away from another. We cannot attend to a thing with- 
out at the same time attending away from everything 
else. If we are attending to the study of our lesson, we 
are at the same time refusing to attend to, or are at- 
tending away from, the noises of the street. The expres- 
sion attend to and attend away from, although common, 
are not at all satisfactory, and must be avoided. It is 
much more satisfactory to use the expression positive 
attention, meaning that in which we attend to a thing, 
and negative attention, meaning attending away from, 
although it will ultimately be necessary to modify the 
meaning of these two expressions still further. 

Depends Upon Resistance. — In order to direct a nerv- 
ous impulse into and through a brain center, the resist- 
ance must be decreased between the center in which the 
nervous impulse is and the center into which it is to go; 
but at the same time, the resistance must be increased 
between the center in which the impulse is and the center 
into which it is not to go. The process by which the 
resistance is decreased is the concomitant of positive at- 
tention, and the process by which it is increased is the 
concomitant of negative attention. In every act of at- 



Attention 119 

tention we have these two processes, of increasing the 
resistance in one place and decreasing it in another. At- 
tention is a double process, and its physiological con- 
comitant must manifest this same duplex character. 

Definition. — We are now ready to make a satisfactory 
definition of positive and negative attention. Positive 
attention is the concomitant of the process by which the 
resistance is decreased between cells and centers, and 
negative attention is the concomitant of the process by 
which the resistance is increased between cells and cen- 
ters. 

Not Localized. — If our explanation of the general 
character of attention is at all plausible, it will be seen 
that there is no possibility of localizing the faculty of 
attention, or the process of attention in any portion of 
the brain. There is no such thing as an attention center, 
as there- is a sight center or a hearing center, for atten- 
tion is a process whose function is manifested in every 
center and between any two. Some experimental evi- 
dence has been adduced tending to show that the process 
of attention is located in the frontal lobes. The nature 
of this evidence is to show that when the frontal lobes 
are injured, there is a failure of attention. 

Evidence for Localizing of Attention. — We may admit 

the fact without admitting the correctness of the inter- 
pretation. The strong probability is that the excision 
of any considerable portion of the cortex in which nerv- 
ous energy is generated would result in the failure of at- 
tention in an equal degree. The indications of a weak- 
ening of attention will manifest themselves whenever 
and wherever there is a lack of nervous energy. We may 
pass by the theory of the location of attention in the 
frontal lobes as not only unwarranted by the evidence, 
but as highly improbable from the very nature of the 



120 Functional Psychology 

case, and contradicted by other well observed phe- 
nomena. 

Method of Varying Resistance. — There are several 
suppositions that may be made concerning the nature 
of the process by which the resistance may be varied be- 
tween cells and centers. We have already seen reason 
to believe that the resistance is encountered at the syn- 
apses, or points of junction of the neurons, where the 
nervous impulse leaves one neuron and enters another. 
We have spoken of the neuroglia as being an insulating 
substance, meaning that it offers more resistance to the 
passage of a nervous impulse than does the cell sub- 
stance. Although difficult of demonstration, this is in 
all probability true. The problem then, or decreasing re- 
sistance depends upon varying the conductivity of that 
small portion of neuroglia which separates the arboral 
terminations of the neurons from each other. 

Change in Conductivity. — At least two methods are 
conceivable. We may suppose that the neuroglia changes 
its conductivity at the point of nearest approach of the 
neurons, something as the insulating material of an elec- 
tric circuit may have its conductivity increased by be- 
coming wet. This is the hypothesis advanced by Sher- 
rington, who conceives of the neuroglia surrounding the 
neuronic extensions as a synaptic membrane whose os- 
motic conductivity is variable and functional in only one 
direction. No supposition is advanced about the method 
by which the osmotic conductivity can be varied, and the 
hypothesis seems less probable than the next to be con- 
sidered. 

Shifting of the Dendrites. — Instead of this, we may 
suppose that the tips of the axonic and dendritic termi- 
nations of two cells may approximate each other more 
closely, so as to bring them into physiological communi- 
cation although not likely into physical contact This 



Attention 



121 



would be the condition of positive attention, while the 
wider separation of the tips of the dendrites would be 
the condition of negative attention. The shifting of the 
dendrites, then, either toward each other to accompany 
positive, or away from each other to accompany negative, 
would be the physiological concomitant of attention. 




Fig. 4— Diagram showing shifting of the dendrites at the synapse; a, b, normal 
position; x, y, positions in positive attention; m, n, positions in negative attention 

This second hypothesis is more easily understood, and 
will be adopted provisionally in these explanations. 
Whether this shifting of the dendrites is the actual pro- 
cess by which the resistance is increased or decreased 
or not cannot be positively affirmed ; but the psychologi- 
cal facts that are observed would all be explained by the 
operation of the process. 

Dendritic Movement Observed. — There is some evi- 
dence based upon the observations of Rabl-Ruckard, M. 
Duval and others, that the dendrites do shift their posi- 
tion. The principal value of their observation for us, 
however, is to demonstrate that there is such a possi- 
bility. The amount of movement observed by them 
would necessarily be altogether inadequate to account 
for such phenomena as we find manifested in attention. 
The phenomena of attention demand a quick movement 
throughout molecular distances so small as scarcely to 
come within the limit of microscopical observation. And 
the observations would have to be made upon some ani- 



122 Functional Psychology 

mal in which the attentive processes were as rapid as 
those of man, and in probably very few animals that could 
be observed do such processes occur. Hence it is very 
doubtful if the phenomena of movement that this theory 
demands could ever be observed. It is like the dance of 
the atoms that no one has seen, but the phenomena that 
we can observe demand such a movement for their ex- 
planation. 

Spontaneous Attention. — We may discriminate two 
kinds of attention, spontaneous and voluntary. Spon- 
taneous attention is that kind which we give without 
effort. There are certain things that it seems impossible 
not to attend to. If the teacher should stand on top of 
his desk and fire off a pistol, every pupil in the class 
would give undivided attention to the circumstance. If 
the ceiling of the room should suddenly fall down, no one 
would be inattentive to it. If the partition of this room 
should suddenly rise and disclose an elaborate banquet, 
every student who lives in a boarding house would imme- 
diately be thoroughly attentive. 

Established by Natural Selection. — This character- 
istic of spontaneous attention is a part of the human con- 
stitution. It is the only kind of attention that is possible 
to children and other animals. It seems to have been 
fixed in the constitution of animals by the process of 
natural selection. The things that are attended to spon- 
taneously are the indications of food and the presence of 
danger, or strange and unusual things, which are gener- 
ally dangerous. In times of scarcity of food, those ani- 
mals that attended most successfully and with least effort 
to the indications of food would be the ones that sur- 
vived, while those that failed to attend would perish. 
Likewise, if we imagine two animals, or young children, 
playing on a railroad track while a train was approach- 



Attention 123 

ing-, the one who attended to the danger would in all 
probability escape, while the one that failed to attend 
would be killed and leave no descendants to inherit the 
same inability to attend. Ultimately, the characteristic 
of giving attention to dangerous conditions, or to strange 
and unusual circumstances, or to the signs of the pres- 
ence of enemies and indications of food would become 
universal. 

Voluntary Attention. — But there is another kind of 
attention which we may call voluntary. This is the kind 
that we give to the study of our lesson when there is a 
circus parade, or a monkey and a hand organ outside. 
We know that we are able to attend to the study of our 
lesson under distracting circumstances, but it requires 
an effort to do so. This kind of attention is always ac- 
companied by a feeling of effort, and always, or nearly 
always, by some kind of muscular movement. The mus- 
cular movement is the particular feature of the process 
from which the name attention is derived. 

Voluntary Attention and Education. — It is through 
the process of voluntary attention that we become edu- 
cated, and the ability to give voluntary attention for con- 
tinued periods of time is a mark of education. We may 
state the entire process of education in terms of attention. 
When a particular form of activity or a particular sub- 
ject ceases to demand effortful attention, it is no longer 
educative. When we learned the alphabet, or the multi- 
plication table, it was an educative process, but when 
these two subjects became mechanical, and could be re- 
cited without effort of attention, their repetition was no 
longer educative. Only those animals can be educated, 
in any true sense of the word, that are able to give volun- 
tary attention. 

Origin of the Feeling of Effort. — It is necessary to 

consider what is the source of the feeling of effort which 



124 Functional Psychology 

is the most characteristic feature of the process. Many 
persons, impressed with the prevalence of muscular con- 
traction in attention, have recognized the muscular con- 
tractions as the source of the feeling of effort. In fact, 
some psychologists have insisted that the muscular con- 
traction is the attention. Ribot believes that the feeling 
of effort arises from the contraction of the muscle that 
wrinkles the forehead, and Mr. James says that whenever 
we attend to anything, we are conscious of the movement 
of something in the head. 

Not Due to Muscular Contraction. — But we may ex- 
perience the feeling of effort when there is no movement 
of the muscle. In cases where the nerve has ben cut, or 
paralyzed from some other cause, there is as truly a feel- 
ing of effort as if the nerve were functional and the mus- 
cle contracting. It appears then, that the feeling of effort 
has its origin in the head, but on the inside, in the brain, 
rather than on the outside, in the muscle. We may asso- 
ciate it with the shifting of the dendrites. 

Origin of the Movement. — Although it is impossible 
for us to agree to the conclusion that the contraction of 
the muscle is the attention, it is necessary to inquire what 
is the origin and meaning of the muscular movement 
which so commonly accompanies attention. When we 
experience the feeling of effort involved in the shifting 
of the dendrites, it is evidence that there is considerable 
resistance encountered by the impulse. Considerable 
feeling is experienced also, for the process of attending 
voluntarily is not pleasant, but rather a painful process. 
When the resistance is encountered, the nervous impulse 
runs out into the centers most easy of access which are 
usually the motor centers, and the movement follows. 

Illustration. — Did you ever try to teach a big boy to 
write? He grips his pen hard, his hands are clinched, his 
feet writhe around the legs of his chair, his facial move- 



Attention 125 

ments are expressive of pain, and his tongue is likely to 
be thrust out of his mouth and to move in sympathy with 
the movements of his pen. According to the theory that 
muscular movement is attention, he is giving great and 
successful attention to the process of learning to write, 
but the results of his efforts do not vindicate the conclu- 
sion. When he has acquired more skill, his movements 
diminish, his facial contortions disappear, and his writ- 
ing is better. It is only in the absence of his excessive 
movements that we can say that his efforts to attend are 
successful. The muscular movements, instead of con- 
stituting attention, are indicative of a failure of atten- 
tion. He fails to direct the nervous impulse into the 
desired channels, and it escapes into the expression cen- 
ters and is lost for effective work. 

Attention and Intellect. — We are now ready to under- 
stand the relation of attention to the intellectual process, 
which may be nicely illustrated by tracing its effect upon 
perception. In general, the effect of attention is to 
heighten perception. We may hear a clock tick at a dis- 
tance of one hundred feet, when under the same condi- 
tions we are unable to hear it at a distance of ten feet 
when we do not attend. 

Explanation of Increased Sensitiveness. — The means 
by which this result is attained seems to be as follows : 
When I am attending to the ticking of the clock, I think 
or imagine how the ticking will sound. This means that 
I am setting the dendrites in the clock ticking center in 
such a way that the -nervous impulse will pass through 
them most readily. If I have heard the clock tick before, 
I am already sending a centrally initiated impulse 
through the same clock-ticking center, so that it requires 
a very slight peripherally initiated impulse joined with 
the centrally initiated impulse already passing through 
it, to increase the vividness of the experience to the in- 
tensity of a percept. 



126 Functional Psychology 

Search for Lost Article. — So when a boy loses a knife 
or a ball, he throws a similar ball or knife down in a 
locality in which he supposes he lost it. He explains the 
success of this method of search by the hypothesis that 
the second ball or knife draws the first to it. Really, the 
second ball or knife enables him to establish a vivid im- 
pulse in the ball or knife center, so that he knows exactly 
how the lost article will look, and a very slight peri- 
pherally initiated impulse will enable him to discover the 
object. 

Law of Dynamogenesis. — This explanation shows us 
also, why an ideal that we hold before our minds tends 
to work itself out into action. It lies at the foundation 
of that profound psychological principle that we shall 
study under the name of the Law of Dynamogenesis. It 
shows us also why we can see a thing so much better if 
we know what to look for, and why it is difficult to see 
a thing that we are not expecting to find. 

Hypnotism. — This explanation of the power of atten- 
tion to heighten perception accounts for many of the 
phenomena of hypnotism. Hypnotism may be explained 
as a case of perfect attention, which is the explanation 
proposed by James Braid, its founder. This explanation 
has been criticised severely, but not in the light of this 
brain cell movement theory of attention. Some of the 
most astonishing phenomena of hypnotism are explain- 
able upon the supposition that the activity of the senses is 
enormously intensified. In one case, in which the hyp- 
notized person stood in front of another who was hold- 
ing a book, the hypnotized person was able to read off 
the words that the other person saw. Immediately the 
hypothesis was proposed that there was a mysterious 
transference of thought, but it was positively proved 
that the hypnotized person was reading the reflection of 
the words from the cornea of the other person's eye. 



Attention 127 

(See James, Psychology, v. 2, p. 609). Similarly a hyp- 
notized person may be able to hear a watch tick when 
it is in a distant room in another person's pocket. 

Intellect Varies Directly as Attention. — Since atten- 
tion directs a nervous impulse through the brain center, 
and the amount of intellectual work that can be done is 
the concomitant of the amount that goes through, it is 
readily understood that with a given amount of nervous 
energy, the intellectual work will vary with the atten- 
tion, and the more successful the attention the greater 
the amount of work that can be done. 

Attention and Feeling. — Positive attention decreases 
the resistance that is encountered in a nervous arc, or a 
brain center, while negative attention increases it. Since 
resistance is the concomitant of feeling, it will be readily 
understood that feeling may be increased or diminished 
by a process of attention. We may attend to an ache or 
a pain in such a way as to cause it to disappear. This 
is the secret of all faith cures, or mind cures or miracle 
healing or Christian Science. The various formulae re- 
cited, or recommended by the miracle worker, and mys- 
teries and mummeries with which the processes are sur- 
rounded are merely devices by which the proper kind of 
attention may be induced. 

Hysteria and Worry. — By negative attention we may 
increase the resistance and increase the feeling, even to 
the point of great pain. A disease may be induced in this 
way, and probably half of all our cases of disease have 
more or less of this element of hysteria in them. When 
the disease and its accompanying painful feeling is the 
result of negative attention, the only thing necessary to 
cure the disease is proper positive attention. The general 
name for such disease is hysteria, which may simulate 
almost any form of organic trouble with which the pa- 
tient is already acquainted, and it is almost impossible 



128 Functional Psychology 

to distinguish it from the real organic disease by the 
methods of ordinary diagnosis. In a milder form it is 
called worry, which may be described as the condition of 
continued negative attention. 

Experiment in Attention. — If a person will look stead- 
ily at the end of his finger for a minute, thinking of it all 
the time, he will begin to experience a very peculiar feel- 
ing in that spot. Under extraordinary conditions a blis- 
ter may even be produced by the touch of a pencil point. 
If we look steadily at any single letter or figure in the 
page of a book, we shall soon begin to feel that that let- 
ter is the queerest and most peculiar letter ever printed. 

Mental Healing. — When a disease is of this kind, su- 
perinduced by negative attention, the only thing neces- 
sary to cure the disease is to give proper, positive atten- 
tion to it. But there are diseases that are not the result 
of negative attention, and positive attention will not cure 
them. Attention will not heal a broken arm, nor a rup- 
tured artery, nor destroy the bacillus of tuberculosis. 
However, even in cases of genuine lesion of the tissues, 
positive attention may diminish the pain, or cause it en- 
tirely to disappear. The danger is then that the person 
believes the disease is cured, and may die the next day. 
Almost the only test that faith healers apply is the re- 
moval of pain. But pain is only a symptom, and not the 
disease itself. In such cases, the removal of the pain may 
be an injury instead of a benefit. It corresponds to the 
use of morphine or cocaine. It is like covering the crack 
in a broken beam with paint. 

Attention and Consciousness. — The relation of atten- 
tion to consciousness is easily stated, although in conse- 
quence of the duplex character of attention, its manifes- 
tations are complex. We can by a process of positive 
attention diminish the intensity of consciousness. This 
is the condition in which we are so much absorbed in 



Attention 129 

our work that we are slightly conscious of other events 
that occur near us, and are scarcely aware of what we 
ourselves are doing. The typical cases of absent-mind- 
edness are of this kind. The absent minded man is so 
intensely attentive to his own thoughts that he is scarcely 
conscious of circumstances that might be expected to 
influence his actions. 

Unconsciousness from Negative Attention. — On the 
other hand, by a process of negative attention we may 
become conscious of things that ordinarily we do uncon- 
sciously. We may make ourselves conscious of the move- 
ment of the organs in speech, or the muscular movement 
in running, and by a process of attention we may become 
conscious of the beating of the heart and the contact of 
our clothes with our body. The effect of positive atten- 
tion is in general to diminish consciousness, and of nega- 
tive attention to intensify it. But in extreme cases, neg- 
ative attention may throw so much resistance into the 
circuit that it breaks the current, and unconsciousness 
follows. This is the condition that is sometimes called 
fainting from excess of emotion. 

Chloroform.- — The unconsciousness resulting from 
the administration of chloroform, although not a process 
of attention, involves the same mechanism. Each neuron 
may be considered as homologous to a single animal cell, 
and likened to an amoeba with enormously attenuated 
pseudopodia. If a drop of chloroform, or chloroform 
vapor is introduced into the water surrounding an 
amoeba, all the pseudopodia at once contract. When a 
person breathes the vapor of chloroform, it is taken from 
the lungs into the blood, carried to the brain, affects the 
neurons, causing all the dendrites to retract and shrink 
away from each other, increasing the resistance to such 
an extent that the nervous impulse is unable to pass 
through the brain center, or to radiate out of it, and un- 
consciousness follows. 



130 Functional Psychology 

Attention and Memory. — The relation of attention to 
memory is easily understood. Positive attention dimin- 
ishes the resistance in a brain center, permitting a larger 
amount of nervous energy to pass through it, and con- 
sequently modifying the nervous arc more than would 
otherwise be done. Hence the nervous impulse more 
easily retraverses the same arc, and memory is more suc- 
cessful. The more nearly perfect attention becomes in 
the process of learning, the better we shall remember. 
If attention were perfect in learning anything, the prob- 
ability is that we should not forget what we have learned. 

Attention and Nervous Energy. — Attention is weak- 
ened if the amount of nervous energy is diminished. We 
must make a greater effort to attend if we are sick or 
feeling bad or out of sorts. We may understand this 
effect if we consider that a strong nervous impulse will 
pass over a larger synaptic space than a vv^eaker one will. 
Hence when the amount of nervous energy is small, we 
shall need to bring the dendrites closer together, neces- 
sitating a greater effort. 

Pulsation of Attention. — It is impossible to attend to 
one thing, or to one aspect of a thing for a very long time. 
About three-fifths of a second is the average length of 
time before the attention shifts, although in extreme 
cases six seconds or even twelve seconds have been re- 
ported as the result of experiments. It is the amount of 
time that the isomeric changes from colloidal to crystal- 
loidal can occur without an interval of rest. 

Active and Passive Attention. — Voluntary attention, 
accompanied by a feeling of effort, is sometimes called 
active attention. As the process of transmission through 
any nervous arc becomes habitual, it is attended with 
less effort until all feeling of effort seems to disap- 
pear. The attention that is involved in such transmis- 
sion is then sometimes called secondary passive, from 



Attention 131 

its resemblance to spontaneous attention, which is some- 
times called passive attention. These terms passive, 
active and secondary passive are employed by some psy- 
chologists, but they are not to be commended. 

DEFINITIONS 

Attention — The psychological concomitant of the pro- 
cess by which a nervous impulse is directed into and 
through a brain center. 

Positive Attention — That kind of attention by which 
the resistance between cells and centers is decreased. 

Negative Attention — That kind of attention in which 
the resistance between cells and centers is increased. 

Spontaneous Attention — That kind of attention that 
is accomplished without effort. 

Voluntary Attention — That kind of attention that is 
accompanied by a feeling of effort. 



CHAPTER X 

WILL. 

For a long time any explanation of the phenomena of organic 
life by means of the general forces of nature was regarded as 
materialism. — Hoffding, Psychology, p. Z2>. 

In the case of willed movement, this voluntary enforcement 
depends upon the amount of free energy in the brain at the moment. 
— McDougall, Physiological Psychology, p. 166. 

The will of the metaphysicians, then, is clearly the outcome of 
an illusion due to the necessary incompleteness of self-observation, 
— Loeb, Physiology of the Brain, p. 216. 

The fondness of these writers, and of popular thought, for 
the term will, or activity, with the implication of something beyond 
consciousness, seems to be rooted in the anthropomorphic ten- 
dencies of the human mind. — Pillsbury, Attention, p. 290. 

There are large numbers of intelligent persons who rather pride 
themselves upon their fixed belief that our volitions have no cause, 
or that the will causes itself, which is either the same thing or a 
contradiction in terms. — Huxley, Hume, p. 145. 

Will is not an independent thing; it is merely the control of 
action by ideas. — Irving Miller, Psychology of Thinking, p. 64. 

The other theory, that consciousness makes adjustments, and 
modifies structures directly by its fiat, is contradicted by the psychol- 
ogy of voluntary movement. Consciousness can bring about no 
movement without having first an adequate experience of that move- 
ment to serve on occasion as a stimulus to the innervation of the 
appropriate nerve centers. This point is no longer subject to 
dispute. — Baldwin, Development and Evolution, p. 113, 

Wundt has shown that will and attention are intimately related, 
and has employed the term apperception to denote their common 
constituent. — Kulpe, Psychology, p. 214. 

Phenomena of Will. — That there is a phenomenon of 
mental Hfe called will, which every one recognizes as a 
constituent element in his own experience, no one will 
deny. That its nature is very complex and difficult to 
conceive in any way is equally evident. That most of the 
discussions of will have involved inconceivable proposi- 
tions and have been largely beside the question, is quite 
as demonstrable. So difficult are the problems involved 
in the discussion of the will that many psychologists 
refuse to consider it under that head, and treat of action 
instead. The reason adduced for this procedure is that 



Will 133 

every act of the will must eventuate in some kind of 
muscular contraction. Hence a study of the will is noth- 
ing more than a study of the kinds of actions that muscu- 
lar contraction produces. 

Not Necessarily Motor. — It would seem that this prop- 
sition is scarcely demonstrable. It is as truly an act of 
the will sometimes to refrain from making a muscular 
movement as it is to move. It is as truly an act of the 
will to keep an idea before the mind and to think about 
a certain thing as it is to contract a muscle. There are 
no muscular contractions in the internal direction of a 
train of thought. The movement theory of will implies 
that in order to become an act of the will, a nervous 
impulse must enter, pass through and leave a brain cen- 
ter, but it must leave by way of a motor center. But it 
appears to be quite as satisfactory interpretation of the 
facts, if instead of passing into a motor center, the nerv- 
ous impulse should pass into a center of some other kind. 

Former Notions About Will. — To the older psycholo- 
gists, will was a simple matter. It was merely a self de- 
termination of the substantial entity called mind, or the 
ego, and was conditioned by no necessary laws. The 
self activity of the mind and its self determination was 
will. "The will determined itself." It was not neces- 
sarily determined by anything else. It was a funda- 
mental power of the mind, and no other explanation was 
necessary nor possible. 

Feelings Determine the Will. — But even among the 
older psychologists there were those who regarded any 
decision made by the will as determined by the feelings. 
It was a common expression that feelings formed the 
will. By this was meant that the actions of a person 
were determined by the will in accordance with the feel- 
ings. If one kind of feeling was experienced, the will 
acted of its own accord in one way; if another kind of 



134 Functional Psychology 

feeling was experienced, the will acted in another way 
although if it had been so disposed it might have acted 
differently. This is merely another statement of the 
proposition that feelings are the motive powers and lead 
to action ; that feelings determine what the action shall 
be, whether it is of a mental or a physical character. 

Ideas Determine the Will. — In opposition to this at 
the present time the opinion is widely prevalent that it 
is the intellectual idea that works itself out into action, 
and determines what the action shall be. This is the law 
of dynamogenesis, and it seems to be supported by satis- 
factory observations. Either position may be defended 
by observations that all will acknowledge to be true, but 
this merely shows the complexity of the phenomena 
grouped together as will, and the inadequacy of the 
theory of will as at present understood. 

Identity of Will and Other Processes. — So we find 
that different writers at various times have considered 
will and feeling as identical; others have believed the 
same thing of will and intellect, will and consciousness, 
will and attention, and will and expression, or action. It 
will be seen that a comprehensive theory of will which 
shall coordinate all the facts whose partial consideration 
has led to such diverse interpretations is badly needed. 

A Double Process. — Will is a double process, and one 
of its elements is the process of attention which has al- 
ready been discussed. But there is a second element 
of will that has been overlooked. We can best make 
clear what this element is by a resume of the propositions 
that have been advanced in the preceding chapters. 

Elements of a Current. — In every current, there are 
certain elements which are necessary to constitute it a 
current. The elements that are common to all currents 
will very likely indicate the essential components, while 



Will 135 

those characters that are peculiar to the individual cur- 
rents will be left out of the number that enter into the 
conception of currents in general. 

Concomitants of Current Elements. — We have as- 
sumed that all the psychological processes that can be 
discriminated from each other have their physiological 
concomitants in the elements of a current. It will help 
us very much to determine what the essential elements 
of a current are. 

The Conductor. — Every current must have some kind 
of a conductor. In the case of a river current, the river 
bed itself is the conductor. In the electric current, the 
conductor is usually a wire. In a nervous current, the 
conductor is a nervous arc, w^hich in its simplest form 
consists of a nerve, two ganglion cells, and another 
nerve. 

The Insulator. — Every current must have some kind 
of an insulator for the conductor, or some method by 
which the current is kept from leaving it. In the case 
of the river, the banks serve the function of an insulator ; 
in the electric current, the insulator is a covering over the 
wnre, or it may be that the air itself serves as the insulat- 
ing material. In the case of the nervous current, we have 
assumed that the neuroglia, and along the course of the 
nerve, the medullary sheath serves the function of the 
insulator. It will be seen that neither the conductor nor 
the insulator has any psychological concomitant. 

Resistance. — Every current encounters some resist- 
ance. In the river current the resistance is the friction of 
the water against the banks, the inequalities in the river 
bed, or obstructions that it meets. The effect of the re- 
sistance is to delay the current, and to warm the water 
in the river. In the electric current, the resistance is 
called merely resistance, and we measure it in ohms. 



136 Functional Psychology 

The effect of the resistance is to produce heat. In the 
nervous current the resistance has no other name. We 
are unable to measure its amount, although we detect it 
by means of the chronoscope, and its physiological con- 
comitant is feeling. 

Field of Influence. — Every current produces some 
effect upon the bodies in the space near it. We may call 
this space in which it produces the effect the field of influ- 
ence. In the case of the river current, the field of influ- 
ence is indicated by the water that is drawn by capillarity 
out of the river into the soil along its banks. Also it is 
shown by the current of air that is dragged along by the 
surface of the water. In the electric current the field of 
influence is called the magnetic field, and it is mapped 
with a magnetic needle. In the case of the nervous cur- 
rent, the field of influence is the radiation of the nervous 
impulse out of the brain center into the fringing cells, 
and its physiological concomitant is consciousness. 

Work Done. — Every current is capable of doing some 
work. In the river, the work may take the form of driv- 
ing water wheels and turning machinery. It is meas- 
ured in foot pounds and horse power. In the electric 
current the work done is the turning of motors and driv- 
ing machinery. In the nervous current the physiological 
work is the transmission of a nervous impulse through a 
nervous arc, and its psychological concomitant is intel- 
lectual work, such as solving problems, memorizing, per- 
ceiving, etc. 

Direction of Current. — Every current is directed by 
changing the degree of resistance to be overcome, making 
it greater in one path than in another. In the river cur- 
rent, it is directed by dams and gates. In the electric 
current by switches and shunts. In the nervous current 
by the shifting of dendrites, and the psychological con- 
comitant is attention. 



Will 



137 



Driving Force. — Every current must have some kind 
of driving force. In the river current, this is provided 
by the fall of the river, or in the case of water wheels 
the force of the water is the difference in level between 
the water above the dam and the water below, which 
is called the head. In the electric current the driving 
force is called the electro-motive force, and is measured 
in volts. In the nervous current we have no means of 
measuring it, and no name for the force. The fact that 
there is a current is well recognized, but its driving force 
has not been considered. It is in some way connected 
with the oxidation of tissue, and after the analogy of the 

TABLE I 





River 


Electric 


Nervous 








Physiological. 
Current 


Psychologic. 
Psychon 


Conductor 


Bed 


Wire 


Nervous Arc 




Insulator 


Banks 


Cotton Covering 


Neuroglia 




Resistance 


Friction 


Resistance 


Resistance 


Feeling 


Field of 
Influence 


Capillary Water 
Air Currents 


Maflnetic field 


Radiation 


Consciousness 


Work Done 


Water Wheels 


Motors 


Transmission 


Intellectual Work 


Directed by 


Dams and Gates 


Switches and 
Shunts 


Shifting of the 
Dendrites 


Attention 


Drivinl Force 


FaU. Head 


Electro-motive 
Force 


Nervo-mottvc 
Force 


Will 



138 Functional Psychology 

electric current, I propose to call it the nervo-motive 
force. It is this nervo-motive force that appears to be 
the concomitant of will, or its concomitant, the sec- 
ond element in the constitution of the will. 

The Psychon. — We have thus described the elements 
of the nervous current and have determined the psycho- 
logical concomitant of each. As we have one word, cur- 
rent, to express the sum of all the elements, so we need 
one word to express the sum of all the psychological con- 
comitants. Mind and consciousness are both unsatis- 
factory, and I propose to coin a new word to fit the new 
conception in psychology and call the combination of the 
psychological concomitants of the current elements — 
intellect, consciousness, feeling, attention, will — the 
psychon. It will be found very convenient to speak of 
the different elements of the psychon, instead of the 
different states of consciousness. 

TABLE 2 

Concomitant of 
Nervo-iMotive Force 



WilH 



Attention < 



Positive 
Negative 



Evidence of the Hypothesis. — In order to establish 
the validity of the determination of will as the con- 
comitant of nervo-motive force, we shall need to demon- 
strate, first, that there is a nervo-motive force, and sec- 
ond, we shall need to present evidence in favor of the 
assumption that this force is the concomitant of will. 

Existence of the Current. — The best evidence of the 
existence of nervo-motive force is the existence of the 
current itself. By current we mean the change in succes- 



Will 139 

sive molecules of the nervous arc. No one will deny the 
existence of the current, and no one will believe that it 
will flow and that successive molecules will change with- 
out the manifestation of some force. The nature of the 
force is beyond our knowledge, and perhaps beyond our 
comprehension. Whether it is some form of energy simi- 
lar to those already described in textbooks on physics, or 
identical with one of them, or whether it is different from 
any that is there recognized is beyond our province to 
discuss. Whether it is capable of being transformed into 
one of the recognized forces, and has a quantitative rela- 
tion to them, is also beside our present question. But 
that there is a force, the fact of a current abundantly 
proves. 

Oxidation of Brain Tissue. — Another evidence of the 
existence of a nervo-motive force is found in the fact 
that brain tissue is oxidized, and the resulting products 
have a lower degree of complexity than those which are 
destroyed. Whenever substances undergo a chemical 
change resulting in the production of substances of a 
lower degree of complexity, energy is liberated. The 
change is a katabolic change, and results in the liberation 
of energy. 

Interruption of Mental Processes. — In the next place, 
we find that all mental processes stop almost instantly 
and nervous currents cease to flow, when the conditions 
for this chemical action in the brain are not present. 
Pressure on the carotid arteries results in unconscious- 
ness in thirty seconds. Hemorrhage produces fainting. 
The brain weighs only one-fiftieth of the weight of the 
body, but it draws usually from one-twelfth to one-eighth 
of the blood. It is not necessary, however, to shut ofif the 
supply of blood in order to stop mental action. All that 
is necessary is to shut off the supply of oxygen to the 
brain, and this may be done by cutting off the supply 



140 Functional Psychology 

of oxygen to the blood. The blood may continue to flow, 
but if the person is in an atmosphere that contains little 
oxygen, the same results follow as if the blood were cut 
off. More than this, we find that when severe mental 
work is accomplished, there is a greater amount of kata- 
bolic substances produced in the brain and excreted from 
the system. 

Concomitant Variation. — The evidence for the con- 
comitance of will and nervo-motive force is found prin- 
cipally in the fact that the two vary together constantly. 
When we are able to make proper allowance for all modi- 
fications of the nerve current that arise from variation 
in resistance, character and modifications of brain tissue 
and the substance of the nervous arc, and for the effect 
of habit and attention, we shall always find that strength 
of will varies directly as the amount of nervous energy 
liberated. The facts that constitute this evidence may be 
grouped under three heads. 

Pathological Will. — The first group of facts are those 
that are derived from an examination of pathological 
conditions of will. We find in every case of weakened 
will, that the bodily conditions are such as to diminish 
the amount of tissue oxidized in the brain. Some of 
these pathological conditions are cases of habitual users 
of alcohol, morphine, opium, cocaine. In every case, the 
formation of the habit of this kind results in a condition 
of weakened will. Why does not the drunkard, or mor- 
phine eater discontinue the habit? Every one not so 
addicted is sure that he himself could quit under similar 
circumstances, so why does not the drunkard? But with 
his weakened will, the breaking of the habit is a chemi- 
cal impossibility. 

Diminished Nervi-Motive Force. — Indulgence in a 
narcotic habit always results in lessened oxidation in the 
brain. The entire range of metabolic processes in the 



Will 141 

body is circumscribed, and this can usually be recog- 
nized in the paler complexion, due to the lessened num- 
ber of red blood corpuscles, which are the carriers of 
oxygen ; the loss of appetite ; in the sluggishness of the 
circulation, and in fact, in almost all the processes that 
we have found to be essential to the liberation of ner- 
vous energy. 

Drunkard's Red Nose. — Even the red nose of the 
drunkard is an indication of lessened nervous energy. The 
nose is red because a diminished supply of nervous 
energy is transmitted to the muscles that keep the arte- 
rioles tense and of their proper size. When the nervous 
supply to the muscles is diminished, the muscles relax, 
and the little arteries enlarge. 

Indications of Weak Will. — The man whose will is 
weak from narcotics or sickness or any other cause is 
unable to carry on his work and to do the things that he 
knows he ought to do even if it is his customary and 
habitual occupation. Still less is he able to undertake 
any new work, or devise new processes of accomplishing 
the old. We have a classical example of this weakness 
of the will from the use of opium in DeQuincey. He tells 
us that when he was addicted to the use of opium, let- 
ters would lie for months unanswered. He knew that 
they should be answered, knew exactly what to say, but 
could not bring himself to answer them. His will was 
weak. 

Treatment of Weak Will. — Many of us have unan- 
swered letters, or some unfinished work that corresponds 
to them, and the cause is the same. Our wills are tem- 
porarily weak, not perhaps from indulgence in opium, but 
from other causes. In such a case, when we feel dis- 
inclined to work and to do what we know we ought to 
do, the only proper thing is to do something that will 
enable us to generate more nervous energy. We need 



142 Functional Psychology 

to take a vigorous walk, to start the blood to moving 
more rapidly to the brain, to breathe more fresh air so 
as to oxygenate the blood. In this way by generating 
more energy, we strengthen our will. It is a common 
experience that at the beginning of exercise or many 
other kinds of work we feel much disinclined to do it, but 
as we continue, the circulation quickens, more nervous 
energy is liberated, and we find it pleasurable. 

Treatment of Narcotic Habit. — The proper treatment 
of a narcotic habit is indicated by its efTect. The treat- 
ment is to do anything that will cause more nervous 
energy to be liberated. Good food, pure air, sufficient 
exercise to quicken the circulation, but not enough to 
produce fatigue ; and it may be necessary although this 
condition is secondary, to discontinue the use of the drug. 
But the discontinuance of the drug without the other 
conditions to increase the nervous energy generated will 
result in disappointment. Anything that will cause more 
energy to be liberated will strengthen the will. Some 
cases of weakened will do not arise from narcotic habits. 
Many examples are given by Ribot in his Diseases of 
the Will. 

Weakened Will From Starving. — When one is fasting 
or starving for several days, the most noticeable per- 
sistent psychological symptom is a weakness of will. 
Nothing can be undertaken that is not done by the force 
of habit. Notes of the psychological condition of a man 
completely abstaining from food for seven days con- 
tinually emphasize the facts of weakness of will. When 
food is lacking to repair the tissues, oxidation cannot 
proceed with its usual rapidity, and less energy is lib- 
erate. 

Evidence From Sensation. — Another line of evidence 
is derived from the fact that sensations are diminished in 
intensity in cases of weakened will. The senses are not 



Will 143 

so acute nor the sensations so vivid when the will is 
weak. Not so small difference in touch, sight, color, 
nor hearing can be perceived as when the will is of its 
normal strength. If the amount of nervous energy avail- 
able for psychological purposes at any time is less than 
the usual amount, the impulses originating in the sense 
organs will be less than they usually are, and we shall 
be able to experience sensations of less than the ordi- 
nary degree of intensity. Intensity of sensation depends 
upon the amount of nervous energy that is manifested 
in the nervous impulse. The weakened will is accom- 
panied by a diminished intensity of sensation. The con- 
clusion is that since we know that the diminished amount 
of nervous energy is the cause of the diminished intensity 
of sensation, and diminished intensity of sensation al- 
ways accompanies weakened will, the weakened will 
must also be related to the diminished amount of nerv- 
ous energy. 

Function of Attention in Will. — The nervous energy 
that is liberated in the brain must be gathered up and 
transmitted through a brain center before it is available 
for intellectual work. It is like the generation of elec- 
tricity upon the plates of a battery, but no work can be 
done by the electricity until it has been gathered up and 
a circuit established through a wire connecting the plates. 
The energy liberated in the brain cells is the nervo- 
motive force, but the energy is gathered up and directed 
through a nervous arc by a process of attention. Hence 
we find that nervo-motive force, and attention, both posi- 
tive and negative, constitute the concomitant of will. 

Will and Feeling. — Since feeling depends in part upon 
the amount of nervous energy, or strength of the current, 
we shall expect to find feeling and will varying with each 
other. In general this is true, although other circum- 
stances may sometimes prevent a recognition of the fact, 



144 Functional Psychology 

and the other condition of resistance, the nature of the 
nervous arc, will always explain the contradictory in- 
stances. It is on account of this fact that many persons 
believe will is identical with feeling, or that the feelings 
form the will, and are the motive powers. 

Will and Intellect. — In general, also, the man of 
strong will is a leader of men, and capable of greater 
intellectual work. If the will is weakened from any 
cause, the intellectual ability is decreased. So we are 
unable to accomplish our work when we are sick, not 
primarily in consequence of lack of muscular power, or 
any other imperatively inhibiting cause, but primarily 
because our will is weak. 

Will and the Law of Dynamogenesis. — This view of 
will is quite different from the one that asserts that will 
is capable of deciding upon any line of action and then 
pursuing it. No act of any kind can be willed except by 
entertaining a clear idea of the action, and a clear idea 
demands the transmission of a strong impulse through a 
brain center. The act of the will really consists in trans- 
mitting an impulse through the center. No act can be 
willed that has not been previously experienced. This 
in itself is sufficient to necessitate a new interpretation 
of will. 

DEFINITIONS 

Will — The concomitant of nervo-motive force directed 
by attention, both positive and negative. 

Nervo-motive force — Nervous energy liberated by the 
oxidation of brain tissue. The force that drives a nervous 
impulse through a nervous arc. 

Law of Dynamogenesis — A statement of the fact that 
an idea clearly entertained will work itself out into action. 

Psychon — The entire concomitant of a nervous cur- 
rent. The sum of all the psychological processes which 
are the concomitants of the current elements. 



CHAPTER XI 

FORMS OF ACTION. 

There are no muscular movements in the internal direction of a 
train of thought. — Saleeby, Psychology, p. 56. 

The expression reflex act is generally synonymous with an 
unconscious voluntary act. — Morat, Physiology of the Nervous 
System, p. 508. 

As originally employed by Marshall Hall, and since then by 
common consent, reflex action involves a differentiated nervous 
system. — Lloyd Morgan, Animal Behavior, p. 32. 

There is the remarkable difference that intelligent actions are 
centrally stimulated while reflex actions are peripherally stimulated. 
— Baldwin, Methods and Processes, p. 72). 

The mere idea of an act starts a chain of nervous processes 
that finally make the action real. — Stratton, Experimental Psychol- 
ogy, p. 206. 

To make any movement voluntarily, the attention must be fixed 
upon some kind of an idea that represents that movement. — Baldwin, 
Methods and Processes, p. 86. 

Why Consider Actions? — Instead of discussing will as 
a mental process, many psychologists discuss action in- 
stead ; or discuss will in terms of action. The theory 
upon which this treatment of will is based is that every 
act of the will must eventuate in some muscular contrac- 
tion. The impulse must start in some sense organ, pass 
through a brain center and run out into some muscle 
before it can constitute an act of the will, or be the con- 
comitant of a mental process. This theory is sometimes 
described as the sensori-motor arc conception. It ap- 
pears to be incapable of demonstration, and is in fact too 
limited a view of the relation between mental processes 
and the nervous impulse. We may agree fully with the 
proposition that a nervous impulse must enter, pass 
through and leave the brain center in order to constitute 
the concomitant of a mental process ; but that it must 
originate in a sense organ is undemonstrable, and that it 
must pass into a motor center is likewise unnecessary. 
Many impulses do originate in a sense organ, but many 
are centrally initiated. Many impulses do pass into a 



146 Functional Psychology 

motor center, but many do not ; and many of those which 
do, bring about actions which are the expressions of feel- 
ing, and are more or less accidental and superfluous. 

Reflex Movement. — If you are sitting with your knees 
grossed, and strike the patella a sharp blow w^ith your 
knuckles, your foot will move. This is a reflex act, and is 
not willed, nor in fact can it be prevented. The foot 
moves of itself. A nervous impulse is started by the blow 
of the knuckles in a nerve under the patella, is carried to 
the spinal cord, and passes back to the muscle that moves 
the foot over a motor nerve, but does not reach the 
cerebral cortex. Other examples of reflexes are found in 
the contraction of the muscles that control the size of the 
pupil of the eye, in the movements of the digestive organs, 
and in many other parts of the body. 

Other Reflexes. — But reflex movements are not lim- 
ited to the human body. If we observe an amoeba or a 
vorticella or other one-celled animal under the micro- 
scope, we shall see it make movements adjusting it to 
the conditions in which it finds itself. It will sent out 
pseudopodia, and when it comes into contact with other 
objects will retract them. These movements are reflexes. 
Similarly, a sensitive plant will fold its leaflets and drop 
its leaves at a slight touch. Other plants will do the same 
in a less degree, and in fact the same kind of movement 
will be found universal in the animal and plant kingdoms, 
wherever there is protoplasm manifesting its activity. 

A Direct Response to a Stimulus. — If we observe the 
movement of the protoplasm in the leaf cells of Elodea, 
we shall find it move more and more rapidly under the 
stimulus of heat. A sharp blow on the stage of the micro- 
scope will immediately stop the movement. So wherever 
we find protoplasm, we shall find it responding to stimuli, 
sometimes by movement, sometimes by cessation of 



Forms of Action 147 

movement, and this direct response of protoplasm to a 
stimulus constitutes the reflex action. 

Direct and Indirect Application of the Stimulus. — In 

case of the amoeba and the sensitive plant, the stimulus 
is applied directly to the protoplasm itself. In case of the 
knee jerk, the stimulus is applied to the protoplasm of 
the nerve, but it reaches the protoplasm of the contract- 
ing muscle indirectly by means of the nerve. The same 
application of force to the muscle v^ould produce move- 
ment, but it is distributed more efficiently to the muscle 
by the nerve than it could be directly by the mechanical 
shock. 

Three Kinds of Reflexes. — We shall be able then to 
discover three kinds of reflex action: First, the kind in 
which the stimulus is applied directly to the protoplasm, 
as in case of the amoeba and the sensitive plant. Second, 
that in w^hich the stimulus is applied to the motor nerve 
leading to the muscle. And third, that in which the stim- 
ulus is applied to the sensory nerve, is carried to the 
ganglion, or reflex center, and thence sent back to the 
muscle by means of the motor nerve. It is this third 
kind of movement from which the word reflex is derived, 
and sometimes the word is limited to this kind of move- 
ment. The thought is that the stimulus is reflected from 
the spinal cord, and thrown back as a ball is reflected 
from a wall. It appears, however, that this is too limited 
a meaning for the term, and that there is no essential dif- 
ference in the three kinds, except that the nerve is con- 
nected with the different fibers of the muscle in such a 
way that the stimulus can be applied to all of them at 
once more effectively through the nerve than it can be 
directly. 

Two Properties of Protoplasm. — Movement results 
from the contraction of the substance that moves. Con- 
tractility is especially a muscular function, as irritability 



148 Functional Psychology 

is a nervous function. In the undifferentiated protoplasm 
of the amoeba, or the leaf cell of elodea, and all other 
examples of protoplasm of that kind, we find contractility, 
or ability to contract, and irritability, or the appreciation 
of a stimulus manifested in equal degrees. But muscular 
protoplasm has become highly differentiated in the direc- 
tion of contractility, while nervous tissue has become 
highly specialized in the direction of irritability, or per- 
ceiving the stimulus and transmitting it. 

The Nerve-Muscle Machine. — A stimulus so slight 
that it would not affect a muscle if applied to it directly, 
will be appreciated by a nerve ; and when transmitted by 
the nerve to a muscle will bring about a contraction 
incomparably greater than would be manifested in the 
protoplasm of the nerve, or in the undifferentiated proto- 
plasm of the amoeba. The combination of nerve and 
muscle constitutes a nerve-muscle machine which has the 
effect of intensifying both the stimulus and the move- 
ment. 

No Mental Process Involved. — So far as the contrac- 
tion of a muscle is concerned, every muscular contraction 
is a reflex. It is the direct response of the muscular 
protoplasm to the stimulus transmitted to it by the motor 
nerve. There is no mental process about it, and we shall 
need to look in some other place for the distinction be- 
tween reflex and any other kind of action. 

Automatic Action. — The beating of the heart and the 
movement of the lungs in breathing represent another 
kind of action which is called automatic. It is sometimes 
described as the most reflex of all the reflexes, and the 
description is fairly appropriate. The difference between 
reflex and automatic is not in the kind of movement but 
in the regularity. Automatic actions are rythmical, oc- 
curring at regular intervals, while reflexes occur at any 
time that the stimulus is applied. Otherwise we may con- 
sider the two as identical. 



Forms of Action 149 

Reflex Movements of a Baby. — The first movements 
of a baby are all of them reflex. If a brightly colored ball 
or other conspicuous object be held in front of a baby 
from three to six months old, the sense impression pro- 
duced by it establishes in him a series of reflexes. If a 
sufficient supply of nervous energy is available, he will 
respond by a movement of his hands and his feet and his 
head and his whole body. It is the undirected overflow 
of nervous energy into the motor area and the entire 
series of reflex movements results. 

Functional Selection. — None of these movements are 
purposeful, or directed toward grasping the ball. But 
some of these purposeless reflexes may bring the hand 
of the child into contact with the ball, when the stimulus 
furnished by the contact establishes another impulse, 
resulting in the contracting of the muscles that grasp 
it. The next time the ball is suspended in front of the 
child, the same reflexes are produced, but in consequence 
of the previous practice, it is not likely to be so long 
before the hand comes into contact with the ball, and 
grasps it. The more frequently the hand is thus brought 
into contact with the ball, the more effective becomes the 
hand reflex and the less efficient or emphatic become the 
other reflexes. Finally the other reflexes almost disap- 
pear, and the effective reflex is the one that survives. 
This survival of the effective reflex is called functional 
selection. 

Sensations Established. — Whenever the baby suc- 
ceeds in grasping the ball, an impulse is established in the 
touch corpuscles of the hand, which is transmitted 
through some combination of cells in the touch center, 
and accompanies the sensation of touch. Whenever the 
muscles contract that bring the hand into contact with 
the ball, an impulse is started in the muscles themselves 
that is transmitted to the muscular sensation center in the 



150 Functional Psychology 

brain, and accompnies the muscular sensation. When- 
ever he grasps the ball, he is likely to see his hand grasp- 
ing it. An impulse is established in the eye which is 
transmitted to the sight center in the brain, and accom- 
panies the sensation of sight. 

Perception of the Action. — These several sensations 
experienced at the same time, perhaps with others, com- 
bine and modify each other, and accompany the percep- 
tion of the action of grasping the ball. A perception cen- 
ter for this act is thus organized, and an impulse can be 
transmitted through it with little resistance. It ulti- 
mately becomes so well organized that a weak centrally 
initiated impulse may be transmitted through it, and 
when that is the case, the child can see himself grasping 
the ball before the movement is actually made. When 
this point has been reached it is no longer a reflex, but a 
conscious voluntary act. 

The Motive. — The difference between the reflex and 
the conscious voluntary act is that a mental process pre- 
cedes the conscious voluntary, while no mental process 
precedes the reflex. This antecedent mental process is 
called the motive, and is always an idea, not a feeling. 
Any idea that is clearly entertained tends to work itself 
out into action, and may constitute a motive. The state- 
Idea of One's Own Act. — The first motive is the idea 
of the act itself, or the idea of our own movement in per- 
forming the action. We must think just how we are ex- 
pecting to do the act. The first time we perform any 
action, it is done as the result of an accident or blunder, 
without any clear idea of how it should be performed. 
The law of functional selection applies. When we learn 
to skate, or knit, or whet a razor our attempts are awk- 
ward and far from skillful. We may have watched some 
one else perform these actions, but when we undertake 
ment of this fact is called the law of Dynamogenesis. 



Forms of Action * 151 

to do the same things, we find that we are able to per- 
form them far from skillfully. 

Not a Complete Idea. — The explanation of this fact 
seems to be as follows : When we watch some one else 
perform the act, we obtain a visual sensation of how it 
should be performed; but into the percept of an action 
enters also the touch, and muscular sensations, with 
others. It is impossible for us to obtain these sensations 
visually, by watching some one else, hence it is impos- 
sible to get a clear, motivating idea from seeing some one 
else perform it. We must get our motivating, effective, 
idea by a series of trials and gradual approaches toward 
the correct idea. This is sometimes called the method of 
trial and error, although a very expressive designation 
for it is blundering. 

Idea of Result. — We are never very skillful so long as 
the motivating idea is the idea of our own action. But 
as we become skillful, we can cease to hold before our 
minds the idea of our own action, and hold only the result 
of the action. A baseball batter, when he has become 
skillful, does not have in mind an idea of just how he 
shall stand nor how he shall hold his bat, nor just how he 
shall swing it. He merely sees in his mind the ball sail- 
ing over the back field fence, or cutting the grass between 
shortstop and second base, and then the ball goes exactly 
to that place. Or if he is an ear minded individual, he 
holds clearly in mind the sound of the bat as it strikes the 
ball, and then it sounds in exactly that way. Or he may 
be a touch individual, when he has a clear idea of how 
the bat will feel when it collides with the ball. If, how- 
ever, the idea is not clearly held in mind, the result will 
not occur. 

Dynamogenesis as a Method of Discipline. — We have 
been told that in school children will do just what they 
are expected to do. If we understand what is meant by 



152 Functional Psychology 

this statement, we shall find a great deal of truth in it; 
but it will result disastrously as a method of maintaining 
discipline, unless the teacher knows the explanation. If 
a teacher holds clearly in mind the idea of proper be- 
havior, that idea will work itself out into action. Every 
movement, gesture, word, regulation, of the teacher will 
express the idea that she holds in mind. The children 
then obtain that idea of proper behavior, which works 
itself out into their actions. But if the teacher antici- 
pates disorder, issues prohibitions and commands, there 
is every probability that the children will carry out the 
idea that the teacher's actions express, and disorder will 
follow. 

Another Motive. — But the motive is capable of still 
further development. Even the idea of result may dis- 
appear, and the action follow immediately upon the re- 
ceipt of the sensation without any previous contempla- 
tion of the idea of result. When a door begins to slam 
toward us, we throw up our hand to ward off the blow. 
There is no antecedent idea of our action, and no idea 
of the result to come from it. There is not the least inti- 
mation of the mental process that might be interpreted 
by saying "Now I must throw up my hand in this way in 
order to avoid being struck in the face." Nothing cor- 
responding to this process appears. 

Sensation as Motive. — But the appearance of the ap- 
proaching door starts the impulse that terminates in the 
action. The motive here is merely the sensation. The 
sight center and the corresponding motor center have 
been connected by so many experiences, and the pathway 
between the two has been traversed so many times, that 
the resistance is practically nothing, and the impulse 
flows directly into the motor center. 

Secondary Reflex. — This kind of an action is some- 
times called a secondary reflex, the qualifying word indi- 



Forms of Action 153 

eating that it has been derived from a conscious volun- 
tary act. In fact, one school of psychologists insist that 
every reflex is of this nature. They have all been derived 
originally from conscious voluntary acts, and have be- 
come reflex as the result of habit. 

Unconscious Voluntary. — A much more satisfactory 
interpretation of these actions is found in the description 
of them as unconscious voluntary actions. The nervous 
impulse traverses the same centers that it traversed, or 
would traverse, when the motive was the idea of our own 
act ; but in consequence of repetition and habit, the brain 
center offers so little resistance that there is no feeling 
and no radiation with its concomitant consciousness. 
Such an action is sometimes called a sensori-motor act, 
the action following immediately upon the sensation. 
Sometimes these actions are described as involving only 
the "lower centers," meaning by that that the accompany- 
ing impulses do not pass through the cerebral, cortical, 
centers, but only through combinations of cells in the 
cerebellum or the spinal cord. There is no evidence of 
the truth of this supposition except the absence of con- 
sciousness, and we have a much more satisfactory expla- 
nation of that than the theory of lower centers offers. 

Instinctive Action. — Instinctive action is the kind that 
is illustrated by the activity of a bird in building its nest, 
or a digger wasp provisioning its cell with caterpillars, or 
a mud dauber engaged in the same occupation. In this 
case the nerve center that is traversed by the impulse is 
organized without any antecedent experience. It is de- 
veloped by the processes of growth as the result of varia- 
tion and heredity in the ancestral animals. So when the 
occasion arises, and the instinct is fully developed, the 
nervous impulse traverses the instinctive center and the 
instinctive action follows. 

Nature of Instinctive Action. — Three distinct ques- 



154 Functional Psychology 

tions arise from the consideration of instinctive actions. 
First, is an instinctive action more closely related to the 
reflex or to the conscious voluntary? Many persons re- 
gard an instinctive action as a compound reflex, com- 
posed of a series of reflexes, each of which constitutes the 
stimulus for the next. The difficulties in the way of this 
explanation are so great that we may safely reject it. 

A Conscious Voluntary. — Then shall we say that the 
instinctive action is a conscious voluntary action, or 
closely related to it. The difficulties in the way of adopt- 
ing this explanation arise principally from the fact that 
the best examples of instinctive action are found in in- 
sects and other animals in which we are not inclined to 
recognize consciously intelligent behavior of any kind; 
and in man, the instinctive actions are poorly represented, 
and are obscured by others. But making due allowance 
for this fact, there appears to be no good reason for re- 
fusing to call instinctive actions, conscious voluntary. 
This implies that the instinctive action is preceded by a 
motive which is an idea, and nearly certainly an idea of 
the end, immediate or remote, to be attained by the 
action. 

Indicates Intelligence. — A second question is whether 
or not a thoroughly fixed instinct is indicative of intelli- 
gence or the lack of it. It is generally assumed that an 
animal that posssses thoroughly fixed instincts is 
thereby demonstrated to be devoid of intelligence. But 
in the case of the human being, the actions that are 
best performed are those that most nearly approximate 
the condition of an instinctive action. In fact we some- 
times speak of an unconscious voluntary action as 
instinctive, and assert that we performed it instinc- 
tively, without thinking about it. 

Instinctive Ideas. — Another bit of testimony is that 
the ideas that are most nearly instinctive ideas, conform- 



Forms of Action 155 

ing to the definition of an instinct in every respect, are 
those that have sometimes been called intuitive ideas. It 
would be perfectly appropriate to call them instinctive 
ideas, and the possession of them would never be sug- 
gested as indicating a lack of intelligence, but the ab- 
sence of them would. Hence it seems to be a necessary 
conclusion that the possession of well organized instincts 
is an indication of intelligence of a considerable degree of 
complexity. 

Origin of Instinctive Actions. — A third question con- 
cerns the method of origin of instinctive actions. One 
group of philosophers affirm that they originate as the 
result of habit in the ancestors, which brought about a 
modification of the nervous system, which was transmit- 
ted to the descendants, so that the instinctive center was 
organized in the descendants as the result of heredity, not 
as the result of individual experience. Instinct is thus 
described as inherited habit. 

Variation and Natural Selection. — The other theory 
asserts that the organization of the instinctive center was 
accomplished as the result of variation, modifying the 
organization in advantageous ways, and that the experi- 
ence of our ancesters had no share whatever in the organ- 
ization. The principle is that acquired characters cannot 
be inherited. The latter explanation is adopted by the 
larger number of psychologists, although it cannot be 
said to be positively demonstrated. 

DEFINITIONS. 

Reflex Action — The direct response of protoplasm to 
a stimulus. It is preceded and accompanied by no mental 
process. 

Automatic Action — A rhythmical, regular reflex ac- 
tion. No mental process precedes it. 



156 Functional Psychology 

Conscious Voluntary Action — One that is preceded by 
an idea. 

Unconscious Voluntary Action — An action whose mo- 
tivating idea is not attended by consciousness. 

Motive — The idea which precedes the conscious vol- 
untary action. 

Instinctive Action — An action whose ideational cen- 
ter is organized without experience, as the result of inher- 
ited organizing tendencies. 

Functional Selection — The process by which an ap- 
propriate and useful reflex is preserved out of a series of 
reflexes, most of which are useless and inappropriate. 



INDEX 



Action 14'6 

automatic 148 

instinctive 153 

reflex 146 

conscious voluntary 154 

unconscious voluntary 153 

iA-ctive attention 130 

Advantage of sleep 93 

of related circumstances. .108 
Advantageous expressions... 46 

Affective state 21 

Altruism 6Q 

Artistic accomplishment 33 

Attention 117 

positive 118 

negative 118 

spontaneous 122 

voluntary 123 

active 130 

passive 130 

and feeling 127, 53 

and intellect 127 

and consciousness 128 

and memory 130, 108 

and nervous energy 130 

and will 143 

Awareness '77 

Baby, movements of 149 

Benevolent feelings 70 

Brain center 49 

Central theory 38 

Centrally initiated impulses . . 27 

Children's feelings 31, 65 

Chronoscope 8 

Classification of feelings 62 

'Community preserving feel- 
ings 65 

Common theory 37 

Consumption 59 

Constant tone 59 

Chloroform 129, 87 

Conductivity of the synapse, 120 
Concomitants of current ele- 
ments 135 

Consciousness 76 

and mind 78 

and feeling 82 

and expression 82 

and intellect 84 



and skill 85 

and attention 87 

and habit 87 

and excessive resistance. . 87 
and decrease of nervous 

energy 87 

utility of 86 

variation in 8k 

'Courage 67 

Current elements 136 

Conscious voluntary act Ig4 

Delay at the synapses 18 

Delay, a condition of mental 

processes 18 

Divided repetition 114 

Dendritic movement 121 

Dreams 89, 96 

influence of 89 

vividness of 98 

peripheral direction of 99 

fantastic nature of 99 

elements of 9'9 

not prophetic 100 

Dream books 90 

Driving force 137 

Drunkard's red nose 141 

Dynamogenesis, law of, 126, 144 

Expression 35 

muscular 35 

glandular 36 

Expression of fear 44 

Expression and consciousness, 82 
Education and voluntary at- 
tention 123 

Effort in attention 123 

Egoism 66 

Elements of a current 134 

Epicureanism 57 

Estivation 92 

Feeling 20 

first law of 28 

second law of 29 

properties of 47 

number of 49 

transformation of 50 

specific character of 47 

localization of 49 

expression of 35 

intensity of 51 



remembered 52 

classification of 62 

self preserving 64 

community preserving. . . 65 

race perpetuating 70 

malevolent 68 

benevolent 70, 

vestigial 69 

religious 71 

esthetic 72 

pseudo-esthetic 73 

moral 67 

theories of 3 • 

James' 37 

common 37 

peripheral 38 

central 38 

resistance 24 

Feeling and habit 53 

and intellect 22, 28 

and expression 40 

and natural selection 63 

and will 133, 143 

Feeling of effort 123 

Fear 65 

expressions of 44 

Fear paralysis 45 

Fatigue 16 

Fringing cells 81 

Forgetting 110 

Functional selection 149 

Habit 3i 

effect on feelings 53 

effect on tone 55 

Hibernation 91 

Healing, mental 128 

Hysteria 127 

Idea 140 

Idea of result 151 

Indifference 32 

Inhibitions 45 

Immortality 89 

Instinctive ideas 155 

Instinctive action 153 

Interest 30 

James' theory 37 

arguments for 41 

Kubla Khan 101 

Laws of resistance 27 

of feeling 28, 29 

of dynamogenesis 126 

Localization of feelings 49 



of attention 119 

Memory 103 

and education 109 

and feeling Ill 

and consciousness 115 

in plants 113 

Mental reproduction 103 

recognition 105 

pain 56 

healing 128 

Monotony 32 

Mother love 71 

Motor reaction 15 

Motive 150 

Movement in attention 123 

Muscular expression 36 

Natural selection 74 

in feelings 63 

in sleep 91 

and attention 123 

and variation 155 

Natural classification 62 

Narcotic habits 142 

Nerve-muscle machine 148 

Nervo-motive force 138, 140 

New psychology 22 

Nocturnal sleep 91 

Pain 54 

origin of 56 

advantage of 58 

not universal 60 

and pleasure '58 

and unpleasantness 54 

Paralysis, fear •. . 65 

Peripheral theory of feel- 
ings 38 

Peripherally initiated im- 
pulses 27 

Practice 15 

Protoplasm 147 

Psychon 138 

Radiation 81 

Rate in a nerve 17 

in a brain center 17 

Reaction time 8 

variation of 14 

Recognition 105 

Reproduction 105 

Retention 104 

Remembering 107 

Reflex movement 146 

Reflexes, kinds of 147 



Remembered feelings 52 

Retroactive inhibition 114 

Resistance 16 

cause of 25 

meaning of 25 

effect of 18 

laws of 26, 27 

two factors in , . 26 

Resistance theory 24 

Secondary reflex 152 

Selection, natural,63,91,123,155,74 

functional 149 

S'ensibilities 21 

Sensory reaction 15 

Sigma 14 

Sleep 89 

advantage of 93 

primary condition of 94 

blood supply 95 

diminished oxygen 95 

peripheral impulses 96 

food 95 



starvation 96 

variation in depth 96 

and consciousness 93 

Sleep curve 9ti 

Somnambulism 102 

Spontaneous atention 122 

Starvation 142 

Unpleasantness 54 

Useful expressions 44 

Tone 54 

Unconsciousness 77 

Unconscious voluntary act... 153 

Variation 156 

Vividness of dreams 98 

Will 138 

definition of 14* 

and attention 143 

and idea 134 

and feelings 133, 143 

and intellect 144 

Worry 127 

Wundt 22 



NCTIONAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 




NATHAN A. HARVEY 

STATE NORMAL COLLEGE 
YPSILANT?, MICHIGAN 



